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Abstract 
Holders of rights sue ISPs for copyright and trademark infringement: 
specifically, for contributory liability through the ISP’s knowledge of user 
infringement. Knowledge about user infringement has been prevalently 
recognised as a crucial element of ISPs’ secondary liability, but the approaches 
concerning the knowledge standard are different in US copyright case law 
(traditional tort), the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the US Lanham 
Act, US trademark case law, and the EU Electronic Commerce Directive. 
Their differences have posed questions on the efficacy of the current 
knowledge standards and case law interpretations to omit legal ambiguities and 
offer appropriate guidance for tackling issues.  
This research presents that the US knowledge standards and the ECD 
knowledge standard apply broad knowledge standards to evaluate ISPs’ 
knowledge but they differ in terms of their elements and conditions for 
permitting ISPs and copyright holders to co-exist and combat copyright 
infringement. US copyright case law, the InWood knowledge standard, and the 
EU knowledge standard are deficient in terms of offering a suitable notice and 
take-down regime to reduce the duties of ISPs and to tackle the high risk of an 
ISP being held liable without knowledge. This is in contrast to the DMCA, 
which is free from such legal concerns because of its specified notice and take-
down regime.  
Consequently, to fulfil the aims of this research, the following 
recommendations are made: the US copyright knowledge standard should 
preserve the broad knowledge standard of the DMCA, subject to implementing 
a compulsory notice and take-down regime, establishing a special body 
regarding the notification in section 512, and designing technical criteria for 
the ‘red flag’ test. In addition, it is recommended that the Lanham Act codify 
the InWood knowledge standard and the DMCA’s notice and take-down 
procedures. Besides, it is recommended that the ECD establish a notice and 
take-down regime similar to that applied by the US DMCA (subject to the 
above amendments). 
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CHAPTER I: Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
Infringement of copyright and trademark by internet users, without the right 
holder’s consents, have a considerable effect on society, from the point of view 
of internal markets, the economy, public health and fair competition, as well as 
of freedom of expression and other related fields
1
. Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs)
2
, as providers of facilities for direct infringers(users), of copyright and 
trademark have been sued massively by copyright and trademark right holders, 
because of the difficulties associated with linking such infringement with an 
individual or a specific state. Furthermore, it is more cost effective for 
copyright and trademark right holders to seek remedy from ISPs, than from all 
                                                          
1
 See WIPO Study; Lillian Edwards, Role and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the 
field of copyright and related rights;<http://www.wipo.int/copyright/./role_and_responsibility> 
accessed 10 September 2013; Ambassador Ronald Kirk, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative(2012)2012Special301Report)<http://www.ustr.gov.Report_0.pdf>accessed 
13September 2013; IFPI Digital Music Report 2013 <http://www.ifpi.org/content2013.pdf>, 
accessed 10 September 2013; See, European Commission on Digital Agenda for Europe 
Scoreboard 2012 regarding the attention of the European Commission on Role of ISP in and 
EU Economy <ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/.PDF>accessed10 September 2013. Over the past 
ten years, the potential liability of online service providers for third parties has increased; 
Béatrice Martinet Farano ‘Internet Intermediaries’ Liability for Copyright and Trademark 
Infringement: Reconciling the EU and U.S. Approaches’ (2012) TTLF Working Papers No. 
14/2012 http://www.law.stanford.edu accessed10 September 2013: Besides, value of 
counterfeiting and piracy would equal USD 200 to 250 billion annually, BASCAP Report 
(Online Piracy alone: between 30 and 75 billion annually), and IAC (International Anti-
Counterfeiting Report), The truth about counterfeiting according TTLF Working Papers No. 
14/2012; Béatrice Martinet Farano < http://www.law.stanford.edu/> accessed 10 September 
2013; See also OECD Study, ‘The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy’; 
<http://www.oecd.org/.pdf‎> accessed 10 September 2013; In the United States, 17.53% of 
Internet traffic was estimated to be infringing, copyright piracy would account for almost 25% 
of the global internet traffic, according to ‘Technical Report: An Estimate of Infringing Use of 
the Internet’, January 2011<http:// documents.envisional.com/docs.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2013; Michael G. Noblett, Mark M. Pollitt and Lawrence A. Presley, ‘Recovering 
and Examining Computer Forensic Evidence’, (Forensic Science Communications, 2(4) 
2000).<http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/fo.htm> accessed 2 July 2011; ‘See also’ Perset, K 
‘The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries’(2010) OECD Digital Economy 
Papers, No. 171, OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/5kmh79zzs8vb-en 
2
 Internet Service Provider is the term commonly used to describe a company that provides 
internet access or a related service. It is named differently in the USA, for instance. A service 
provider is defined broadly in 17 U.S.C.S 512(k), and in the EU Electronic Commerce 
Directive the term intermediary service provider in information society service is used. In this 
thesis, ISP will be used for services that provide an access service, hosting service, caching, 
mere conduit, information location tools, search engines and other online intermediary 
services; for categories of ISP and the same definition, see Broder Kleinschmidt, ‘International 
Comparison of ISPs’ Liabilities for Unlawful Third Party Content’ (2010) 18(4) International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology, Oxford University Press 333-334. 
  
 2 
 
of the individuals. This approach has had an impact on copyright legislation, as 
manifested by the Recital 59 (the European Information Society Directive 
2001/29/EC) that; “In the digital environment, in particular, the services of 
intermediaries may increasingly be used by third parties for infringing 
activities. In many cases such intermediaries  are the best place to an end, 
therefore, the right holders should have the possibility of applying for an 
injunction against an intermediary who carries a third party's infringement of a 
protected work or other subject-matter in a network’’3.   
Therefore, ISP secondary liability has become a complex issue, and there has 
been a recognition of the need for striking a balance between the copyright and 
trademark right holders’ rights to protection and the protection of the ISP. It 
has been argued that there are inequities, in that the ISP could be forced to 
police the issues of copyright and trademark, having to take any possible 
technical measures to identify all infringements caused by the material flowing 
through their system, to escape from the liability
4
. On the other hand, users and 
the public have defended the concept of an open internet and untrammeled 
access to the widest possible range of goods and content online, resisting the 
removal of content or services on the grounds of suspected infringement.  
                                                          
3
(59) “…this possibility should be available even where the acts carried out by the 
intermediary are exempted under Article 5. The conditions and modalities relating to such 
injunctions should be left to the national law of the Member States”, (Directive 2001/29/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society). In the first case regarding 
ISPs’ liability - Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena - the court held that a Bulletin Board System 
(BBS) operator was directly liable for distributing infringing photographs uploaded and 
downloaded by their users. Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
4
 While doing such duty can lead to violation of other rights, and technically seems impossible 
and against the public interest; William C. Harrison, ‘Filtering The Internet to Prevent 
Copyright Infringement: ISP Safe Harbors and Secondary Liability in the US and France’, 
(2010) 35(2) New Mater<http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/filtering/> accessed 14 
November 2012; Cf. Sylvie Nérisson and Rita Matulionytė, ‘The French Route to an ISP Safe 
Harbour, Compared to German and US Ways’, (2011) 42(1), IIC - International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 55; Because it is impractical for ISPs to obtain 
knowledge about users’ copyright infringement or to identify contents that are infringing 
copyright without a proper notice and take-down procedure; see also Damon Chetson, ‘Perfect 
10 and Contributory Liability: Can Search Engines Survive?’(2007) (9) North Carolina 
Journal of Law & Technology <http://ncjolt.org/category/articles/volume-09/volume-9-online-
edition> aaccessed 6 December 2011. 
 
 3 
 
This approach has had an impact on the law in relation to copyright and 
trademark secondary liability for ISPs in the EU Electronic Commerce 
Directive (articles 12,13, 14 and 15 ECD and on US case law and US 
legislations;s.512DMCA, InWood case, and contributory liability cases)
5
. The 
gist of this impact has been that ISPs be sheltered from knowledge-based 
liability until such a time as they become aware of illegal content, activities or 
services, and then fail to exercise control by removing or disabling access to 
such content. In this regard, although ISP liability based on knowledge for 
copyright and trademark is a fair approach, that protects all parties’ rights, it 
has legislative shortcomings:  
The US Copyright Contributory Case Law Knowledge Standard
6
 widely 
applies the “reasonable man test” criterion instead of adopting a technical 
                                                          
5
 Where the court faced the question of secondary liability, rather than primary liability, of the 
provider, See Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp. 354 F3d 1020, 
1024 (9
th
 Cir. 2004). The evolution of secondary liability has been based on case law, as can 
be demonstrated in RTC v. Netcom, where the court did not impose a direct infringement on 
the ISP. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services Inc., 907 
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). It has also been commented that “Developing countries also 
should evolve a policy of fault-based liability, as this is economically more feasible and also 
would not affect the rights of citizens”. Nehaluddin Ahmad, ‘Computer and Internet 
intermediary liability: a comparative overview’ (2011) 4, Telecommunications Law 
Review109. Oliver Koster and Uwe Jurgens, ‘Liability for Links in Germany, Liability of 
Information Technology Location Tools under German Law after the Implementation of the 
European Directive on E-Commerce’, Hans Bredow Institute Working Paper / 14. An ISP can 
be held liable when knowledge of user infringement or awareness of the infringement exists 
and the ISP does not react upon receipt of the knowledge; Mary E. Resenberger, David W. 
Sussman and Rebecca Silberberg, ‘When is a Service Provider Liable for Inducement Under 
Grokster?’ (2010) 22 Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal 6; See also 
<http://www.bitlaw.com/internet /linking.html> accessed 13 November 2011.In re Aimster 
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003);A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios Inc [1984] 464 
U.S. 417 Supp. 1984[37]; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd [2005] 545 U.S. 
913, 125 S.Ct.  And also, Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC [2004] 340 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1100-01 
(C.D.Cal. 2004); See also’William Landes and Douglas Lichtman,’Indirect Liability for 
Copyright Infringement: Napster and Beyond’ (2003)17(2) The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 113-124; In the US, knowledge standards for ISPs’ copyright liability can be 
divided into: knowledge standards based on copyright case law according to the contributory 
liability of tort, which is applicable when there are no DMCA terms, and knowledge standards 
based on Section 512 of the DMCA. 
6
 It is applicable when the ISP does not meet the section 512 elements according to 512 (c) 
(3)(B)(i)); US copyright case law limited the scope of the tort contributory knowledge 
requirement for imposing secondary liability on an ISP for copyright infringement by 
replacing mere knowledge of infringement to knowledge of non-infringement use (Sony rule), 
attention on ISPs’ inducement role to proof ISP knowledge of user infringement (Grokster) 
and requiring specific knowledge (Perfect 10) but evaluating ISP knowledge still ties with  
reasonable man mind test criteria (probabilistic knowledge, rather than requiring the right 
holder’s cooperation through a specific approach) and the wide application of the negligent. 
 4 
 
criterion and approach,
7
 to evaluate the ISPs’ knowledge of copyright 
infringement. Besides, the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Section 512 
c(3)
8
 notice and take-down procedure elements
 9
 (for establishing actual 
knowledge) has legal ambiguities regarding the representative list (s.512 c (3) 
(ii), duration of put back, and expeditious removal of content (512(c (1) c))). 
These weaknesses create fear of liability. Moreover, objective knowledge 
standard s. 512 c (1) (A) (ii) and 512(d) (1) (3) (Awareness of Facts or 
Circumstances from which the Infringing Activity Appears) does not have any 
explicit criteria for ISP to assist ISP from being held liable when infringement 
is lees apparent
10
. Besides, DMCA Red Flag Test as a technical test
11
 allows 
                                                          
7
 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios; MGM v. Grokster; Hendrickson v. eBay; and 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., Other case law in the US that is related 
to the contributory theory can be found in the Napster case; the Aimster case; the Grokster 
case; IO Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc.; NCR Corp. v. Korala Assocs. Ltd, 512 F.3d 807, at 
816 (6
th
 Cir. 2008); Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Arts Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 
1159.1166 (2d Cir. 1971). See Alfred C. Yen, ‘Third Party Copyright Liability after Grokster’ 
(2006) Information and Communications Technology Law <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu> 
accessed 4 December 2011. 
8
 Section 512 of the DMCA positively includes “a broad knowledge standard” for ISP 
copyright liability, along with other requirements, i.e. financial benefits, the right and ability to 
control, drawn from vicarious liability, and ISP duties to “take down” offending items based 
on the copyright owner’s notice (512(c) (3) (A) (I-VI)) or being “aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent”, according to s.512(c) (1) (A) (ii), as 
a prerequisite to ISP copyright liability. Section 512(c): “Under the knowledge standard, a 
service provider is eligible for the limitation on liability only if it does not have actual 
knowledge of the infringement, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent, or upon gaining such knowledge or awareness, and responds expeditiously 
to take the material down or block access to it”. 
9
 In this regard, s.512 requires ISP to design a “notice and take-down” procedure (s.512 (i) (1) 
(a) and s.512 (i) (1) (b)), in order to determine whether an ISP has gained the requisite level of 
knowledge of the infringing activity and examine ISP actual knowledge to benefit from 
immunity (s512(c) (3) (A)); In Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1335 (C.D. Cal. 2001) the court “considered the copyright holder’s failure to satisfy 
the requirements of a proper notification by identifying material as insufficient to trigger an 
ISP’s duty to act”. See: Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103; See also 
Craig W. Walker, ‘Application of the DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions to Search Engines’ 
(2004) 9(2) Virginia Journal of Law & Technology, University of Virginia 
<http://www.vjolt.net> accessed 21 February 2012. 
10
 The point is that, in the ‘red flag’ test, the legislation intends to release the ISP from liability 
when the infringements are less apparent to the ISP, and it had put sufficient or proper 
technical measures in place. In this part, the question is whether the constructive knowledge 
standard prevents infringement but may affect privacy or may lead to a monitoring industry. 
Therefore, different knowledge standards exist in trademark and copyright law in the US. This 
is in contrast to the EU, where there are not different standards. 
11
 The court did not use the awareness and ‘red flag’ test; instead, it used constructive 
knowledge for evaluating the ISP’s liability and the Ninth Circuit Court found that Napster, by 
 5 
 
the court to evaluate ISP objective knowledge by constructive knowledge (as 
probabilistic knowledge as the court applied in the ALS Scan v. RemarQ 
Communities, Inc
12
 case).  
Similarly, the Lanham Act, Article 32
13
 and InWood knowledge standard 
(InWood Laboratories Inc. v. Ives Laboratories Inc)
14
, as the main basis for 
the knowledge standard for trademark infringement in term of a specific legal 
mechanism for parties’ cooperation with the ISP in reaching the level of 
knowledge, has legal uncertainty.  
                                                                                                                                                        
its conduct, had performed both actual and constructive knowledge infringement, and had 
knowingly encouraged as well as assisted in the infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright. This 
concerned the first generation of file sharing systems. Napster had designed and operated a 
free software program that permitted the transmission and sharing of sound recordings 
employing digital technology. In this case, the use of Napster’s system by users who uploaded 
and downloaded copyrighted music was qualified by Napster as fair use, but the court rejected 
this argument and the Ninth Circuit noted that, traditionally, “one who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of 
another, may be held liable as a contributory infringer”. The Ninth Circuit found that Napster, 
by its conduct, had both actual and constructive knowledge of direct infringement and had 
knowingly encouraged, as well as assisted, in the infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright. 
12
 [2001] 39 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001); NCR Corp. v. Korala Assocs. Ltd 512 F.3d 807, at 816 
(6
th
 Cir. 2008); A&M Records v. Napster the court accepted constructive knowledge as the 
ISP’s liability; Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services 
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.Cal.1995). 
13
 The Lanham Act only codifies, in 32(2) (a) and (b), some general provisions for immunity 
of a trademark infringer, although not specifically for ISPs. Immunity in the Lanham Act 
depends on the proof of lack of knowledge, even though knowledge of infringement has not 
been defined in the 32(2) (a) and (b) provisions, and the onus is more on the innocent infringer 
or innocent violator; Jane Coleman, ‘Contributory Trademark Infringement: A Contributory 
LiabilityDoctrine:TheInWoodStandard’(2011)<http://www.secondarytrademarkinfringement.c
om> accessed 28 November 2011. 
14
 456 US 844, 845 (1982); It should be noted that the court, in the case of William R Warner 
& Co v. Eli Lilly & Co. 265 US 526 (1924), had already recognised the contributory liability 
on trademark infringement, but its validity was questioned in federal law; In Transdermal 
Products Inc. v. Performance Contract Packing Inc., 943 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1996), it was 
noted that the case of InWood Laboratories “merely confirmed the continued validity of 
contributory infringement under the federal statutory law”.  According to the InWood standard, 
contributory liability will be satisfied by the plaintiff proving the ISP did the following: “1. 
intentionally induce[d] another to infringe his trademark, or 2. Continue[d] to supply its 
product to one whom it knows or it had reason to know [was] engaging in trademark 
infringement”; The InWood case knowledge standard has been developed and elaborated by 
case law, such as Tiffany v. eBay 600 F. 3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010); Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry 
Auction Inc., 76 F. 3d 259, 264-265 (9
th
 Cir. 1994) “InWood… laid down no limiting principle 
that would require the defendant to be a manufacturer or distributor.” Furthermore, the court in 
Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services Inc., 955 F. 2d 1143, 1149 (7
th
 Cir. 
1992) concluded that “[the] InWood test extends to landlords and licensors”. 
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The European E-commerce Directive (ECD) Article 14(1) has a broad 
knowledge standard
15
, but an absence of notice and take-down procedures in 
articles 13(1)
 16
 (e) 14(1) (b) (a) (b) Directive 2000/31 is a legal obstacle that 
poses questions on the coordination of the ECD knowledge standard with ISP 
function. Divergence of interpretation regarding ISP “passive, technical and 
neutral” work (Recital 42)17and scope of host service are another legal concern 
due to application of ‘’reasonable man test’’ for interpreting. On the other 
hand, using constructive knowledge (the ‘reasonable man’ test and 
probabilistic knowledge)
18
for assessing “awareness” of facts or circumstances, 
and the term “apparent” in article (14(1) (b) , raises questions in relation to 
imposing irrelevant and impossible duties on ISPs, and there are the same 
questions regarding Article 15(2)
 19
.  
                                                          
15
 It is with a horizontal approach to dealing with all areas of e-commerce law, such as 
copyright infringement, defamation, trademark, and privacy. The reason behind the use of the 
term ‘horizontal’ refers to the Directive’s aims: unlike the DMCA, (which only aims to 
provide a balance between copyright and ISPs), the ECD has further purposes, such as 
enhancing electronic commerce by ensuring the free movement of the information society. 
This is attested in Recital 40 of the ECD: “both existing and emerging disparities in Member 
States’ legislation and case law concerning liability of service providers acting as 
intermediaries prevent the functioning of the internal market, in particular by impairing the 
development of cross-border services and producing distortions of competition”. 
16
 “The requirement of taking down content upon receiving ‘actual knowledge’ is much too 
heavy a burden for intermediaries. Such a requirement forces the intermediary to make 
decisions, rather than the appropriate authority (which often is the judiciary)” Ahmad (n5) 
111.Sophie Stalla Bourdillon, ‘Should Search Engines Begin To Worry?’ (2011)6(1) Journal 
of International Commercial Law and Technology <http://www.jiclt.com> accessed 2 January 
2012; Miquel Peguera, ‘Internet Service Providers’ Liability in Spain: Recent Case Law and 
Future Perspectives’ (2010) 1 Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-
Commerce Law 151  
17
 Paul P. Polanski, ‘Technical, Automatic and Passive: Liability of Search Engines for 
Hosting Infringing Content in the Light of the Google Ruling’ (2011)6(1) Journal of 
International Commercial Law and Technology 42; Thibault Verbiest, Gerald Spindler, 
Giovanni M. Riccio and Aurélie van der Perre, ‘Study on the Liability of Internet 
Intermediaries’ (2007) <http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu> accessed 20 June 2012. 
18
 See, Rosa Juha-Barcelo and Kamiel J. Koelman, ‘Intermediary Liability in the E-Commerce 
Directive: So far So Good, But It's Not Enough’ (2000-2004) Computer Law & Security 
Report 231-239. <http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/koelman/notenough.html> accessed 17 
February 2011. 
19
 There is concern that these constructive knowledge requirements may thus cause the growth 
of filtering and censorship by the expeditious onus to remove, and lack of definition of the 
apparent infringement, and the possibility of issues imposing the duty to prevent, based on 
article 15 and Rec 16 and 59; See the legal conflict about injunction in Article 15(2) and the 
legal issues relating to the legal interpretation of Directives 2000/31, 2001/29 and 2004/48 and 
with Articles 17 (2) and 47 of the Charter, where Promusicae submitted that the Member 
 7 
 
1.2 Research Aims and Questions  
Based on the aforementioned legal shortcomings in the US legislation and 
Electronic Commerce Directive, regarding the ISP knowledge standard for 
copyright and trademark infringement, the effectiveness of current knowledge 
based liability is open to question due to the divergence of criteria and legal 
uncertainties, in terms of the appropriate legal approach to assessing ISP 
knowledge and obtaining knowledge about user infringement. For instance, 
US law (both trademark and copyright) is based on the “reasonable man test”, 
and its notice and takes -down procedure elements are also linked to the 
‘’reasonable man test criterion’’. In EU Member States, the use of the 
“reasonable man test” to assess knowledge of user infringement in respect to 
copyright and trade mark is associated with the absence of, or divergence form 
of notice and take -down procedures which is stemming from the Electronic 
Commerce Directive because it leaved it to EU members to implement these 
notice and take down procedures in their national law. For instance, Germany 
and The Netherlands do not have formal procedures for notification to obtain 
knowledge about user infringement, and their criteria are based substantially 
on ”should know, or have reason to know”, ‘’with the “reasonable man test”. 
Other Member States have not established formal notice and take down 
procedures, but notification is mandatory in their statutes, (in the UK, for 
instance).  
Therefore, this research aims to tackle these divergences and legal uncertainty 
in criteria and approach of ISP knowledge standard in the US DMCA, the 
Lanham Act and the EU Electronic Commerce Directive in order to protect 
ISPs from liability without knowledge, and protect copyright and trademark 
holders and the public at the same time. To meet this objective, the following 
research question is proposed, regarding the knowledge standard in US 
copyright case law, DMCA and the Lanham Act, and the InWood knowledge 
standard, and the European Electronic Commerce Directive: Whether current 
provisions and case law interpretations are able to afford the legal integration 
                                                                                                                                                        
States, according to the purpose of those directives, must interpret Article 12 of the LSSI in 
accordance with those provisions. See chapter 4 
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regarding criteria and approaches to ISP knowledge standards, to shield ISP 
and other parties’ rights. In line with this, the research in the light of main 
question attempts to find that, ISP knowledge based liability through what 
legal approach can reduce risk of imposing secondary liability without 
knowledge to ISP and strike a balance between protection of copyright and 
trademark holder right and the protection of ISP.  
1.4 Scope, Limitations, Research Methodology and Hypothesis  
This thesis focuses on knowledge standards for ISPs’ secondary liability for 
copyright and trademark infringement
20
 because of impact of online copyright 
and trademark infringement in the internal market, and other aspects of human 
life and impact of ISP liability without knowledge in ISP industry and online 
information society service.
21
 At the same time, it applies and borrows case 
law from other relevant areas of law, such as privacy and defamation, in order 
to find better answers to the research questions and research aims. 
This research is a comparative legal analysis of knowledge standards in the US 
(copyright case law, tort, contributory liability, the DMCA, the Lanham Act 
and case law from elsewhere) and the EU (the E-Commerce Directive and the 
Trade Marks Directive). The research also investigates other developments in 
relation to knowledge standards for ISPs’ secondary liability for copyright and 
trademark infringement, in the context of other jurisdictions. The US was 
selected for comparison with the European E-commerce Directive because the 
examination of ISP liability starts with American law and cases. The US 
position is very central to the subject of ISP liability, due to the fact that most 
literature and cases relating to ISP liability are from the US. Moreover,  the EU 
                                                          
20
 This research does not examine direct copyright and trademark infringement at the level of 
IP policy, regulations or instruments, because these are already assumed to be prerequisites for 
secondary liability. 
21
 See this chapter p1(n1) and case law that this research applied in other chapters; 
‘see also’ Regarding the impact of ambiguities of the current knowledge standard on the ISP 
industry and necessity of an evaluation in light of the contradictory approaches in different 
jurisdictions concerning the ISP liability; see also, Yiman Zhangt, ‘Establishing Secondary 
Liability with A Higher Degree of Culpability: Redefining Chinese Internet Copyright Law to 
Encourage Technology Development’ (2007) 16 (I) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
Association; Eddy D. Ventose and Javier J. Forrester, ‘Authorization and Infringement of 
Copyright on the Internet’(2010)JIL.  
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experience as the largest internet usage in the world with significant law cases 
in the light of advantages and drawback of the ECD knowledge requirement 
(with horizontal approach) can assist the US ISP knowledge standard  to find 
an appropriate approach toward smoothing  function of ISP and combat the 
trademark and copyright infringement. 
Hypothesis of this research is that; according to the aforementioned legislation 
shortcomings, knowledge based liability immunity regarding ISP secondary 
liability for copyright and trademark infringement requires a proposal for 
reform in term of criteria for interpreting the ISP knowledge and notice and 
take-down procedures. 
This study does not discuss the effects of protection (i.e. the remedies and 
punishments available for ISPs). Also, this research does not more delving into 
the process of the enactment of the relevant laws. 
This study is limited to library research, and so no fieldwork (and related 
methodology) is attempted. The technique of this research is based on both 
primary and secondary data. The primary data of this research include statutes, 
regulations and cases. Secondary data consist of various references, including 
books, a number of reports (formal and informal, national and international), 
and the notes of law lecturers, journals and databases.  
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The thesis comprises six chapters, as follows: 
1.5.1 Chapter I: Introduction  
This chapter provides an outline of the argument, identification of the research 
questions, the research limitations and organization of the thesis. 
1.5.2 Chapter II: Knowledge Standard Approach, Theory and 
Epistemology 
This chapter starts with an explanation of the rationale and concept of 
secondary liability for third-party infringement. Then, the application of the 
 10 
 
approach and principle of liability (fault theory, negligence and intentional 
tort)
 22
 on ISPs, regarding copyright and trademarks, is described. At the same 
time, the rationale of the limited liability of ISPs regarding copyright and 
trademarks, and the epistemology of knowledge, are elaborated
23
. Finally, the 
chapter is linked to the subsequent chapter for an examination of current case 
law and provisions for knowledge standards in the US. 
1.5.3 Chapter III: Analysis of the Knowledge Standards for ISPs’ 
Secondary Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement in the 
US 
Firstly, this chapter provides observations on the legal interpretations of 
knowledge standards in the light of copyright contributory liability in US 
copyright case law, in cases such as Netcom
24
, Napster
25
, Playboy
26
, Sony
27
, 
Grokster
28
, Perfect 10
29
 and other related cases. Following this, the chapter 
focuses on the broad knowledge standard (actual knowledge, awareness) of 
section 512DMCA, notice and take down procedures, the “red flag” test and 
case law interpretations. Secondly, this chapter focuses on knowledge 
standards for ISP trademarks in both case law and the Lanham Act and 
InWood knowledge standard, and their interpretations through related cases; 
such as eBay and other law cases such as Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.,
30
 
Google Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.,
31
 Tiffany (NJ), Inc. 
                                                          
22
 Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (Oxford University Press, 
2008)54; See also Hassan. Badinee, ‘Target of civil liability’ (2006) 6(1) Law Quarterly – 
Journal of Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran 78. 
23
 Ghajar Ghioloo, Syamak, Civil Liability of On-Line Data Bank Services (Nika Publishers, 
2007)303,305, 308-321. 
24
 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services Inc.,907 F. 
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
25
 A & M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004, 1013 n. 2 (9
th
 Cir. 2001) 
26
 Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp. 354 F3d 1020, 1024 (9
th
 Cir. 
2004) 
27
 Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios Inc [1984] 464 U.S. 417 Supp. 1984[37]  
28
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd [2005] 545 U.S. 913, 125 S.Ct. 
29
 This case identifies the statute of constructive knowledge as a duty to prevent copyright 
material from infringement, even by filtering search results. 
30
 562 F. 3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). 
31
 No. 03-cv-05340 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007). 
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v. eBay, Inc.
32
, and 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.
33
. The chapter 
concludes with an appraisal of the US knowledge standard, and consideration 
of the research question of the thesis.  
1.5.4 Chapter IV: Analysis of the Knowledge Standard for ISPs’ 
Secondary Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement in the 
EU E-Commerce Directive 
This chapter considers the research question in the context of the ECD and 
related case law
34
. The knowledge standard of ISPs for both copyright and 
trademarks, based on the horizontal approach of the ECD, is further examined. 
In this regard, the standard level for knowledge in the ECD’s provisions and 
the legalities regarding notice and take-down procedures
35
 in this directive are 
appraised in depth.  
Subsequently, the legal conflicts in developing constructive knowledge (in 
Articles 5, 12, 14, 15, and 21(2) of the ECD) are illustrated. Alongside this, in 
order to answer the research question, the flaws of constructive knowledge are 
highlighted. On the other hand, the ability of the constructive knowledge 
requirements in the ECD to strike a balance between the rights of copyright 
holders and the ISP industry’s development is examined in the light of existing 
case law. This discussion also presents the disadvantages of the lack of a 
technical test.  
1.5.5 Chapter V: A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of Knowledge 
Standards in the US and the EU 
This chapter focuses on the similarities and differences between the US and 
EU knowledge standards for ISPs’ secondary liability for copyright and 
trademark infringement, in the light of the research question and the objectives 
                                                          
32
 576 F. Supp. 2d at 505-506 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 
33
 414 F. 3d 400 (2d Cir. June 27, 2005). 
34
 Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France v. Louis Vuitton 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex 
LEXIS 119. 
35
 Subsequently, the legal uncertainties regarding notice and take-down procedures, such as the 
duration and taking down of alleged infringing materials, are explored. 
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of the research. There is also an evaluation of the standards in terms of their 
weaknesses and strengths, in order to find better solutions and to understand 
the implications of the different approaches. 
1.5.6 Chapter VI: Summary and Conclusion 
The thesis is summarised and concluded, with some recommendations 
provided with respect to the knowledge standards for ISPs’ secondary liability 
for copyright and trademark infringement in both the EU and the US, so as to 
fulfill the research aims. 
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      Chapter II: Knowledge Standard Approach, Theory and Epistemology 
2.1Knowledge Standard Approach in Secondary Liability 
Firstly, it is worth noting that ISP‘s actions can be considered as primary 
liability (direct infringement) and secondary liability (indirect infringement). 
ISP primary liability arises from ISP‘s direct infringements of copyright and 
trademark as opposed to an action of another party. For instance, if Google 
directly makes copies without the authorization of a rights owner, this would 
be considered primary liability. 
In contrast to direct infringement and primary liability, right holders are 
entitled to sue ISP’s for indirect infringement when it does not independently 
commit the infringement but it provides service for a user to materially 
contribute to, facilitate, or induces to commit all of the acts necessary to 
infringe a copyright or trademark. For example, an ISP hosting service when it 
is used for selling counterfeit goods or for selling goods that infringement on a 
trademark. In such situation if an ISP after receiving a proper notification from 
the trademark holder, does not remove or block access to such service, the 
right holder will be entitled to sue the ISP for secondary liability or 
contributory liability.  
It is noteworthy that ISP liability has been recognized as limited liability, not 
strict liability owing to ISP functions (i.e. they are neutral and without 
investigation, and no monitoring data). Therefore, secondary liability of ISP 
has been limited to the time which ISP has knowledge about user 
infringement. Knowledge is an important element of secondary liability in 
light of contributory liability. It is also worth clarifying that knowledge for ISP 
primary liability is not question. This is because it has been assumed that direct 
infringer is doing infringement with knowledge. In line with the above, ISP 
knowledge on user infringement attached to secondary liability on ISP conduct 
is widely based on the “reasonable man mind” in which causes divergence in 
interpretation. This would be further discussed in this chapter.  
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Concerning knowledge requirement in the secondary liability, secondary 
liability can be categorised into secondary liability based on strict liability and 
secondary liability based on fault (limited liability).   
2.1.1 Strict Liability as Secondary Liability for ISPs for Copyright and 
Trademark Infringement 
 Strict liability is not dependent on knowledge of infringement and it is no-
fault liability that enforces strict liability on the ISP. Proponents of strict 
liability believe that the impossibility of proof of fault mostly leads to real 
infringers escaping liability; therefore, liability should be strict to avoid this. 
For this reason, strict liability is considered to be in line with justice. However, 
it seems that although strict liability has some advantages, it solely considers 
the concept of tort (liability) in terms of compensation, instead of paying 
attention to all elements or acknowledging other tort aims such as deterrence, 
prevention, and duty of care. Consequently, through such an approach, strict 
liability is unable to assist secondary liability to work as a mechanism for 
deterrence, prevention, and duty of care. Strict liability causes the duty of care 
to be reduced and the concept of negligence to be decreased, as the duty of 
care does not have any effect on the infringer’s liability36.  
Others believe that strict liability leads to reduce damage because it 
encourages directors to take more care in employing the best employees and 
providing services that put more attention on the users and prevent damage. 
While this may be appropriate for labour cases, it is not relevant for ISPs as 
they do not have any control over users’ actions when they are working as 
distributors. Moreover, evaluating an ISP’s knowledge of infringement based 
on a ‘but for’ standard of tort37 for causality would be almost boundless and 
the ISP liable would be held without knowledge. This is not in accordance 
                                                          
36
 Badinie (n22)72; Vedder, Anton, ‘Accountability of Internet Access and Service Providers 
- Strict liability Entering Ethics?’ (2001) 3( 1) ABI/INFORM Global; Ethics and Information 
Technology68-69 
37
 Legally, the general meaning of tort has certain similarities to its legal concepts: “the law of 
tort… is the law of civil liability for wrongfully-inflicted injury, or at least a very large part of 
it. (Breach of contract and breach of trust are perhaps the two most important civil wrongs.)” 
Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (2008 Oxford University 
Press) 1. 
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with moral and justice rules38 because liability without fault breaches social 
justice and restricts ISPs’ services to society. 
2.1.2 Limited Liability as Secondary Liability for ISPs’ Copyright and 
Trademark Infringement 
In contrast with strict liability, limited liability is based on fault. In terms of 
secondary liability, it is more focused on the indirect infringer’s knowledge of 
the user’s infringement and the negligence of indirect infringer to provide a 
duty of care. It is worth mentioning that ISPs’ liability has been more 
frequently recognised as indirect liability because of the fact that ISPs do not 
perform in the same way as a person who intends to promote his/her intent or 
interest by infringing copyright or trademarks directly39. In sum, implementing 
the concept of limited liability based on knowledge about the direct infringer 
seems in harmony with the development of the ISP industry, as is highlighted 
further in the coming chapters. 
 Limited liability regarding the ISP liability can be divided into primary and 
secondary liability. It has also been categorised into vicarious liability, 
inducement liability, and contributory liability. After the case of MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd, inducement liability as a new type of secondary 
liability for copyright infringement appeared among scholarly discussions.  
Among these classifications, contributory liability and inducement require 
knowledge (unlike vicarious liability) in order to impose secondary liability
40
. 
2.1.2.1Vicarious Liability 
Vicarious liability, as in the case of indirect infringement, makes the superior 
responsible for the acts of their subordinates41. It refers to the enterprises 
                                                          
38
 F.H. Lawson, Alexander E. Anton and L.N. Brown, Amos and Walton’s Introduction to 
French Law (1967 Ed 3, Clarendon Press) 203; Seyed Mortaza. Qasemzadeh, the Foundation 
of Tort (2008 Mizan Publications) 146. In this regard Oliver W. Holmes also states that 
rejection of strict liability is more than an affirmative case for negligence (which he refers to 
as a ‘criminalist’ theory). 
39
 John G. Fleming, the Law of Torts (1998LBC Information Service) 149. 
40
 Secondary liability for ISPs’ copyright liability is also called ‘secondary copyright liability’ 
and ‘third-party copyright liability’ in the US. In civil law countries such as Germany and 
China, it is known as ‘joint tort copyright liability’. 
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doctrine in common law, in which the courts state that employers should be 
liable for the infringing acts of their employees under the traditional master-
servant principle. Evidence of this claim can be found in M. Witmark & Sons 
v. Calloway42; Shapiro, Bernstein and Co. v. H.L. Green Co43; and Gershwin 
Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc44. The vicarious 
liability elements would be fulfilled when the ISP has the ability to control or 
supervise and direct financial interest from infringement45. Unlike contributory 
and inducement liabilities, vicarious liability does not focus on knowledge 
about direct conduct. 
2.1.2.2 Contributory Liability  
Contributory liability has been developed in the wide area of intellectual 
property rights, mostly in copyright and trademarks46. Its key elements are 
material contributions and knowledge about the act itself. Contributory 
liability is rooted in the tort theory of enterprise liability and it is established 
by the fault of a defendant who has knowledge of the infringement and makes 
material contributions to the infringement.  
Contributory liability is the first theory of secondary liability in the common 
law system (US)47 and involves a knowledge requirement. In 1982, 
                                                                                                                                                        
41
 See Joel v. Morison [1834] EWHC KB J39; ‘See also’ Honeywill & Stein Ltd v. Larkin 
Brothers Ltd [1934] 1 KB 191 concerning its scope in English tort law. 
42
 22 F. 2d 412 (1927). 
43
 316 F. 2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); ‘See also’ Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22. 
44
 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971): “Although vicarious liability was initially predicated 
upon the agency doctrine of respondeat superior… one may be vicariously liable if he has the 
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in 
such activities”;  other relevant cases such as Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing & Breeding Ass’n., 554 F. 2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977); KECA Music Inc. v. Dingus 
McGee's Co, 432 F. Supp. 72, 199 US P.Q. (BNA) 764 (W.D. Mo. 1977). 
45
 See for legal challenges on secondary liability Case C-323/09 Interflora v. Marks & Spencer 
2011 (1). 
46
 InWood Laboratories Inc. v. Ives Laboratories Inc. 456 US 844, 854 (1982). “The notion 
that a party who does not himself infringe another’s trademark may nevertheless be indirectly 
liable, for such infringement is not expressly provided for in the Lanham Act, but rather has 
emerged from case law over the years.” ; ‘See also’ Coleman(n13) accessed 7 November 
2011. 
47
 ‘See also’ 80 Iowa Law Rev. 101,109-129 (1994); Georgia Pacific Consumer Products LP 
v. Von Drehle Corp, 2010 WL 3155646 (4
th Cir.), which analysed the plaintiff’s crime under 
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contributory liability was established in the case of InWood Laboratories Inc. 
v. Ives Laboratories Inc.48, where it was stated by the Supreme Court that “a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant ‘intentionally induce[d] another to 
infringe’ [the plaintiff’s] trademark or… continue[d] to supply its product to 
one whom it knows or it had reason to know [was] engaging in trademark 
infringement”. This standard for imposing contributory liability was developed 
by numerous cases, for instance in the case of Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios Inc in the light of constructive knowledge was ruled 
that failure on duty of care can be recognised as contribute materially to the act 
of infringement49.  
Overall, knowledge about direct infringement is a vital factor. Based on 
contributory liability, lack of knowledge is equivalent to a lack of liability.  
2.1.2.3 Inducement Liability 
Inducement liability is based on intentional tort and requires proof of intent of 
a reprehensible state of mind, which is one of the components of fault. The 
inducement liability rule has a substantial body of authority in support of its 
general applicability throughout other areas of law, for example in the Patent 
Act50.  
In sum, among the above types of secondary liability (vicarious liability, 
inducement liability, and contributory liability), the knowledge requirement (as 
indirect infringement) is the only requirement holding an ISP liable in terms of 
inducement and contributory liabilities. 
                                                                                                                                                        
the judicially created doctrine of contributory trademark infringement, derived from the 
common law of torts; ‘See also' the case of Tiffany v.eBay 600 F. 3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) 
48
 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc. 464 US 417 – Supreme Court 
1984[38] 
49
 The court phrased it thus: “the mere sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles 
of commerce, does not constitute contributory liability if the product is widely used for 
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it needs to be capable of substantial non-
infringing uses”. 
50
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd [2005] 545 U.S. 913, 125 S.Ct. 
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2.2 Knowledge Standards and Secondary Liability Theories 
Nowadays, secondary liability (tort) 51 governs a range of different activities 
including copyright and trademark infringement to protect user rights, service 
providers, and exclusive right holders. 
Thus, studying the aims and concept of secondary liability tort in light of legal 
theory to examine the current knowledge standards for ISPs’ secondary 
liability seems necessary52. As Holmes states: “in order to know what it is, we 
must know what it has been, and what it tends to become and “law has a 
content that is not imported from without but elaborated from within”53. 
Therefore, the description of secondary liability (tort) philosophy and its 
foundation begins with common theories. . 
2.2.1 Common Theories on Secondary Liability 
Common theories state that the aim of secondary liability is to establish justice 
between parties54 or to act as an instrument for corrective justice to correct 
imbalances caused by one party’s breach of duty to another55. The concept of 
                                                          
51
 The origin of the concept of tort has its roots in French, derived in turn from the Latin term 
torquere, which means ‘twisted or wrong’. Generally, “it is a civil ‘wrong’ which occurs when 
one party destroys another party’s initial entitlement by imposing a negative externality on 
him.” Werner Z. Hirsch, Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis (Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich1988)165; ‘See also’ Patrice Jourdain, Principles of Civil Liability (Majid Adib tr, 
Mizan Publishers2007)9 ; In early Roman law, a tortfeasor was liable for any injury he had 
caused to the victim, whether or not he was culpable. However, this approach was abandoned 
in classical Roman law; Qasemzadeh (n38)136; ‘See also’ International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, (1983) Vol XI (2 vols), para196.  
52
 James Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition’, in Philosophical Foundations of 
Tort Law, (David G. Owen ed, 1edn, Clarendon Press1995) 133. 
53
 Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law, (44 edn, Little, Brown and Company1951)1; William 
B. Yeats, Know the Dancer from the Dance: Among School Children in The Collected Poems 
of W.B. Yeats: A New Edition, (K. J. Finneran ed, Macmillan Publishing1983)215; Aristotle 
asserts that “one cannot understand the organization of anything by its functions and its parts; 
its functions must be explained within its aims”; M. Thomas, The Philosophy of Law: An 
Introduction, (Behrooz Jandaqi tr, Ziton 2009) 23.  
54
 The same can be found in the beliefs of Kant and Rawls. 
55
 See Kathryn R. Heidt, ‘Corrective Justice From Aristotle to Second Order Liability: Who 
Should Pay When the Culpable Cannot?’ (1990) 47(2) Washington and Lee Law Review. 
Concerning the relationship between secondary liability (tort) and distributive justice, there are 
differences of opinion: some believe that tort law is not within the scope of distributive justice 
and is best explained through corrective justice or secondary duty. Conversely, others such as 
Cane argue that “when we take account of the fact that court decisions can create precedents 
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corrective justice is an element found in all common theories. Therefore, 
secondary liability can be studied in terms of: theories based on formalism, 
theories based on strict liability, and theories based on both fault. Among these 
theories, formalism and the theory of liability based on fault are closer to the 
standard for evaluating the knowledge of users’ infringement. 
2.2.1.1Formalist Theory and Secondary Liability  
The formalist theory (also called mechanical jurisprudence56) is a common 
legal theory that began in the 19
th
 century in the US57as an application of 
norms to facts. Formalists have viewed the law from the normative approach 
or as a system that stems from Aristotle’s logic. Formalists believe that to 
identify the basics of law, we first need to delve inside the law to find out the 
legal principles and sub-principles58. Then, the principles and their sub- 
principles must be arranged in a logical form so that decisions can be made. In 
other words, results rest on a relatively closed set of logically organised rules59. 
                                                                                                                                                        
which can be used to guide people’s conduct and to decide disputes other than that before the 
court, we can see that the law of tort is also concerned with distributive justice”; Peter Cane, 
The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart Publishing1997)18. The roots of such schools of thought can 
be found in Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100, [1932] SC (HL) 31, [1932] AC 562. 
56
 Due to the lack of differences between tort and secondary liability, we applied tort law in the 
end. In discussing tort law, we describe secondary liability in the form of contributory and 
vicarious liability and inducement theory. Roscoe Pound’s Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908) 
was seminal in creating the image of judging as an exercise in mechanical, deductive 
reasoning. Pound began by posing the question: What is scientific law? His answer was that 
“the marks of a scientific law are, conformity to reason, uniformity, and certainty. Scientific 
law is a reasoned body of principles for the administration of justice, and its antithesis is a 
system of enforcing magisterial caprice, however honest, and however much disguised under 
the name of justice or equity or natural law” ; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist–
Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Oxford University Press2009)27. 
57
 In the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, laissez faire, laissez passer was the dominant system of 
thought in the US. Formalism (which has individualistic results) has been applied in social 
science and philosophy with theoretical and empirical reasoning and arguments. However, 
there has been a move towards considering social science and philosophy as empirical 
phenomena. The pioneers of this movement in logic and philosophy were William James and 
John Dewey, whereas Oliver Holmes was a pioneer of legal realism; Michael D.A. Freeman, 
Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, (edn 7 Sweet and Maxwell2001) 799, 800. 
58
 Bagher Ansarie, The Role of the Judge to Develop the Law (Mizan Publishers 2012) 60. 
59
 According to formalists, “judges apply the governing law to the facts of a case in a logical, 
mechanical, and deliberative way. For the formalists, the judicial system is a ‘giant syllogism 
machine,’ and the judge acts like a ‘highly skilled mechanic.’ Legal realism, on the other hand, 
represents a sharp contrast... for the realists, the judge ‘decides by feeling and not by 
judgment; by ‘hunching’ and not by ratiocination and later uses deliberative faculties ‘not only 
to justify that intuition to himself, but to make it pass muster’”; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. 
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According their rule, formalism defines the knowledge of infringement to 
impose secondary liability only relies on the interpretation of legal texts; they 
are assessed with the view of “what the law should be” rather than “what the 
law says”60. The formalist theory, which is the same as positivism, is not 
interested in any secret hidden meaning61. Formalists apply internal 
justification to define the targets of liability and observe the knowledge 
requirement system62. Some people who favour the classical natural theory as 
proposed by Kant, Aristotle, and Aquinas have applied the formalist approach 
to define the philosophy of tort63. 
To find out the formalist rationale for defining liability, so as to evaluate the 
US and EU law approaches in the next chapter and to address the deficiencies 
of the current knowledge standards, a brief analysis of the thoughts of Kant, 
Aristotle and Weinrib on this matter is described. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rachlinkski and Andrew J Wistrich, ‘Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases’, 
(2007) 93(1) Cornell Law Review 2 .Furthermore, it has been noted that the jurisprudence of 
conceptions “tends to decay. Conceptions are fixed. The premises are no longer to be 
examined. Everything is reduced to simple deduction from them, principles cease to have 
importance. The law becomes a body of rules. This is a condition against which sociologists 
now protest, and protest rightly”; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist–Realist Divide: 
The Role of Politics in Judging, (Oxford University Press2009)27. It is worth mentioning that, 
as pointed out in Black’s Law Dictionary, formalism is a “theory that law is a set of rules and 
principles independent of other political and social institutions”; Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd 
ed) < http://thelawdictionary.org/ >accessed 14 November 2011 
60
 The most eloquent expression is in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: “[T]he judicial 
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end [that the 
Massachusetts’ government] may be a government of laws, and not of men.” 
61
 Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (Greenwood Press 1976) 177,178; ‘See also’Cf. Justice 
Scalia’s rejection of intuitionalism: “If you are a textualist, you do not care about the intent, 
and I do not care if the framers of the Constitution had some secret meaning in mind when 
they adopted its words” <http//www.rtbot.net/legal formalism> accessed 11 November 2011. 
62
According to formalism, internal justification is used instead of economic and social 
justification. 
63
 They support internal justification rather than empirical, economic, and social justification; 
Badinie, Philosophy of Tort Law (Sahami Publisher Comapny2005)81; Martin Stone, 
‘Formalism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law, (Jules Coleman 
and Scott Shapiro eds, Oxford University Press2002)166,200; Brian Leiter, Legal realism, in A 
Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, (Blackwell Publishers2000) 275,276; 
‘See also’ Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford University Press1961)120,150. 
‘See also’ Ken Cooper-Stephenson and Elaine Gibson, Corrective Justice, Substantive 
Equality and Tort Law, (Captus University Publications1993)3 
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2.2.1.1.1 Kantianism 
Kantianism64 focuses on right and duty in the light of liberty to expose 
liabilities rather than compensate for injuries. ‘Right’ has been defined as the 
“sum of conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the 
choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom”65. A 
significant aspect of Kantianism is that liability is based on fault (intentionally 
and non-intentionally), rather than causation of damage. Kant presented the 
theory that causation (liability based on non-fault) is not compatible with tort 
and liberty because liability without fault leads, as Hegel puts it, to “only the 
negation of a negation of action, not a negation of action itself”66. Thus, even 
the term ‘person’67 is a barrier to applying the knowledge requirement for ISPs. 
However, limited liability can be said to limit ISPs’ duties68, which are subject 
to scope of constructive knowledge.  
2.2.1.1.2 Aristotle’s 
Aristotle’s view involved restoring the parties69, as nearly as possible, to the 
positions they held before the injury, as liability in corrective justice through 
tort falls on the injurer70. Aristotle focused on arithmetical71 equality in tort law 
rather than giving attention to the special value or social position of the injurer. 
                                                          
64
 For Kant, the possibility that law can be systematically right encompasses private law, 
public law, and international law; it also gives law its normative character as a condition of 
freedom under which public compulsion is justified; Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Law as a Kantian Idea 
of Reason’ (1987) 87Columbia Law Review 472.  
65
 Immanuel Kant, Philosophy of Law, (Saneie Darebie tr, Majd publisher 2008) 28. 
66
 George W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (T.M. Knox tr, Clarendon Press1967)181; ‘See 
also’ Bdinie (n22)116. 
67
 A person is who he has imputation for his act. Kantianism liability is applicable to the 
‘person’ and is not applicable to ‘objects’ (ISPs) due to the lack of an imputation object. 
Moreover, the scope of duty is limited to positive acts and does not recognise omissions, as 
Kant stated that omission of damage is not a duty, even if there is knowledge of damage. 
68
 In Hegel’s view, knowledge standards must be line with duty and must not force others to 
avoid emission of damage when it is not in their duty; Badini(n22)85,89 
69
 Oliver W. Holmes long ago remarked that “[t]he law of torts abounds in moral phraseology” 
The Common Law Lecture 1881(III,); ‘See also’ Heidt (n77); Jules L. Coleman, ‘The morality 
of Strict Liability’, (1986) 18 Wm. & Mary Law Review259; Coleman, ‘Corrective Justice and 
Wrongful Gain’, (1981) 11 J. Legal Studies421; Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Liberty, Community, and 
Corrective Justice’ (1988) 1(3) Canadian J. of Law and Jurisprudence.  
70
 Heidt (n55) 350. 
71
 Stephenson (n63) 66.  
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In his view, the injurer (A) is obliged to pay to the injured (B) the value that he 
took from B by damaging B’s assets. Aristotle paid more attention to the 
causation of damage rather than knowledge about infringement72. He argued: 
“The law looks only at the nature of the damage, treating the parties as equal, 
and merely asking whether one has done it and the other has suffered injustice, 
whether one has inflicted and the other has sustained damage.” 
It sounds as if Aristotle’s ‘causation’ concept is like retaliation in corrective 
justice. It has been expressed by Pythagoras that if A inflicts damage on B, B 
can do the same to A.   Apparently, the performance of both the arithmetical 
approach (in both of Aristotle’s corrective justice categories: general justice or 
particular justice73) and Pythagoras’s retaliation approach leads liability 
without knowledge based on this claims that the knowledge requirement exists 
in the concept of ‘a voluntary act’. However, this is not appropriate in the 
context of the current research topic because assuming knowledge through a 
voluntary act does not cover the tort of negligence when an ISP infringes 
copyright by negligence. Overall, establishing a fit between Aristotle’s 
‘causation’ concept and ISPs’ secondary liability sounds impossible, as the 
former does not recognise knowledge of infringement as an element to 
establish corrective justice74.  
                                                          
72
 In contrast with this, however, is Pythagoras’s belief that retaliation establishes corrective 
justice (if A inflicts damage on B, B can do the same to A), but it seems that the arithmetical 
and retaliation approaches are non-performance approaches; George P. Fletcher, ‘Corrective 
Justice for Moderns’, (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1668; ‘See also’ Coleman, ‘Property 
Wrongfulness and Duty to Compensate’, (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent Law Review 461,462. 
73
 Aristotle’s general view on justice is the ‘whole of virtue’ approach. Aristotle further divides 
justice into distributive justice and corrective justice; Heidt (n55) 350. 
74
 It is still open to question whether or not a negligent act is subject to corrective justice or 
not. “The idea of negligent conduct was not a concept that was well developed in Athens nor 
was it discussed by Aristotle in any length. However, Aristotle does recognize some 
culpability for certain conduct we could classify today as negligent. For example, he would 
hold someone responsible who, by our standards, negligently failed to obtain information that 
could have prevented the loss.” Although Aquinas stated that Aristotle’s corrective justice 
covers both voluntary action and involuntary action because involuntary action also has 
choices; it does not necessitate the reorganisation of liability through the infringer’s 
knowledge; ibid 358. ‘See also’ James B. Ames, ‘Law and Morals’ (1908) 22Harvard Law 
Review .97, 99; ‘See also’ Badinie (n 22)152. 
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2.2.1.1.3 Weinrib’s Theory 
Ernest Weinrib, as a pioneer of formalism, applied tort to establish Aristotle’s 
concept of corrective justice. In this theory, tort has a special internal system 
and a reciprocal75 relationship that exists between the injured and the loss76. 
According to his theory, corrective justice is a task for the legal formalist, who 
has to make explicit the intelligibility that is latent in the legal materials and to 
indicate which legal error is a deviation77. For this reason, to provide an 
appropriate knowledge standard for ISPs’ secondary liability for copyright and 
trademark infringement in harmony with this theory, attention to the internal 
dialectics of tort (in corrective justice) and the reciprocal relationship between 
the injured and the loss is required. This is because secondary liability (tort) 
has been considered as needing an evaluation that is based on ‘why it is’ what 
it is from ‘within’ and not from the ‘outside’ appearance. For example, to 
understand mathematics, we need to investigate the intricacies of mathematics 
and its functions by understanding mathematical formulas. Hence, 
investigating the internal rationality of tort is vital in order to understand tort 
liability78. 
According to this theory, secondary liability (tort) is non-political in its nature 
and aims and the law is not allowed to use liability as an instrument for 
political, social, and economic purposes. Weinrib’s measure is a subjective 
criterion of negligence instead of an objective one. A subjective criterion of 
negligence in tort law is a feature of behaviour and mental state that is 
reprehensible ethically. Therefore, the appropriateness of using a subjective 
criterion of negligence for evaluating the knowledge standard for secondary 
liability is open to question. Weinrib’s subjective criterion of negligence 
                                                          
75
 However, he also believed that there is no necessity to establish corrective justice only by 
tort law. 
76
 Stephen R. Perry, ‘Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice’ (1992) 67 Indiana Law 
Journal 381,382 
77
 Allan C. Hutchinson, ‘The Importance of Not Being Ernest’(1988-1989) 34 McGill Law 
Journal 234,263 
78
 Weinrib illustrates that the tort format is arranged by an internal and dependent system. Tort 
in the internal system uses the instrument of private law and not public law because “the 
purpose of private law is to be private law”. Weinrib, the Idea of Private Law (Cambridge 
University Press1995) 241. 
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places emphasis on the mind of the injurer. As a result, using a subjective 
criterion of negligence for the knowledge requirement might lead to 
establishing corrective justice and equality but its components (i.e. personal 
features and the moral status of damage) affect justice because they rely on the 
adage “do unto others as you would have them do unto you”. This foundation 
leads to prevalent injustice because of its capability to impose duty to another 
without giving him rights.  
In contrast, the objective criterion of negligence applies a “duty of care” in the 
light of wisdom, custom, and acts and specific knowledge or knowledge of the 
injury79. The subjective criterion of negligence delimits the types of injury 
because any damage80 is not compensable and any benefit does not have tort 
liability (it only recognises normative or non-factual profit)81. According to 
this theory, the appropriate knowledge standard is a knowledge standard that 
consists of the internal massage of tort for establishing corrective justice. 
However, the issue is that Weinrib’s theory is only focused on the victim and 
the compensation, rather than the injurer’s rights. This gap or unequal value 
between the rights of the victim and those of the injurer does not allow 
knowledge standards to be established in harmony with the parties’ rights82. As 
a result, applying Weinrib’s theory to the knowledge requirement for ISPs 
leads to the infliction of risk liability without fault83. 
                                                          
79
 Alan R. White, Grounds of Liability: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (Oxford 
University Press1985)100,103. 
80
 Omission, as Kant points out, is not the subject of tort. 
81
 Weinrib, ‘Formalism and its Canadian Critics’, in Tort Theory, (Ken Cooper-Stephenson 
and Elaine Gibson eds, 1993) 5. 
82
 Scott Hershovitz, ‘Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists’ (2011)39 Florida State 
University Law Review 107-108 <http://www.law.fsu.edu> accessed 21 June 2011. 
83
 Consequently, the formalist attitude to tort liability is based on an internal understanding and 
a non-instrumentalist attitude, which looks to establish formalist justice and equality between 
parties. Moreover, it is more based on Aristotelian and Kantian thoughts. According to those 
beliefs, tort liability intends to provide corrective justice (as it is called by Aristotle) or 
commutative justice (as Aquinas calls it) through an internal system. Some current writers use 
the phrase ‘certificatory justice’ or ‘reparative justice’; Christopher Berry, the Philosophy of 
Law: An Encyclopaedia (Garland Publishing Inc1999)163. 
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2.2.1.2 Fault Theory 
Fault in the form of a knowledge requirement was “one of the conquests of 
civilization”84 that began in the 18th century85 and developed further in the 19th 
century. No liability without fault has been developed by common law and 
civil law (American law refers to the case of Brown v. Kendall)86. Moreover, 
legal scholars have replaced liability without fault (or liability for causation 
and the ‘but for’ test) with liability in the form of fault87, which consists of 
knowledge requirements88. 
The knowledge elements required for recognising fault are truth and justified 
true belief. Therefore, no knowledge is equivalent to no fault89. Pioneers of the 
fault theory believe in establishing corrective justice and reforming distributive 
justice, which have been damaged by the injurer90, and so we need secondary 
liability with fault grounds. Pioneers of the fault theory believe that fault with 
a knowledge term leads to expose equality and liberty between both parties, 
                                                          
84
 Roast said “fault was one of the conquests of civilization”. Fault is the same as faute in 
French, which in English is called negligence or blame. Even in common law, there are 
differences in tort between negligence and fault because negligence does not cover intentional 
fault, whereas fault covers both intentional and non-intentional fault. 
85
 Even from a historical view, tort has always been based on fault or causation. However, in 
the past, the causation theory mostly dominated in imposing and defining liability. 
86
 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850) 
87
 The fault liability approach is more based on the moral approach (as pointed out in 
instrumentalist and formalist theories) because of its function, which imposes liability on the 
one who committed the fault; Tunc (ed.), International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, 
Vol XI. Torts, (1976)13. Fault liability in common law has two sets of criteria: objective 
criteria and subjective criteria. Objective criteria are based on the ‘reasonable man’ criterion; 
Qasemzadeh (n 38)190. 
88
 Savatier defined it as a breach of duty by a guilty party who could have appreciated and 
fulfilled the duty; Tunc (ed.) (n109) 13. In contrast, Prosser pointed out that “fault is conduct 
which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage or more fully conduct which 
inflicts risks below the standard established by law for protection of others against 
unreasonably great risk of harm” . Based on his definition, a breach of previous obligations 
must satisfy the following terms: it must be an acceptable injury, not foreseeable and actual, a 
direct injury, and a non-reaper injury; W. L. Prosser, (eds) Hand Book of Law of Tort (4th 
edition West Publishing Co1971)148. 
89
 Non-fault liability or strict liability in some cases has even been manifested as an instrument 
to fulfil tort law aims. However, the extension of strict liability to all types of damage does not 
correspond to tort philosophy, as the aforementioned aims of the development of a general 
non-fault scheme of compensation are not in line with the deterrence of damage aims and 
economic rules of tort. 
90
 David G. Owen(eds), Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law, in Philosophical Foundations of 
Tort Law, in Collection of Essays (Clarendon Press1995) 24. 
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due to the dependency of the knowledge criterion on social measures. Fault 
based liability evaluates knowledge of injurer based on the reasonable man 
behaviour in form of social behaviour criterion and corporal criterion. Social 
behaviours are measured through a delineated knowledge requirement within 
the scope of the actions of a ‘reasonable man’, which is more in line with the 
current goals of tort (which aim to give more value to deterrence than to 
compensation).  
In this regards, the fact is that although the social behaviour criteria has above 
advantages  their application for evaluating the knowledge of ISPs seems open 
to debate because the social behaviour criteria for evaluating a ‘reasonable 
man’ have applied diverse approaches, for instance in utilitarianism, which 
unreasonable behaviour is an action that one never wants for oneself. Injurer 
behaviour is also unreasonable when the cost of the risk of an action is more 
than the social profit from the action (economic efficiency). Furthermore, they 
evaluate the knowledge based on the situation i.e; different criteria for 
different situations. Courts use different methods and criteria to define a 
‘reasonable man’, his social behaviour, and the value of causes91. For instance 
the courts’ criteria depend on altruism and equal liberty, standard 
utilitarianism, and economic analysis. Therefore, reasonable behaviour should 
be analysed according to who did what, for whose benefit, and who the victim 
is. Moreover, the position of consent varies in different situations, instead of 
following fixed criteria92. 
                                                          
91 
Osborne v. Montgomery, 234 N.W. 372 (Wis.1931).  
92 
The position of consent varies in different situations: (1.) Personal or third-party benefits: 
the injurer’s infliction of risk injures the victim to gain benefit for him or for a third party. 
Although the injurer’s act benefits the victim (who is not meant to receive any profit from the 
injurer), his action is not the behaviour of a ‘reasonable man’ because the injury is foreseeable 
and the common people would never accept such risks. (2.) Society’s interests outweigh the 
criteria: if the injurer’s action has a benefit to society, evaluating the behaviour of a 
‘reasonable man’ is done based on the level of risk (whether the action had a serious and high 
risk to others). The level of risk (which outweighs personal interests) would be compared to 
the level of society’s interests, so if the society’s interest is higher than the personal interest, 
the injurer’s behaviour will be recognised as that of a ‘reasonable man’ and the injurer is not 
liable. It is the same circumstances as when an injurer does not have knowledge of the injury. 
(3.) Victim’s interest – infliction of risk: the injurer acts in the victim’s interest. Therefore, the 
injurer’s act is a reasonable action due to its links with the risk–interest criterion and equal 
liberty. (4.) Paternalistic: the injurer acted paternalistically in the victim’s interest but without 
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As a consequence, evaluating the knowledge of infringement based on fault 
based liability with the behaviour of a ‘reasonable man’ poses various criteria 
for evaluating the knowledge of infringement. Most of them are closely related 
to the state of mind and do not pay attention to the social role of the injurer’s 
behaviour and the role of technology (like ISPs) 93. Thus, requiring an ISP to 
combat infringement and provide services based on these criteria seems 
technically impossible.It has applied the ‘reasonable man's behaviour’ as a 
criterion for tort by common law94.  
2.2.3 Instrument Theory and Secondary Liability  
Instrument theory applies secondary liability (tort) to establish utilitarian- or 
welfare-based perspectives. According to this theory, the law cannot undo the 
past, but it can apply its role to make a better future by applying secondary 
liability as an instrument for social welfare95. Furthermore, the role of liability 
has been stated to be for the good of all, not only to provide justice between 
two parties; in other words, liability at its most efficient benefits society. The 
instrument theory illustrates the fact that secondary liability (tort) is able to 
provide incentives for maximally beneficial behaviour and to serve as 
insurance by compensating for loss as well. It implies that secondary liability 
(tort) has also been considered as a mixture of markets and morals due to the 
different bases of tort. Tort is a mixture of grounds for decisions that are drawn 
from both corrective justice and economics. 
                                                                                                                                                        
the victim’s consent: the injurer did not inform the victim about the consequences of the risk. 
The injurer's behaviour is not reasonable behaviour, due to its conflict with equal liberty 
(although there are some exceptions, for example in the patient-centred or physician-centred 
medical practice standards (these are standards in the UK))
.
 
93
 For instance in feminist theory, reasonable man behaviour is depend on the level of 
relationship; Joanne Conaghan, ‘Tort Law and the Feminist Critique of Reason’, in Feminist 
Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law (Anne Bottomley ed 1996) 
<http//www.law-lib.utoronto.ca> accessed 12 December 2011. Leslie Bender, ‘An Overview 
of Feminist Torts Scholarship’ (1993) 78 Cornell Law Review 575 <http//www.law.syr.edu> 
accessed 12 December 2011. 
94
 The ‘reasonable person’ construct can be found applied in many areas of law. The standard 
performs a crucial role in determining negligence in criminal law, that is, criminal negligence 
and tort law. 
95
 Mahmoud Abdali, Legal Approaches and Extra-Legal Attitudes (Mizan Legal 
Foundation2012) 24. 
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In this regard, some scholars (such as Coleman) have also remarked that 
secondary  liability can be based on more than one fundamental principle96 and 
it is an institutional method for giving effect to the principle of corrective 
justice, but not the only method. Furthermore, the mode of rectification 
represented by secondary liability, in which injurers are required to bear their 
victims’ losses, must be justified on grounds independent of corrective justice, 
such as considerations of deterrence and accident/cost avoidance. Thus, 
economic efficiency should be recognised as supporting existing secondary 
liability functions. 
Overall, in instrument theory, liability values depend on the social goals of 
society, such as economic aims, compensation, distributing costs and risks 
between society members, and deterring society members who present non-
social behaviour. Generally, secondary liability (tort) has been categorised into 
tort in economic instrumentalism (an instrument for protecting economic 
policy)97 and tort in moral instrumentalism (an instrument for addressing social 
and political aims)98. Therefore, based on the above categorisations, once tort 
as an instrument is not able to answer and protect society’s goals (such as 
social, political, and non-economic goals), society would apply other 
instruments, because the aim defines the context and form of tort (rather than 
the tort itself)99. It has also been applied to distribution of loss100, public and 
                                                          
96
 Perry (n 76) 381,384. 
97
 There are other criteria such as easy rescue and non-easy rescue ;Stephenson(n85)129-130; 
‘See also’ Coleman, Risk and Wrongs: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law, (1th edn, 
Cambridge University Press1999) 203. 
99
 Kant and Helime, who have explored tort, might respond that the aims have social value but 
that this does not mean that tort obtains its value from such aims; Badinie, ‘Economical 
Analysis of Tort’, (2004) Law Quarterly – Journal of Faculty of Law and Political Science, 
University of Tehran 59, 200,205. 
100
 There is a belief that distribution of loss in society has a positive effect on society’s 
economic plans and has a corrective justice rule among society’s members. Secondary liability 
(tort) decries the fear of obligation and such fear leads to the development of social insurance 
and liability insurance. For instance, secondary liability makes a company insure its staff via 
adding the cost of such liability as a production cost. Secondary liability as an economic 
instrument helps companies to distribute their loss among customers instead of companies 
suffering. According to the aims of distribution, to offer any knowledge standard, the law 
should pay attention to the capability of the knowledge standard to fulfil these aims. Calabresi, 
in the light of costs of accidents, defines three types of costs: primary costs, such as costs 
which are associated with the harm; secondary types of costs, which are social costs; and 
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private deterrence101, and other economic functions, for instance secondary 
liability in the light of the economic approach can make the party or parties 
who are in the best positions avoid the liability or minimise their losses. In 
other words, the person makes a decision about whether the benefits of the 
activity outweigh its costs102.  
Therefore, tort is offered to the producer to internalise liability costs by placing 
the liability costs on their products, which protects markets from market 
equilibrium103. In line with this, secondary liability is an instrument for striking 
a balance between social costs and economic costs because it imposes the 
liability on those who have the ability to prevent damage at a low cost. 
Consequently, implementing secondary liability as an instrument protects the 
economy from loss104.In short, considering the knowledge requirement in 
secondary liability with instrumentalism view rather than formalism seems 
appropriate because it does not force to be limited on the tort context aims, it 
allows designing a knowledge standard close to realism of technology.  
2.3 Concept of Knowledge 
Knowledge cannot be bounded by one definition due to its wide scope, but it 
can be seen within the scope of formal/informal, limited/unlimited, and 
theoretical/practical concepts; in other words, it can be divided into scientific 
knowledge and situated knowledge. To better understand the knowledge 
requirement, its epistemology needs to be considered. For this reason, a review 
is firstly presented of the concept of knowledge for human beings and 
machines, focusing on mathematical, science, and computer philosophy. 
                                                                                                                                                        
tertiary costs, which are costs associated with administering the tort system; Jeffrey L. 
Harrison, Law and Economics, (3th edn, Thomson West2003)157. 
101
 In terms of the deterrence aims of tort, tort law has applied and modified some level of fault 
and attempted to create a balance between fault and compensation. See Coleman (n 97) 234-
235; ‘See also’ W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (16 edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell2002)12; ‘See also’ A.M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law (Ed 5, Butterworths1993)90. 
102
 Harrison (n100)156-157. 
103
 Badinie (n85) 85, 86, 89. Furthermore, tort reduces the cost of accidents and the cost of 
avidness of accident; ‘See also’Katozian, Liability of Failure Products (3th edn, Mizan 
2005)20, 22, 26. 
104
 Michael D. Bayles, Principles of Law: a Normative Analysis, (D. Reidel ed, Publishing 
Company1987) 216. 
 30 
 
2.3.1 Epistemology of Human Knowledge  
To design an appropriate knowledge standard to impose liability, the 
epistemology of knowledge needs to be understood. In sophistic philosophy, 
human sense and analogy are manifested as sources of human 
knowledge105.This view of human knowledge was criticised by Aristotle and 
Socrates. They claimed that, depending on the human knowledge, analogy 
does not prove that those elements that we make an analogy with are true. This 
is because although analogy has a mathematical base, it does not have any 
external meaning. For instance, if we say that A + B = C, the analogy does not 
show that A and B are true by themselves. Before the 5
th
 century, to tackle 
these challenges, philosophy paid attention to the internal sense rather than the 
external sense. Subsequently, scepticism, experimentalism, and new Platonism 
appeared and they presented intelligence, sense, and wisdom as the sources of 
human knowledge. Platonism states that knowledge is equivalent to “justified 
true belief”106, but it is not clear what is meant by ‘true’ and ‘belief’. In line 
with this, in modern philosophy (rationalism and empiricism), knowledge has 
become systematic through scepticism. When associated with 17
th
-century 
thinkers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, word rationalism used to 
mean a belief in reason was the only valid source of knowledge. Descartes, as 
the father of scepticism, pointed out that human beings achieve knowledge 
through scepticism. In this regard, Kant, as a follower of Descartes, combined 
both the rationalism of Descartes and the empiricism of Hume as idealism. He 
believed that the mind is like the gloss on the eyes that leads to making a wall 
between reality and fact. Therefore, knowledge has its roots in empiricism107. 
In contemporary philosophy, discussions on the source of knowledge have 
moved from idealism to realism, in the light of pragmatism, science and non-
science, and existentialism. 
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Consequently, a similar point in all philosophical approaches is that human 
knowledge has a link with prior knowledge108 and culture and expectations109. 
A person’s prior knowledge is undeletable knowledge that has an effect on 
human understanding and comprehension, in contrast with the knowledge of a 
machine110. 
2.3.2 Machine Knowledge 
In a similar way to the philosophy of human knowledge, the philosophy of 
machine knowledge has been applied both rationalism and empiricism. For 
instance, traditional empiricism can be seen in software engineering and 
computer ideas, and human interference and rationalism can be seen in 
computer methods and theories. Empiricism nowadays has been used in the 
form of positivism. The belief is that science can prove that some facts are 
correct, but this raises a number of questions regarding ISPs. Is an ISP able to 
understand? Is an ISP only able to understand based on a computational theory 
of the mind? Is an ISP a computational machine that only reads mathematics 
and does not have any implied cognitive function? 
Briefly, according to the computational theory of the mind, ISPs are syntactic 
and non-pragmatic or semantic
111
. ISPs are only based on mathematics, 
working within the scope of reading but not comprehension. Their knowledge 
does not have any link to prior knowledge, even though there is sometimes 
interference in cognitive science and compensation
112
.  
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In this regard, the capability of artificial intelligence
113
 (AI) and its relation to 
ISPs’ knowledge is in question; that is, through AI, are ISPs able to 
comprehend, understand, or have consciousness? This question can be 
responded to by the Turing test and the Chinese rooms’ method.  
The Turing test developed mathematical philosophy and presented new ways 
of thinking in computer science. It has been used for defining a standard for a 
machine to be called ‘intelligent’. The idea is that a computer can be said to 
‘think’ if a human interrogator could not tell it apart, through conversation, 
from a human being. The results of the Turing test show that, to date, the 
capability of a machine to have a mind and understanding is in question
114
. 
The Chinese rooms test is a thought experiment method that was devised by 
Searle
115
. Searle explains that there is a program that enables a computer to 
carry on an intelligent conversation in written Chinese. By using this program, 
someone who he is speak only English is able to execute the instructions of the 
program by hand and then the English speaker would be able to carry on a 
conversation in written Chinese, but the English speaker would not be able to 
understand the conversation. Similarly, Searle concludes that a computer 
executing the program would not ‘understand’ the conversation either. He 
mentioned that a program cannot give a computer a “mind, understanding or 
consciousness”, even if it works intelligently or behaves intelligently116.Thus, 
according to the above tests and computer philosophy, ISPs do not have a 
“mind, understanding or consciousness” like human beings. ISPs’ thoughts are 
complex symbols and their thinking is a calculated process. 
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2.4 Conclusion  
Corrective justice is vital and has similar elements across both common 
theories and instrumental theory. In common theories, from formalism to 
liability based on fault and based on strict liability, secondary liability has been 
defined according to its internal functions, which are the same as positivism. It 
is not concerned with the secret meanings that are hidden in the mind. For ISP 
knowledge standards for copyright and trademark infringement to be in 
harmony with this theory, the standards need to pay attention to the internal 
dialectics of tort (in corrective justice) and to the reciprocal relationship 
between the injured and the loss. This is because it has been considered that, in 
order to understand it, we need to evaluate tort based on ‘why it is’ what it is 
from ‘within’ and not from the ‘outside’ appearance. Internal justification can 
be applied so as to define the targets of liability and to observe the knowledge 
requirement system, as can be found in the thoughts of some followers of the 
classical natural theory proposed by Kant, Aristotle, and Aquinas, who applied 
a formalist approach to define secondary liability.  
Formalist ideas involve arithmetical117 equality in tort law rather than paying 
attention to the special value or social position of the injurer. In fault-based 
theory, only social criteria in different situations seem related to the knowledge 
standards, as these criteria are permitted in order to design flexible measures 
for evaluating ISPs’ knowledge. However, implementing the ‘reasonable man’ 
test is still open to debate. The corporeal measures are more focused on 
causation and the internal meaning of tort. In contrast with these theories, 
realism (in light of the instrumentalist view about secondary liability) presents 
economic efficiency and social welfare as elements for designing an 
appropriate ISP knowledge standard. From this perspective, secondary liability 
is considered as an instrument for social aims and economic efficiencies; it is 
considered that a proper knowledge standard is a knowledge standard that is in 
line with these aims.  
Furthermore, developing a proper knowledge standard requires attention to the 
natural differences between machine knowledge and human knowledge. In 
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particular, the inability of an ISP to have prior knowledge is essential in 
developing a knowledge standard for ISPs’ secondary liability. In addition, any 
knowledge standard or requirement needs to address the fact that ISPs work 
with complex symbols and their thinking is a calculated process. 
 As conclusion, time is to pay attention on differences of concept and process 
of ISP knowledge with human knowledge as so to decrease risk of ISP liability 
without knowledge and protect all parties’ right in light of ISP limited liability. 
Therefore, in view of the rationale and philosophy of knowledge and 
secondary liability (tort), the current study in examines the appropriateness of 
the knowledge standards in the US and EU to impose liability on ISPs for 
copyright and trademark infringement. 
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CHAPTER III: Knowledge Standards for ISPs’ Copyright and 
Trademark Liability in the US 
3.1 Introduction  
The US was one of the first countries that had to deal with ISP liability issues 
for copyright and trademark infringement by users. Furthermore, it faced the 
question of the type of liability appropriate for ISPs. This can be seen in the 
Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Frena118 case, which ruled that there was direct 
copyright liability and imposed it on the defendant for distributing infringing 
photographs that had been downloaded or uploaded by its users. 
However, direct liability and strict liability have been replaced by ISPs’ 
limited liability, as case law and legislations (The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) and The Lanham (Trademark) Act, 1946) have 
shown. This ISP liability revelation has been dependent on some 
preconditions, illustrated in legislation and case law; throughout these sources, 
the knowledge requirement was made the critical issue for finding ISPs’ 
copyright and trademark liability in the US. 
In this regard, one question posed has been which type of ‘knowledge’ is 
required: ‘actual knowledge’, ‘constructive knowledge’, ‘and awareness of 
infringement or awareness of facts or circumstances from which the infringing 
activity is apparent’? Moreover, the main debate centres on; Whether current 
provisions and case law interpretations are able to afford the legal 
integration regarding criteria and approaches to ISP knowledge standards, 
to shield ISP and other parties’ rights?  
To answer these research questions, this chapter firstly highlights the 
limitations of ISPs’ liability for copyright infringement in the light of US 
copyright case law (as the knowledge standard is one composed of the 
elements of traditional contributory liability, the copyright case law can be 
divided into cases before the establishment of DMCA Section 512 and after) 
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and the DMCA itself. Then, the research examines the appropriateness of the 
current knowledge standard, which is done through an analysis of the 
knowledge provisions in the statutes and their interpretations in case law. The 
second part of this chapter focuses on analysing the knowledge requirement 
for ISPs’ secondary liability for trademark infringement. 
3.2 ISP Knowledge Requirements for Copyright Infringement  
The Copyright Act of 1976 in the US does not explicitly render anyone liable 
for copyright infringement committed by others but liability would be possible 
under certain circumstances on the grounds of general rules of tort law or the 
legal doctrine of secondary liability. After the Playboy case, secondary liability 
was highlighted by Sega Enterprises v. Maphia119 and the famous Netcom 
case120. It appears that secondary liability is a result of the revelation of fault 
(in the light of the realist approach), which eliminates the strict liability of ISPs 
when infringement has been committed by them. The result of this 
development and the need to harmonise copyright legislation with the World 
Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) internet treaties led to the 
enactment of the DMCA in 1998, which refers to the liability of ISPs in 
Section 512 of the Copyright Act (in title II of the DMCA); this adapts the 
limitation liability for ISPs’ copyright liability in the form of a vertical 
approach. In both copyright case law and the DMCA, secondary liability 
consists of actual knowledge, awareness of apparent infringement and 
constructive knowledge. Based on the role of case law, in the development of a 
secondary liability regime for ISPs’ copyright infringement and the enactment 
of the DMCA, the knowledge requirement in case law is firstly explored. 
3.2.1 Knowledge Standard in Case Law 
The knowledge requirement in copyright case law (as per the DMCA) is 
rooted in the theory of enterprise liability in tort law121 and has been 
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highlighted as a crucial element of contributory liability122 because enterprise 
liability as secondary liability focus on knowledge of individuals to be part of 
shared enterprise to impose a joint liability on infringers.  
The knowledge requirement is established when “one who, with knowledge of 
the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another”123. In other words, the knowledge requirement 
is demonstrated in the ‘know or have reason to know’ element of the direct 
infringement. Tort law on contributory liability knowledge is based on a broad 
knowledge standard that comprises both actual knowledge (know) and 
constructive knowledge (have reason to know), and its ambit has been 
extended by the advance of new technology; it now imposes secondary 
liability on ISPs for copyright infringement124 (as per the DMCA and after, 
when an ISP or copyright owner does not comply with the DMCA terms to get 
for benefit from DMCA limitations). 
3.2.1.1 Actual Knowledge 
Actual knowledge of infringement has been interpreted in divergent 
approaches by the US courts in relation to copyright infringement, as can be 
proved by the following cases. 
In the case of Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management 
Inc.
125
, the plaintiff sued Columbia Artists Management Inc. (CAMI) for using 
its song without permission for a profit-making concert in which artists 
managed by CAMI performed. The plaintiff argued that CAMI had substantial 
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knowledge of the artists’ and community associations’ copyright violation 
during the planning process between the field representatives and the local 
associations. Therefore, ASCAP (the American Society of Performers and 
Composers) deemed CAMI liable for infringement of their music by 
organising, supervising, and controlling the local community concert 
associations. However, although CAMI admitted that music belonging to the 
plaintiff had been played for profit at community concerts without permission, 
they raised the question of the knowledge requirement. CAMI argued that they 
had not had knowledge because they were not directly involved in the 
violation. As District Judge Anderson stated: 
CAMI was liable for their involvement in planning and looking 
over the Port Washington Association’s concert series. While 
CAMI did not have direct control over the artists it managed or 
over the local organization, the court deemed that the local 
association depended heavily on CAMI to produce the concert. 
Additionally, CAMI had enough power to prevent their artists 
from infringing copyright, and it played a major role in creating 
and attracting the audience. Furthermore, CAMI took a significant 
financial profit from the copyright violation. The judge’s 
statement that CAMI had knowledge of the violation was enough 
to make CAMI liable
126
. 
 
The final court decision established that the defendant can still be liable for 
copyright infringement if the party had knowledge of the violating activity, 
whether or not they were directly involved in the violation, as stated: “one 
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially 
contributes may be held liable as a contributory infringer”. This case shows 
that actual knowledge could be established by merely having knowledge of the 
infringing activity and by failure to prevent such violation, based on 
knowledge of the violation. The case proves the claim that actual knowledge 
can be defined as knowing the capability of an activity to violate copyright 
rather than specific knowledge of an action of direct infringing conduct. 
Analysis of this case has shown that the tort of negligence (by breach of duty 
of care) is enough to fulfil an ISP’s knowledge of infringement. By having this 
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wide interpretation, it seems that general knowledge of infringement suffices 
for imposing contributory liability.  
In contrast with the aforementioned case, the court interpreted actual 
knowledge differently in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios 
Inc.,
127
 and narrowed the scope in tort of “know[ing]” or actual knowledge, as 
the decision of the court in that case showed. Sony provided a product that 
enabled another to infringe copyright
128
. This product caused legal issues to 
arise in relation to knowledge of infringement, as the product in fact had the 
capability of substantial non-infringing use. The Supreme Court stated that 
Sony knew that some customers would use the VCRs to infringe copyright and 
therefore Sony materially contributed to the infringement by its customers 
because the customers would not have been able to do so without the 
assistance of the VCRs. However, the Supreme Court settled the issue by 
reference to the patent law concept, which declares that the sale of a staple 
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringement 
use should not comprise contributory liability based on the knowledge that 
some customers might infringe copyright
129
. In line with this, the court 
explicitly stated: 
[There must be] a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate 
demand for effective – not merely symbolic – protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in 
substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly, the sale of 
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, 
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is 
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it 
need merely be capable of substantial non-infringing uses130. 
Thus, close analysis of the Sony case confirms that knowledge of infringement 
by a customer does not establish actual knowledge for imposing contributory 
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liability; it requires the defendant to know of an actual instance of copyright 
infringement and to have failed to take measures to stop that infringement131. 
In other words, the Sony case ruling formulated the capability of non-
infringing use of a product as a lack of knowledge in order to escape liability if 
there is no other evidence that proves that the defendant had any knowledge of 
copyright infringement132. Hence, the scope of the tort knowledge standard was 
narrowed to knowing of an actual instance of copyright infringement, instead 
of the constructive knowledge that existed in the relationship between VCRs 
and copyright infringement. It can be argued that the court in the Sony case 
applied secondary liability as an instrumental approach to respond to an 
economic realist view on the advance of technology133, which seems 
appropriate. 
In the case of MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 134 the court noted that “one 
infringes contributory by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct 
infringement ... and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement 
while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it”135. This case introduced 
the inducement theory for secondary liability136. In the Grokster case, the 
Supreme Court stated that: 
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One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use 
to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere 
distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the 
resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, 
regardless of the device’s lawful uses137. 
 
With reference to this rule, the court limited Sony to safe harbour (substantial 
non-infringement) use, where a defendant is intent on fostering infringement 
and the company’s knowledge is established through the Grokster case’s 
inducement secondary liability by proving an affirmative intent to infringe. In 
relation to providing evidence of affirmative intent as knowledge of 
infringement, the Supreme Court ruled on many factors, for example internal 
communication, efforts to attract users, and failure to use filtering or other 
technology to block infringing activity138. The court concentrated further on the 
application of negligence as fault to detect knowledge of infringement because 
the court focused on the intent and aforementioned factors to evaluate the 
knowledge of infringement. In this regard, it is worth noting that the Grokster 
case’s limitation has been changed by the Perfect 10 case, which explicitly 
bound actual knowledge to specific knowledge and requires an ISP to prevent 
further damage by any technical measures139. 
Overall, knowledge in the Sony case was evaluated through probabilistic 
information rather than specific information, as the court clearly noted that the 
Sony case ruling is not intended to eliminate other common law liability 
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theories. This is because when the defendant’s conduct is in bad faith, the 
defendant is not entitled to claim substantial non-infringing use.  
As analysis, based on reading of the aforementioned cases, the courts restricted 
actual knowledge from referring to knowledge merely about users’ 
infringement to knowledge of non-infringing use of products and then moved 
to establish actual knowledge by the indirect infringer’s conduct in the light of 
inducement theory (as per the Grokster case ruling). This reform, even though 
limiting the scope of actual knowledge, did not establish proper guidance for 
defining actual knowledge, which was absent in the Sony case. This could 
indicate that although substantial non-infringing use was in favour of the 
defendant in the Sony case, there is an opportunity for proving knowledge of 
infringement using any method, rather than a method outlined by specific 
guidance. The court permitted evaluating knowledge through the ‘reasonable 
man’ test, which can lead to different interpretations and uncertainty. 
In line with this, despite the legal debate about inducement theory (regarding 
whether this theory is part of contributory liability or not), the theory adds an 
evaluation of affirmative intent to the assessment of non-infringing use and 
focuses on the application of negligence as fault for evaluating the intent of 
infringement in order to establish knowledge. Thus, evaluating actual 
knowledge must be done based on internal documents and other relevant 
factors. Moreover, according to this case law, ISPs must undertake duties to 
prevent user infringements, such as by policing copyright work and applying 
technical measures, to be on the safe side of the negligence rule. Otherwise, 
they will be eligible for liability. Such duties can be heavy burdens for ISPs 
because they require ISPs to be both police and judges for protecting all 
copyright with general knowledge of user infringements, rather than this being 
the responsibility of a specific authority based on cooperation with the 
copyright owner. Overall the fault it more based on the concept of negligent 
which is close to probabilistic knowledge about infringement. 
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3.2.1.2 Constructive Knowledge  
Constructive knowledge is another knowledge requirement for secondary 
liability. It relates to whether an organisation ‘should know’ or ‘has reason to 
know’ about user infringement in order to establish contributory liability. One 
of the most notable cases in which the court applied constructive knowledge 
for copyright infringement is Screen Gems-Columbia Music Inc. v. Mark-Fi 
Records Inc140. In this case, four music publishers sued Mark-Fi Records Inc., 
alleging that it made and sold bootleg records at very low prices and had a 
business with three other defendants that infringed the plaintiff’s copyright. 
The plaintiff argued that the defendant should have known or had reason to 
know about the nature of the records sold by Mark-Fi, the defendant’s 
assistance in the infringement, and the price tag for such products. 
Consequently, the court concluded that, according to the fundamental doctrine 
of common law, anyone who knowingly participates with others in conducting 
an infringement is jointly and severally liable141. Therefore, the ‘should have 
known’ (the prices of the product types in this case could easily be found, 
according to the ‘reasonable man’ test) and the ‘had reason to know’ 
evaluations for constructive knowledge in this case were sufficient to establish 
contributory liability.  
In Sega Enterprises v. Maphia
142
, a BBS (bulletin board service) operator was 
distributing pirated versions of Sega video games. In addition, the BBS was 
apparently established specifically to permit the uploading and downloading of 
video games
143
. The court clearly noted, regarding the knowledge needed to 
impose liability on the defendant for contributory infringement, that Sega must 
establish that “(i) with knowledge of the users’ infringing activity, (ii) [the 
defendant] induced, caused, or materially contributed to their infringing 
activity”. The court thus defined that the defendant (Chad Sherman) had 
knowledge of infringing activities and applied an objective standard that can 
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 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
141
 Malibu Media LLC v. John Does, 1-14 US District Court, N.D. (Ind, FWD) 2012.  
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 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
143
 The point was that, in contrast with other websites, Maphia BBS only had 400 users, and 
there was a possibility of finding out what its users were doing and what they were paying 
their monthly fees for.  
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be satisfied when the defendant knows or has reason to know of the infringing 
activity
144
. It was not disputed that Sherman had knowledge that his users were 
copying the games. Sherman admitted that users were allowed to upload and 
download Sega games from his Maphia BBS. The court ruled that since the 
defendant knew of the infringing activities and substantially participated in 
them by inducing, causing, or materially contributing to the infringing 
conduct, the defendant was liable for contributory infringement. The court also 
found that evidence from a screen printout of a user uploading and 
downloading statistics from the Maphia BBS shows that Sherman tracked, or 
at least had the ability to track, user uploads and downloads.  
Thus, Sega established that Sherman knew of the infringing conduct by 
Maphia BBS users, and Sega contended that Sherman’s actions showed that he 
wilfully
145
 infringed their copyright, which would entitle Sega to greater 
damages under 17 U.S.C. section 504(c)(2). 
The court in the Sega Enterprises case applied a strict interpretation of the 
‘reason to know’ as constructive knowledge for observing wilful blindness by 
focusing attention on whether the defendant had actual knowledge of 
infringement and contributed, rather than whether a ‘reasonable man’ would 
know there was infringement in such circumstances. By considering the court 
ruling in the Sega Enterprises case, one can argue that such strict interpretation 
seems appropriate because it requires the court to evaluate the objective 
knowledge after evaluating the subjective knowledge (wilful blindness). The 
legal issues here refer to when actual knowledge as subjective knowledge is 
absent and the court focuses on general knowledge in order to observe the 
ISP’s constructive knowledge through the ‘reasonable man’ test. 
After the case of Sega Enterprises v. Maphia, which was about an 
organisation’s secondary liability relating to copyright issues146, US case law 
described the role of the knowledge requirement and its scope in the famous 
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 Casella v. Morris, 820 F. 2d 362, 365 (11
th
 Cir.1987) (quoting Gershwin, 443 F. 2d at 
1162). 
145
 See Peer International Corp. v. Pausa Records Inc., 909 F. 2d 1332, 1335 (9
th
 Cir. 1990), 
quoted in the Sega Enterprises case. 
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 857 F. Supp. 679, 683 (N.D. Cal.1994). 
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case of Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services Inc.147, which focused the attention in case law more on the 
application of contributory liability (its knowledge element) in the ambit of the 
ISP’s copyright liability. In this case, the US District Court analysed the 
knowledge for contributory liability of the ISP, which allowed its users to 
access a BBS when such access led to copyright infringement committed by a 
subscriber of the BBS. The plaintiff, Religious Technology Center, argued that 
Netcom as the defendant was directly, contributory, and vicariously liable.  
Netcom concluded its defence as fair use and the district court rejected the 
direct and vicarious infringement but the issue went back to the knowledge 
requirement for Netcom’s contributory liability. The court was faced with the 
question of Netcom’s knowledge of the infringement and its duty of 
preventing infringement, as to whether Netcom knew, should have known, or 
had reason to know about the infringement. The court held that if Netcom 
knew or should have known that the defendant Erlich’s infringing message 
was passing through its server, then its failure to prevent or impede an 
infringing copy from being distributed could constitute substantial 
participation. However, the Religious Technology Center had to prove this 
fact148. Netcom explicitly answered the questions about the application of tort 
law contributory liability on ISPs and the scope of knowledge requirements in 
the existing law. It is clear, therefore, that in case law, in order to impose 
liability on ISPs’ secondary copyright infringement activities, knowledge of 
user infringement is required for secondary liability in terms of whether the 
ISP ‘knew’ or ‘should have known’ about such user infringement, in order to 
establish contributory liability (negligent tort). Moreover, ‘should have known’ 
user infringement suffices for the establishment of ISPs’ copyright liability, as 
well as for finding out ISPs’ constructive knowledge about user infringements. 
These facts encourage courts to pay attention to the nature of the ISP’s internal 
documents. 
                                                          
147
 The case was codified in the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act as a 
portion of the DMCA. 
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 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162 
(2d Cir. 1971). Cf.; Screen Gems-Columbia Music Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 
399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
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According to the aforementioned cases, constructive knowledge requires an 
ISP to have foreseen the capacity for user infringement by general knowledge; 
otherwise, it could be liable through liability negligence. The constructive 
knowledge requirement forces ISPs to prevent current and upcoming 
infringements based on the ‘reasonable man’ test, rather than address specific 
and individual infringements with general knowledge of infringement.  
In short, the aforementioned cases do not pay attention to the fact that an ISP is 
not able to predict and understand all user infringement by itself. Therefore, 
accomplishing such a duty by general knowledge to be safe from secondary 
liability based on the constructive knowledge requirement has a negative effect 
because it forces ISPs to maintain direct control and monitoring to combat 
copyright infringement, which ISPs are reluctant to do. 
3.2.1.3 Appraisal 
Copyright case law in the US restructures the tort law knowledge requirement 
for ISPs’ contributory liability. It has applied a broad knowledge standard; this 
seems appropriate due to the huge amount of copyright infringement in the 
digital age. In this regard, although the safe harbour rules of the Sony and 
Grokster cases in terms of non-infringement use and inducement have 
narrowed the wide scope of knowledge in tort law, there is a lack of explicit 
measures as guidance for how to establish actual knowledge. In addition, 
copyright case law rules, as exceptions to traditional tort law, cannot avoid 
human intervention in assessing an ISP’s knowledge of infringement. 
Therefore, the possibility of human intervention can lead to providing 
confusing guidance for ISPs in offering their services. Furthermore, the focus 
on the ‘reasonable man’ test to evaluate ISPs’ knowledge seems impractical 
and difficult. On the other hand, the narrow standard of specific knowledge 
raises issues regarding how an ISP can obtain specific knowledge of 
infringement when there is a lack of copyright owner cooperation with the ISP 
through sending notification about the specific infringement.  
In line with the above points, US copyright case law has interpreted the 
knowledge of infringement in both actual and constructive knowledge 
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standards according to fault-based theory. Therefore, the implementation of 
the tort fault-based theory for interpreting these knowledge standards confirms 
that neither of them are free from the following legal issues: a) fault-based 
liability (as noted in the previous chapter) leads to the interpretation of an 
ISP’s knowledge of infringement based on the ISP’s situation, rather than 
providing criteria for interpreting the knowledge of infringement in order to 
avoid confusion for the ISP; and b) it imposes the duty of the identification of 
infringement on the ISP, which seems complicated.  
Moreover, the aforementioned case law standard in both knowledge standards 
does not adopt a standard for how ISPs can exercise prevention, and this 
weakness requires ISPs to do the same as a natural person to prevent 
infringement and identification as traditional torts: in other words, to evaluate 
general information to find any knowledge of infringement and to protect 
copyrighted work. This means that ISPs exercise their judgement based on 
probabilistic knowledge. In addition, in US copyright case law, the courts have 
the tendency to detect the knowledge through the negligent tort (reason to 
know). However, this tendency reduces the role of limited liability based on 
the knowledge of infringement because, most of the time, some duties seem 
impossible technically, like combating copyright infringement based on 
knowledge of existing infringement rather than knowledge of the location and 
intellectual property rights protection of infringements. 
Consequently, the copyright case law knowledge standard might be consistent 
with the human but it seems impropriate as a knowledge standard for ISPs’ 
secondary liability. Due to these limitations, the DMCA (s.512) illustrates an 
approach for better cooperation between ISPs and copyright holders, as is 
considered in the next part of this chapter.  
3.2.2 DMCA and Knowledge Requirements 
In contrast with tort principles (contributory and vicarious liability), the 
knowledge requirement in the DMCA for ISPs’ copyright infringement is 
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limited via the defined ‘safe harbours’149. The conduct of an ISP may not lead 
to the secondary liability event it met all of elements of contributory liability 
infringement when the ISP’s functions fall within the provisions of the safe 
harbour exemptions150. For an ISP to be eligible to benefit from the DMCA 
safe harbours, it must comply with two requirements, as stated in Section 
512(i) (1) (A) and (B), namely: to adopt and implement a policy for 
termination of subscribers who are repeat infringers151 and to accommodate 
and not interfere with standard technical measures designed for detecting 
and/or eliminating copyright infringement152. These exemptions are limited to 
four areas of an ISP’s conduct: “transmitting”153 (routing or connecting 
information as well as the intermediate and transient copies that are made 
automatically in the operation of a network); “storage” (at the direction of a 
user, the storing of material that resides on a system or network controlled or 
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 Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (Dist. Court Cal. 2004) “The DMCA 
was enacted both to preserve copyright enforcement on the Internet and to provide immunity 
to service providers from copyright infringement liability for ‘passive,’ ‘automatic’ actions in 
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reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 649; H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(1), at 11 (1998); ‘See also’ ALS 
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statement of the Conference Committee (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998)), it was 
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cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital 
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concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their 
activities.” 
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 S.512(i) (1) (A). 
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 S.512(i) (1) (B). 
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 Transmitting is not limited to transmissions of a performance or play of image or sounds 
within the meaning of section 101 of the Copyright Act, according to the history report of 
Section 512. For the purpose of the first limitation, relating to transitory communications, 
‘service provider’ is defined in Section 512(k) (1) (A) as “an entity offering the transmission, 
routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among 
points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the 
content of the material as sent or received.” For the purposes of the other three limitations, 
‘service provider’ is more broadly defined in Section 512(k) (l) (B) as “a provider of online 
services or network access, or the operator of facilities thereof.” 
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operated by or for the service provider); “system caching”154; and the 
“information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users”. Except 
for transitory communication functions that if the transmission is initiated and 
directed by an internet user, then the above conditions can be met (which 
requires an injunction from the court)155. If an ISP has actual knowledge that 
the material or an activity using the material on their system or network is 
infringing or, in the absence of such actual knowledge, if it has awareness of 
infringement, it may be liable156. 
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 S.512 (b). System Caching: regarding limitations on liability, “A service provider shall not 
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As Section 512(c) (1) (A) explicitly points out, ISPs shall not be liable for 
monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other 
equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the intermediate 
and temporary storage of material on a system or network controlled or 
operated by or for the service provider if there is lack of actual knowledge and 
awareness of infringement, even if it made a substantial contribution to the 
infringement. Furthermore, the same rule is applicable to information location 
tools, according to Section 512(d). 
These provisions and preconditions raise the question of how an ISP’s actual 
knowledge or awareness of infringement should be evaluated. Here this 
chapter study these knowledge standards in Section 512. 
3.2.2.1 Actual knowledge in Section 512 
Section 512(c) (3) (b) (i) of the US Copyright Act explicitly establishes the 
requisite level of the ISP’s actual knowledge or awareness of infringement 
through notification. This notification must be filed in order for it to comply 
with the requirements stated by the statute. Therefore, non-notification means 
the ISP had no actual knowledge or awareness of infringement. In this regard, 
Section 512(c) (3) (A) of the Copyright Act sets out six elements necessary to 
use a notification as evidence. The right holder must ensure that the following 
elements are filed:  
(3) Elements of notification. — 
(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of 
claimed infringement must be a written communication 
provided to the designated agent of a service provider that 
includes substantially the following: 
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized 
to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is 
allegedly infringed. 
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have 
been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single 
online site are covered by a single notification, a 
representative list of such works at that site. 
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(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that 
is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and 
information reasonably sufficient to permit the service 
provider to locate the material. 
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service 
provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, 
telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail 
address at which the complaining party may be contacted. 
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith 
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is 
not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. 
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is 
accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining 
party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an 
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
 
The above provisions show that Section 512 does not require the service 
provider to use a notice-and-take down procedure and does not force the 
copyright holder to notify the service provider. However, if a service provider 
wishes to receive immunity from the liability, it must put in place notice-and-
take down procedures otherwise knowledge of infringement will be evaluated 
by copyright case law tort contributory. As accentuated in Section 512(c) (3) 
(B) (i), subject to clause (ii), an ISP’s actual knowledge or awareness of 
infringement shall not be considered under paragraph (1) (A) in determining 
whether a service provider had actual knowledge or was aware of facts or 
circumstances from which an infringing activity was apparent
157
 when the 
notification from the copyright owner (or from a person who was authorised to 
act on behalf of the copyright owner) did not meet the provisions of 
subparagraph (A).  
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 Hendrickson v. Amazon.com Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917 (C.D. Cal. 2003): Under the 
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Unless the designated agent of an ISP receives a defective notice that does not 
comply with all
158
 provisions of subparagraph (A)
159
, the notice may be taken 
into consideration in evaluating the ISP’s knowledge according to clauses (ii), 
(iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A), because the complaining party provided the 
requisite information in regard to identification of copyrighted work, 
identification of the allegedly infringing material, and sufficient information 
for the service provider to contact the complaining party. The knowledge 
requirement is deemed to exist and to benefit from the exemption clause (i) of 
this subparagraph only if the service provider promptly attempts to contact the 
person making the notification or takes other reasonable steps to assist in the 
receipt of notification that substantially complies with all provisions of 
subparagraph (A). 
By analysing these clauses, it can be seen that there is an inconsistency 
between the ISP and the right holder in terms of the extent of responsibility. 
Despite this, the logic behind such clauses is the capability of the ISP to 
foresee user infringement
160
 and the necessity of cooperation with the right 
holder, due to the spread of copyright infringement. In the same line, the ISP 
must assist the right holder to issue an effective notification. However, the 
issues with this rationale can be highlighted as follows: assuming that a 
notification does not comply substantially with all the provisions of 
subparagraph (A) but does substantially comply with clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) 
of subparagraph (A), clause (i), it can be recognised in the scope of 
notification so as to prevent the copyright and assist with any rationale behind 
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 Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F. 3d 751 (Court of Appeals, 9
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 Or, it references tort law in terms of the foreseeability of damage by such notice. 
 53 
 
the above clauses. However, if the ISP fails to respond, if it is later found that 
notification was not sent from the real right holder, or the right holder does not 
have a good fight belief, can the notification still be recognised as notification 
in determining the ISP’s actual knowledge or awareness of infringement to 
impose secondary liability on the ISP? Moreover, regarding the identification, 
duration of notice and put back of date to make knowledge standard in 
accordance with protection of other rights like the freedom expression, 
competition and other rights is open to debate. The above statute does not 
provide any answer to resolve this issue. (Theses legal vacuums are discussed 
through the interpretation of actual knowledge in case law in the next section 
of this chapter.) 
3.2.2.2 Awareness of Infringement Standard in Section 512 
In the same vein, Section 512 does not describe the awareness of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. Is a wrong activity 
back type of information? Section 512 does not provide an answer regarding 
these facts or circumstances, which requires ISPs to pay attention to the wide 
scope of wrongful activity that takes place on their networks. Section 512 
states that the ‘red flag’ test should be used as an evaluating measure for 
awareness of infringement (subsection of (c) (1) (A) (ii)). The ‘red flag’ test 
consists of both objective and subjective elements to determine whether an ISP 
was aware of a ‘red flag’ or not as a subjective knowledge element. The ‘red 
flag’ test applies the ‘reasonable man’ test to find out the objective elements 
and to prevent ISPs from ignoring obvious infringement. In this regard, the 
appropriateness of the ‘reasonable man’ test161 in evaluating awareness as a 
knowledge requirement is open to question, because it might allow the 
implementation of contributory liability in tort law in the light of constructive 
knowledge, rather than a technical test to evaluate awareness of apparent 
infringement. In other words, implementing the ‘reasonable man’ test in a ‘red 
flag’ or awareness test can affect the efficacy of Section 512’s knowledge 
standards because of the divergence that can exist in the process of knowledge 
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 According to the history report, it is not necessarily what the ‘reasonable man’ would have 
deduced, but is close to blatant factors but it is impossible.  
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gathering between human beings and ISPs, as discussed in the previous 
chapter: namely, the ‘reasonable man’ test is not applicable for an ISP. On the 
other hand, the ‘red flag’ test can discourage monitoring and can create a 
disincentive for ISPs to develop directories that involve human intervention. 
However, implementing the ‘reasonable man’ test in a ‘red flag’ or awareness 
test is against the aims of enact the ‘red flag’ test162 and arise other legal issue 
like breach user privacy. To find out the current interpretation of the 
knowledge requirement and how broad knowledge standards protect ISPs and 
tackle the aforementioned legal challenges of Section 512, this research 
analyses the interpretations of the knowledge requirement in case law. 
3.2.2.3 Interpretations of the DMCA Knowledge Standard in Case Law  
To find out the consistency of applications of the DMCA knowledge standard, 
this research observes and examines the knowledge standard through case law 
interpretations by focusing on the research question: namely, whether case law 
interpretations about knowledge in the DMCA provisions offer useful 
guidelines for tackling the aforementioned ambiguities and could help the 
courts to interpret ISPs’ knowledge. In the same vein, an up-to-date 
interpretation could ensure proper stability and balance between ISPs and 
copyright holders. 
3.2.2.3.1 Actual Knowledge 
As discussed, Section 512 does not provide any definitions regarding what is 
actual knowledge and whether actual knowledge refers to general or specific 
knowledge. It also does not indicate whether the court should consider specific 
or general computer/human computer knowledge, or knowledge about 
infringing conducts. In the Napster case, the court stated: “if a computer 
system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system 
and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and 
contributes to direct infringement”163. This means that specific knowledge 
                                                          
162
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refers to the operator who learns that there is infringing material on the system. 
The court explicitly does not narrow the wide scope of actual knowledge to 
either human or computer knowledge. In the Napster case, it broadly outlined 
that Napster had actual knowledge that specific infringing material was 
available to users of its system, that it could block access to the system by 
suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material164. 
Consequently, the scope of actual knowledge narrows to specific information 
(which has been actually possessed by an individual) and other relevant 
factors. In the context of copyright infringement, actual knowledge has been 
bound to the copyright holder’s ‘notice’, according to Section 512’s provisions 
and interpretations in numerous cases. 
i. Notification Elements 
ISPs’ actual knowledge depends on notification by copyright holders. In 
addition, such notification must comply with the six elements set out in 
Section 512(c) (3) (i) to (vi) (see Section 3.2.2 of this chapter). These elements 
demonstrate that the ISP is obliged to contact the complainant and fulfil these 
terms in order to comply with notice and take-down procedures165. Among the 
provisions for identifying ISPs’ actual knowledge, legal challenges mostly 
arise in relation to clause (ii) “Identification of the copyrighted work”, clause 
(iii) “Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing”, and clause 
(v) “A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of 
the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright 
owner, its agent, or the law.” 
a) Identification of the Copyrighted Work 
As the history report in Section 512 illustrates, the DMCA does not force the 
copyright holder to provide a notice that complies with the identification of 
copyrighted work, but Section 512 rules that failure to comply with its 
provisions affects the copyright holder’s chance to hold an ISP liable based on 
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 In reference to the Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication 
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 Recording Industry Ass’n. of America v. Verizon Internet Services Inc., 351 F. 3d 1229, 
1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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actual knowledge. Therefore, for a copyright holder to prove that an ISP had 
actual knowledge, they must have sent a notice of complaint with information 
regarding the identification of the copyrighted work. Otherwise, when an ISP 
or copyright owner fails to comply with DMCA terms, it is same as an 
infringement that has taken place before the enactment of s.512 DMCA which 
are subject to copyright case law secondary liability rules i.e. Sony case rule, 
Grokster case and Perfect 10 and other case law. 
In this regard, if a single online site has multiple copyrighted works claimed to 
have been infringed and the right holder has provided a single notification, a 
representative list of such works on that site is required. It is not clear when a 
representative list of work will suffice, because simply searching for a name 
does not necessarily lead to the identification of protected work. If a copyright 
holder through a notice gives an ISP information regarding websites that 
contain copyright infringement but the copyright holder omits in the notice 
which websites specifically contain his own copyrighted materials, can such 
notice be accepted as establishing the ISP’s actual knowledge or not? In 
addition, it is not clear how long the notice is valid for in terms of associating 
actual knowledge with an ISP’s conduct. In line with this, it is unclear whether 
a copy of the infringing work which the copyright owner attaches to their 
notice is sufficient evidence to proof the ISP’s actual knowledge or not. 
Beyond all the aforementioned legal challenges, there are also legal issues 
regarding whether an ISP has the duty to identify alleged infringement based 
on such notices or not166. The US courts have attempted to answer these, as can 
be seen through the interpretations in the following cases. 
In Hendrickson v. Amazon.com Inc.167, Robert Hendrickson (the producer of 
the movie ‘Manson’) had licensed his documentary for sale as a video cassette 
but not as a DVD. He found out that his movie had been converted to DVD 
and offered for online sale; therefore, he maintained that this conduct 
amounted to sale of a pirated copy. Hendrickson notified eBay and 
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Amazon.com that the DVD versions of ‘Manson’ were pirated and filed 
contributory copyright infringement suits against both online services. 
However, the defendant alleged that Hendrickson’s notification was not 
adequate to satisfy the specific elements required by the DMCA, even though 
the flaw in Hendrickson’s notice was not so much in its content as in its 
timing: the period of validity for the notice of the identification of copyrighted 
works had expired. The court has previously pointed out that the validity of a 
notice in associating knowledge on users’ infringement with a service provider 
is only valid for notifying infringing activities that take place at the ‘time of 
notice’, not later. However, in this case, the infringing DVD that triggered 
Hendrickson’s lawsuit was not offered for sale on Amazon.com until nine 
months after Hendrickson had sent his letter. For any later infringement, the 
right holder must provide a new identifying notice that complies with all six 
elements of notification in Section 512.  
In Hendrickson v. eBay Inc.168, the plaintiff also lost the case due to the lack of 
identification of the copyrighted works. He failed to comply substantially with 
the requirement because the information that he sent to eBay was not sufficient 
to identify the various listings that purportedly offered pirated copies of 
‘Manson’ for sale. Although eBay received the plaintiff’s letter concerning 
counterfeit copies of ‘Manson’ that were being offered and sold on eBay’s 
website, eBay requested the plaintiff to identify the alleged problematic 
listings by their eBay item numbers and the plaintiff refused. The plaintiff 
replied that providing specific item numbers was not within his duty and he 
had done his duty sufficiently once he had notified eBay of the existence of the 
infringing activity by eBay sellers. However, his information did not clarify 
what distinguished an authorised copy of ‘Manson’ from an unauthorised 
copy. The plaintiff asserted that the identification of usernames provided eBay 
with sufficient information to locate the listings that offered pirated copies of 
‘Manson’. Nonetheless, the court did not recognise this as complying with the 
DMCA’s identification requirement. 
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In short, the court in Hendrickson v. eBay Inc169. established that the 
identification of copyrighted works is not within the duty of ISPs and that, 
furthermore, proper identification under Section 512(c) (3) (A) (iii) should 
have included the specific item numbers of the listings that were allegedly 
offering pirated copies of ‘Manson’ for sale, not merely general information 
regarding the identification of the copyrighted works170. Hence, the court held 
that the plaintiff had failed to comply substantially with the identification 
requirement of Section 512(c) (3). 
In terms of identifying copyrighted work through different sets of documents, 
the court in Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC
171
 found that Perfect 10 had not 
provided a notice that substantially complied with the notification 
requirements. Perfect 10 provided three sets of documents, and the second set 
of documents was not sworn to and consisted of a spread sheet emailed on 14 
July 2003 identifying the Perfect 10 models in the 16 October 2002 production 
by the bates number. On 2 December 2003, the plaintiff combined this set of 
documents with the two other sets of documents and claimed that it met the 
requirements of Section 512(c) (3) through a combination of the three sets of 
documents that it had sent to CCBill and CWIE (CWIE is a webhosting and 
connectivity service company that was another defendant). The plaintiff 
pleaded with the California Court to consider the sufficiency of the notices by 
combining the information contained in all three notices together and claimed 
that this included all the required elements for an effective notice. However, 
both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit found that to require action on the 
notified infringements would put a substantial burden on the service providers 
to piece the separate information together. The DMCA specifically indicates 
that the burden of policing copyright infringement should be placed on the 
owners of the copyright. Both courts held that knowledge of infringement may 
not be imputed to CCBill or CWIE. Perfect 10’s claim that CCBill and CWIE 
failed to implement a repeat infringer policy reasonably was also not found to 
be tenable. 
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Furthermore, the court stated that details to identify the works claimed to have 
been infringed were needed. In line with this, the court also noted that in both 
the emails that had been received by the defendant, Perfect 10 only elaborated 
website names that contained images of celebrities but failed to provide 
information that showed the websites contained their own copyrighted works. 
As a result, the information was not recognised as sufficient for the 
identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed
172
. 
In the case of Arista Records Inc. v. MP3Board Inc.
173
, the lack of information 
for identification of the copyrighted works also existed, because two of Arista 
Records’ notifications provided only named particular artists whose work was 
claimed to have been infringed, along with specified songs. However, these 
two notifications requested the removal of all the infringing list, instead of the 
named artists and song titles and representative listers, or at least the names of 
the copyrighted recordings allegedly being infringed. The court noted that such 
information did not comply with the information needed for the identification 
of copyrighted work and the other requirements of Section 512(c) (3) (A), but 
the plaintiff’s third notice was accepted. 
In UMG Recordings Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc. (UMG I),174 the Ninth Circuit 
noted that many music videos appeared lawfully on Veoh’s website. As a 
result, it was considered that the mere presence of music videos in general 
could not have given Veoh knowledge that some of these music videos were 
posted without authorisation from the copyright holders. The court confirmed 
that UMG had failed to comply with the fact that the DMCA places the burden 
on the copyright holder to identify any specific infringements of copyrighted 
works. Moreover, UMG’s argument that “Veoh, upon receiving notices from 
the Recording Industry Association of America, was obliged to search its web 
site and eliminate all unauthorized videos, noting that neither the DMCA nor 
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court precedent imposed investigative duties on web sites as a condition for 
qualifying for the safe harbor” was rejected by the Ninth Circuit. The court 
explained: “If providing access could trigger liability without the possibility of 
DMCA immunity, service providers would be greatly deterred from 
performing their basic, vital and salutary function – namely, providing access 
to information and material for the public”. 
In contrast with the UMG Recordings Inc. case, the Court of Appeals’ 4th 
Circuit in the ALS Scan Inc. v. RemarQ Communities Inc. case interpreted 
differently the identification of copyrighted work on a website when all copies 
of the copyrighted work offered on the site were likely to be infringing. The 
court ruled that the information provided by the plaintiff for identification 
sufficed: the names of websites and two addresses where the defendant could 
find pictures of the plaintiff’s models (almost all the images on the two 
websites were copyrighted material of ALS). Its reason was that the safe 
harbour immunities “are not presumptive, but granted only to ‘innocent’ 
service providers who can prove that they do not have actual knowledge or 
constructive notice”175. Furthermore, the 4th Circuit shifted the burden of 
identifying infringing material to ISPs, which was in contrast with the 
legislative history of the DCMA176. 
Analysis of the aforementioned cases shows that the courts intended to apply 
the strict interpretation of the duty of identification of copyrighted work to 
define the actual knowledge requirement. For instance, the court in the 
Hendrickson v. Amazon.com Inc. case applied a strict interpretation of the 
duration of the validity of a notice by confirming that a notice is only valid for 
notifying infringing activities at the time, not later.  
There are some advantages of these interpretations: the courts also 
demonstrated that the identification of copyrighted work is within the duty of 
the copyright holder (as illustrated in the cases of Hendrickson v. Amazon.com 
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Inc.
177
, Hendrickson v. eBay Inc.
178
, and Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC179). In 
Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., the court did not recognise the duty for ISPs to 
review a combination of different sets of documents to find out which are the 
copyrighted works and to work as intellectual property rights police for 
copyright holders.  
The courts have considered the nature of the ISP knowledge requirement and 
implemented instrumentalist theory in tort law, similar to the DMCA 
congress’s legislative history rule regarding the actual knowledge standard. In 
addition, aside from the strict interpretations of the DMCA knowledge 
standard, there are divergent and non-related interpretations concerning the 
identification of terms and the duty of identification, as the court interpreted in 
the ALS Scan Inc. v. RemarQ Communities Inc.180 case. In this case, the court 
concluded that finding out the locations of copyright infringement and 
protecting copyright are duties of ISPs. Moreover, the court accepted 
insufficient information as reasonable information for identifying the location 
of copyright infringement and for providing copyright protection. 
Consequently, the different aforementioned interpretations show that there is a 
lack of guidance in relation to the identification of copyrighted work, which is 
a vital element in the admittance of a notification as evidence to associate 
actual knowledge with an ISP. In addition, the aforementioned interpretations 
do not highlight a specific rule regarding admitting a notification that contains 
a representative list of infringements instead of specific ones, as in the UMG 
Recordings Inc. case.  
Overall, current interpretations are inadequate, and admitting a copy of alleged 
infringing work as guidance for finding out all likely infringements seems 
impropriate. It imposes a substantial task on an ISP to investigate potential 
infringements. In addition, it leads courts to pay attention to the nature of 
circumstances to assess whether the ISP achieved knowledge concerning the 
protection of copyrighted work from such notifications.  
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b) Identification of the Infringing Material  
Another necessary element of notification is identification of the infringing 
material, because without sufficient information to identify the locations of 
infringing material, the service provider cannot remove or disable access to 
infringing material. Clearly, a lack of adequate information might have an 
influence on removing or disabling access to infringing material expeditiously. 
Based on these significant aims, Section 512(c) (3) (A) (iii) emphasises that 
the copyright owner or its authorised agent should provide ISPs with 
information that is “reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to 
locate the material”. According to the legislative history of Section 512, such 
sufficient information would be “a copy or description of the allegedly 
infringing material and the URL address of the location (web page) which is 
alleged to contain the infringing material”.  
The court also asserted the importance of the duty of the copyright holder 
concerning providing the specific location of each copyright infringement, as 
applied in the Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC181 case, in which Perfect 10 
claimed that it had submitted notification that complied with the DMCA 
requirements for notification. It argued that its notification constituted the 
location of infringement material, as could be proven by the letters that it had 
sent. The first was a letter from Perfect 10’s counsel to Fisher that was dated 
10 August 2001. The letter was sent to identify several websites that Perfect 10 
claimed contained infringement of Perfect 10’s copyrights, but the court stated 
that the notification did not comply with the requirements because the letter 
only identified the websites that contained the allegedly infringing material; it 
did not identify the URLs of the images, nor did it identify which of Perfect 
10’s images were being infringed. Moreover, it did not identify Perfect 10’s 
images or give the defendants (CCBill and CWIE) sufficient information to 
locate the infringing material. These websites could contain more than 100 
images at different URLs; it was Perfect 10’s responsibility, under the DMCA, 
to provide the defendants with enough information to allow them to locate the 
infringing material. Another letter had been sent to Fisher with an Excel 
                                                          
181
 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1100-01 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 63 
 
spreadsheet that identified the websites and the names of Perfect 10 models 
that appeared on those websites. It was not recognised as valid notification due 
to the court being unable to locate a single URL that was the URL for the 
actual infringing image. Most of the URLs provided referred to the ‘members 
only’ area of the website, not to the URLs of the specific images within the 
‘members only’ area. In other words, access to the URLs of specific images is 
only possible by members of the website. Again, this is not the type of 
notification contemplated by s.512(c) (3) (A). Moreover, Perfect 10 had also 
sent several emails to CWIE regarding password-hacking websites that 
provided passwords to Perfect 10’s website, Perfect10.com, hosted by CWIE. 
However, the court found that they were not “reasonably sufficient to permit 
the service provider to locate the material”. 
In Hendrickson v. eBay Inc.182, there was also a lack of information 
“reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material”. 
The plaintiff failed to comply substantially with the requirement to provide 
eBay with sufficient information to identify the various listings that 
purportedly offered pirated copies of ‘Manson’ for sale. The plaintiff only 
provided general notification without specific item numbers or a copy or 
description of the allegedly infringing material. The information provided by 
the plaintiff did not indicate what distinguished an authorised copy of 
‘Manson’ from an unauthorized copy. In short, the court established that 
proper identification under Section 512(c) (3) (A) (iii) should have included 
the specific item numbers of the listings that were allegedly offering pirated 
copies of ‘Manson’ for sale, not general information. Hence, the court held 
that the plaintiff failed to comply substantially with the identification 
requirement of Section 512(c) (3). 
In Arista Records Inc. v. MP3Board Inc
183
., the court recognised only one out 
of three notices as containing specific information regarding the location of 
infringing material and as a sufficient form of notice under the DMCA, 
because it was accompanied by printouts of screenshots of the MP3Board 
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website. In these screenshots, the RIAA (the Recording Industry Association 
of America) highlighted and placed an asterisk next to 662 links which the 
RIAA believed were infringing their copyrights, and so this notice was held to 
comply substantially with the DMCA’s notification requirements. 
This case is in contrast with ALS Scan v. RemarQ Communities Inc.
184
, in 
which it was held that the absolute compliance notification concerning the 
location of infringing material was not required to establish actual knowledge, 
and only location information was required to meet the terms of Section 512(c) 
(3) for actual knowledge or awareness of infringement. This difference is 
because of the different nature of this particular case, in which all the 
infringing copies of the copyright work were in fact offered on two particular 
sites that were created for the sole purpose of publishing and exchanging the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted works.  
In this case, the court concluded that Section 512 does not require absolute 
compliance185. The court demonstrated the fact that knowledge through non-
absolute compliance seems closer to the tort of constructive knowledge or the 
‘red flag’ test than actual knowledge. Actual knowledge requires sufficient and 
specific information that permits the service provider to remove or disable 
access to the infringing material, which requires a specific location to be 
specified. Therefore, identifying copies of works as per the ALS Scan case on 
two websites does not require the service provider to find specific locations of 
infringement for themselves.  
ii. Appraisal  
From a review and analysis of Arista Records Inc. v. MP3Board Inc., 
Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., and Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC186 as some notable 
cases, it can be seen that US case law has applied a strict interpretation 
regarding the identification of copyrighted works and infringing material. The 
courts have indicated that identification is a duty of the copyright holder (for 
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instance, the court rejected Perfect 10’s claim concerning the combination of 
notices) and have interpreted that the copyright holder must provide specific 
information such as the names, titles, and specific URLs (and in Hendrickson 
v. eBay Inc., specific listing numbers), rather than general information and 
information with technical and non-technical errors. It is worth mentioning 
that the elements of the identification of copyrighted works and infringing 
material compared with other elements of notification to attach actual 
knowledge to an ISP have undeniable significance for providing a chance of 
immunity for ISPs and preventing copyright infringement. For this reason, 
strict interpretations could benefit both parties (ISPs and copyright holders) 
through clarifying the responsibilities of each of them for their conduct in 
practice. Furthermore, a strict interpretation of these elements of actual 
knowledge could lead to advances in technology and ecommerce. Hence, this 
interpretation of the notice required to establish an ISP’s actual knowledge 
should, it seems, be preserved. However, having examined these cases and 
provisions concerning actual knowledge, it can be seen that actual knowledge 
as subjective knowledge has a high threshold that is very difficult to meet and 
does not prevent ISPs from ignoring or avoiding obtaining knowledge of 
copyright infringement. The actual knowledge standard is free from the 
objective knowledge element: it only has subjective evidence through notices. 
Thus, it appears that the lack of an objective standard could affect ISPs’ 
cooperation on protecting copyright and copyright owners’ rights187. Therefore, 
a single actual knowledge standard is insufficient in the extensive online 
copyright piracy environment, and so an additional knowledge standard for 
ISPs’ liability seems to be needed. To respond to this necessity and to address 
the failure of the actual knowledge standard188, Section 152 of the DMCA 
introduced an objective knowledge standard through awareness of 
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infringement so as to examine and impose liability on an ISP when the ISP had 
knowledge of infringement through other evidence, such as an incomplete 
notice or material facts, but turns a blind eye to awareness of the apparent 
infringement (it is worth adding that the application of an objective standard 
could also release ISPs from liability for less apparent infringement). 
3.2.2.3.3 Awareness of Infringement Standard 
Although the awareness of infringement standard is not based on copyright 
owners’ notices like the actual knowledge standard is, it is based on the ‘red 
flag’ test, which contains both subjective and objective elements to examine 
ISPs. The ‘red flag’ test was introduced to prevent monitoring, according to 
the legislative history, and its objective element is based on the ‘reasonable 
man’ test. In this regard, the point that might need to be addressed is the ambit 
of the ‘reasonable person’ test; in other words, how it can avoid judgments in 
practice based on constructive knowledge, due to the similarities between the 
two tests.  
i. The ‘Red Flag’ Test 
As mentioned before, the ‘red flag’ test enables ISPs to avoid seeking out 
copyright infringement but it requires ISPs not to turn a blind eye to the ‘red 
flags’ of obvious infringement if they wish to benefit from the DMCA safe 
harbours and prevent discriminating judgments about potential copyright 
infringement. In regard to what can be considered a ‘red flag’, the legislative 
history has introduced some guidelines, such as including the terms ‘pirate’ or 
‘bootleg’ or other slang terms in the page URL and header information to 
make illegal purposes obvious to pirate directories and other internet users. 
These guidelines are designed for information location tool services but have 
also been applied to host services, even though the courts did not follow the 
legislative history exactly, as in the following cases189. 
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In Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com Inc.
190
, the plaintiff did not make an effort to 
notify Amazon that zShops vendors on Amazon’s site were selling images that 
violated its copyright. However, the plaintiff contended that although it had 
not notified Amazon and complied with the DMCA’s notice provisions, it had 
some proper and important evidence that proved the defendant’s knowledge 
through the evidence that other copyright holders were displaying non-Corbis 
photos. Moreover, Corbis provided evidence suggesting that Amazon was 
aware that Corbis’s celebrity photos were vulnerable to copyright 
infringement. Therefore, according to this evidence, Corbis argued that 
Amazon should have known that zShops vendors were selling infringing 
Corbis images. 
Corbis attempted to prove that Amazon “knew or should have known” that 
zShops vendors were selling infringing Corbis images. However, the issue was 
“what a reasonable person would have deduced given all the 
circumstances”191, rather than whether the service provider was “aware of facts 
or circumstances from which infringing activity was apparent”192 or if the 
service provider turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement “in 
the time of viewing”193. The court focused attention on the Congressional 
Committee Report and noted that a ‘red flag’ is related to a ‘blatant’ or 
‘obvious’ infringement that can be found even from a brief and casual 
viewing. Therefore, the court did not focus on the terms ‘pirate’ or ‘bootleg’ or 
other slang on the site, but instead introduced the legislative history report for 
information location tool services as a ‘red flag’ test. Hence, the court, based 
on Congress’s suggestions, defined a ‘red flag’ as evidence of blatant 
copyright infringement that will often be derived from information on the 
offending site
194
. Furthermore, it pointed out how to prove blatant copyright 
infringement, because “Corbis failed to show that those sites contained the 
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type of blatant infringing activity that would have sent up a red flag for 
Amazon”195. 
In Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC, the ‘red flag’ test was addressed by the court 
because Perfect 10 maintained that CWIE (a web hosting service) and CCBill 
(an online payment service) were aware, from the ‘red flags’ of infringing 
photos of Perfect 10, that infringing activity was apparent. Its evidence was 
that CWIE and CCBill provided services to illegal.net and 
stolencelebritypics.com. It argued that, according to the ‘red flags’ from the 
headings and URLs, the defendants must have been aware of apparent 
infringing activity. The court rejected the plaintiff’s claims that the ‘red flag’ 
established awareness of apparent infringement, because there might be other 
reasons for the use of the terms ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ other than announcing the 
infringement, such as “an attempt to increase their salacious appeal”196. 
Furthermore, Perfect 10 also argued that a disclaimer posted on illegal.net 
made it apparent that an infringing activity had taken place but the court 
declared that the disclaimer (“The copyrights of these files remain the 
creator’s. I do not claim any rights to these files, other than the right to post 
them”) did not mean that the burden was on the service provider to determine 
the infringing material: it only stated that the webmaster had the right to post 
the files. Therefore, it is not sufficient to raise a ‘red flag’ of copyright 
infringement based on this disclaimer, nor is it sufficient to raise a ‘red flag’ 
that these websites were obviously pirate websites with infringing content.                    
Other Perfect 10 claims were in relation to password-hacking websites hosted 
by CWIE. Perfect 10 argued that such sites contributed to direct infringement 
and it quoted the judgment of the Grokster case to support its claims, arguing 
that providing passwords that enable users to access websites with copyrighted 
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content illegally means contributing to infringement
197
. The court rejected the 
claim that providing a password is a ‘red flag’ for copyright infringement, 
because it does not show obviously that such websites instructed or enabled 
users to infringe another’s copyright198. In addition, it was not possible for the 
service provider to identify whether the password would lead to the infringing 
of copyright or not without trying the password. Furthermore, the password 
might have been provided to “help users maintain anonymity without 
infringing on copyright” or the owner of the protected content might have 
supplied the passwords as a short-term promotion or as an attempt to collect 
information from unsuspecting users “when a website could be a hoax, or out 
of date”.  
Overall, the court in the Perfect 10 case imposed no such investigative duties 
on the service provider. It noted that “Password-hacking websites are thus not 
per se ‘red flags’ of infringement” and that it is necessary to establish ‘red 
flag’ proof of a website instructing or enabling users to infringe another’s 
copyright. 
In the case of IO Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., IO Group claimed that 
Veoh allowed its site to view streaming media of various adult entertainment 
producers of IO Group’s films199. It argued that there were several examples of 
apparent infringing activity to prove that Veoh was aware of those ‘red flags’. 
IO Group described this evidence by quoting 17 U.S.C. s.205(c): copyright 
registration is evidence of constructive knowledge relating to ownership of 
work. In addition, the work was created professionally and one of them 
contained a trademark; therefore, the evidence proved an obvious ‘red flag’ 
because the absence of labels required under 18 U.S.C. s.2257 (f) (4) could be 
a ‘red flag’ indicating that “the uploading user did not have authority to submit 
the content in question, while none of the files uploaded by the user had the IO 
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Group’s copyright notices”. Furthermore, as the court clearly stated, “Nor is 
this court convinced that the professionally created nature of submitted content 
constitutes a per se ‘red flag’ of infringement sufficient to impute the requisite 
level of knowledge or awareness to Veoh”200. The court disputed whether 
Veoh could have identified whether a video was a professional or amateur 
production; especially nowadays that high-quality video equipment is available 
to the general public.  
In this regard, the court also negated acceptance of the absence of labels on the 
sexually explicit nature of the works as a ‘red flag’ of apparent copyright 
infringement because it is not the duty of the service provider to know that no 
legitimate producer of sexually explicit material would have omitted the 
requisite labels on the video clips in question, in accordance with the Perfect 
10 case decision
201
. 
Analysis of these cases shows that the courts focused on the subjective element 
of the ‘red flag’ test in order to use strict interpretations of it. The courts 
explained the ‘obvious’ and ‘blatant’ infringements in the light of a subjective 
element and noted that a ‘red flag’ does not appear from words such as 
‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’. However, the weakness is that the courts did not give any 
guidelines as to which images or words do qualify for a ‘red flag’. It seems 
that the courts (especially in the case of Perfect 10) did not make an effort to 
find out other elements of the ‘red flag’ test like the objective elements (the 
‘reasonable man’ test), which are cited in the legislative history and the 
DMCA provisions.  
It is not clear why the court deliberately stopped the effort to find the objective 
elements of a ‘red flag’ test through the numerous pages that Perfect 10 was 
sent: an incomplete notification might be suitable for the objective knowledge 
elimination element (the ‘reasonable man’ test) because it can help to find 
awareness of apparent infringement. Similarly, the courts did not clarify the 
reason and rationale behind separately analysing the subjective elements of the 
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‘red flag’ test (the terms ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ and the disclaimer of the 
webmaster in the Perfect 10 case) from its objective elements, whereas a 
simultaneous analysis of both elements of the ‘red flag’ test necessary for 
finding the service provider’s knowledge. It is undeniable that the separate 
observation of these elements would affect the application of the ‘red flag’ test 
and focus the attention of the court in future on evaluating knowledge of 
infringement in the wide scope of the wilful blindness of constructive 
knowledge and ignoring subjective elements.  
ii. Awareness of Infringement and Constructive Knowledge  
This traditional knowledge standard has not been limited by the DMCA s.512, 
which provides actual knowledge and awareness of apparent infringement 
(‘red flag’ test) standards to strike a balance between the liability of ISPs and 
the copyright holder’s duty and to protect ISPs from liability for potential 
infringement that may be less apparent. As case law shows, the courts have 
applied strict interpretations of the notification requirements for defining 
actual knowledge, which thus clarify any ambiguities on the burden of the 
identification of copyrighted work and the identification of the locations of 
specific material. However, in many cases, the courses have evaluated 
constructive knowledge in terms of whether the service provider ‘should have 
known’ or ‘had reason to know’, as applied in the following cases. 
In ALS Scan v. RemarQ Communities Inc.
202
, the court interpreted awareness 
of infringing through applying the ‘had reason to know’ element of 
constructive knowledge. In this case, the court declared that immunity under 
Section 512 of the DCMA “is not presumptive, but granted only to ‘innocent’ 
service providers who can prove they do not have actual or constructive 
knowledge of the infringement, as defined under any of the three prongs of 17 
U.S.C. s.512(c) (1)”. Based on this rationale, the court determined that 
although the copyright owner submitted an imperfect notification, the 
notification provided awareness of infringement. In line with this, the court 
declared that, substantially, notice according to the DMCA does not mean 
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‘perfect notification’, and it explained that the DMCA and legislative history 
require notice with any of the prongs of section 512(c) (3) (A) in order to 
prove awareness of infringement. Therefore, the court agreed with ALS Scan’s 
argument
203
 that “the district court’s application of the DMCA was overly 
strict and that Congress did not intend to permit internet service providers to 
avoid copyright infringement liability merely because a cease and desist notice 
failed to technically comply with the DMCA”. 
 In addition, the DMCA’s protection of an innocent service provider 
disappears at the moment the service provider loses its innocence: in other 
words, at the moment it becomes aware that a third party is using its system to 
infringe
204
. Therefore, a notice by the copyright holder that provides a 
representative list
205
 of infringed work on the site is sufficient to impose 
contributory liability. 
In the case of A&M Records v. Napster Inc.
206
 for a preliminary injunction, the 
court applied the test of whether the defendant had ‘reason to know’ of its 
users’ infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyright. The court made a decision on 
this according to the internal documents of Napster, which stated that 
Napster’s executives had recording industry experience. The court enforced 
the intellectual property rights and stated that “The other evidence indicates 
that the Napster executives downloaded infringing material onto their own 
computers using the service and promoted the website with screen shots listing 
infringing files”207. Therefore, the defendant had reason to know through their 
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executives’ conduct about the infringements of users but they failed to act and 
their conduct satisfies the objective test of constructive knowledge
208
. 
iii. Appraisal of the ‘Red Flag’ Test and Constructive Knowledge 
By analysing the ‘red flag’ test and the constructive knowledge standard 
through the aforementioned cases, it is clear that the courts interpreted the ‘red 
flag’ provisions and followed the precedents in legislative history by defining 
a ‘red flag’ as blatant and obvious. Such strict interpretations (which are 
accompanied by a lack of the examination of the objective elements of the ‘red 
flag’ test) lead courts towards implementing the traditional knowledge 
standard of contributory liability (constructive knowledge). Additionally, the 
discussed legislative interpretations did not list or give guidance on what a ‘red 
flag’ is and what the conditions are for it to apply. Moreover, the ‘red flag’ test 
may not motivate a copyright holder to share responsibility because, from a 
practical point of view, it is possible that the websites that are infringing the 
copyright might change their styles and other parts of their websites to hide 
themselves from being blatant or obvious as ‘red flags’. Therefore, based on 
those weaknesses, constructive knowledge has been frequently assessed and 
the ‘red flag’ test has remained impractical.  
The tendency towards applying the traditional knowledge standard, as seen in 
A & M Records v. Napster Inc. and other cases, has affected ISPs’ immunity 
by the wide ambit of the ‘human mind’ test, instead of the ‘ISP mind’ test. The 
courts in this regard have not applied realism regarding knowledge of user 
infringement for secondary liability, as noted in Chapter I (the instrumentalist 
view on secondary liability). Due to the different processing of knowledge in 
the human mind and the computer mind, it appears that ISPs’ computing 
machines (which are based on algorithms) do not have a mind and 
understanding like human beings, who can predict damage. For this reason, the 
DMCA focuses on defining the responsibilities of ISPs for secondary liability 
and limits the ambit of traditional knowledge by the notice-and-take-down 
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option. However, the courts have ignored this rationale by way of the ‘should 
have known’ and ‘had reason to know’ standards and have forwarded the 
burden of preventing and finding infringements onto ISPs through notices. 
This appears to have had a negative effect on the ISPs’ services.  
This appraisal shows that, on the one hand, the technical knowledge standard 
for ISPs’ awareness of apparent infringement suffers from a lack of guidance 
in terms of interpreting ISPs’ knowledge. On the other hand, ISPs are being 
challenged by the wide scope of constructive knowledge (the ‘reasonable man’ 
test), which is in contrast with the processing of knowledge in a computer and 
the possibility of foreseeing damage. 
3.3 Knowledge Standard for ISPs’ Trademark Infringement 
The knowledge standard for ISP secondary liability for user trademark 
infringement is rooted in contributory liability: in other words, the origin of 
this in the US is common law tort, such as copyright law. However, some 
differences in the term ‘knowledge standard’ exist between copyright and 
trademark law. As the Supreme Court of the US209 has argued, trademark law 
has “little or no analogy” to copyright law and these two bodies of law are 
different. For this reason, the courts put emphasis on assessing liability in 
trademark infringement and in copyright infringement according to different 
standards210. Nonetheless, there is a failure to distinguish them and sometimes 
they are pleaded together, as case law shows211. In this regard, the Lanham Act 
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of the US does not contain explicit language for establishing secondary 
liability for trademark infringement or dilution212 . 
Overall, the “gravamen of a contributory infringement action is the defendant's 
knowledge”213. Moreover, US trademark case law has applied a broad 
knowledge standard for evaluating knowledge about user infringement for 
secondary liability through the InWood case standard (1982)214, which was 
drawn from common law tort for contributory liability215. However, it is a 
higher than tort law employs216. The InWood knowledge standard has been 
used prevalently by the Supreme Court. Before the InWood case, contributory 
trademark infringement was recognised by the courts from the case of William 
R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1924)217. 
The InWood case was a violation lawsuit filed about the infringement of the 
trademark of a prescription drug manufacturer, Ives Laboratories. Ives 
Laboratories had the patent for the drug cyclandelate under the registered 
trademark Cyclospasmol, but its patent had expired and some generic drug 
manufacturers, including InWood Laboratories, began marketing the drug with 
some pharmacists by copying the appearance of its trademark capsules, which 
led Ives Laboratories to sue them. The Supreme Court cited the basic 
principles of trademark infringement and affirmed in the InWood case that 
“liability for trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually 
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mislabel goods with the mark of another. Even if a manufacturer does not 
directly control others in the chain of distribution, it can be held responsible 
for their infringing activities under certain circumstances”218. The court 
established what is now known as the InWood standard for evaluating 
contributory liability claims thorough a two-pronged test, where one aspects 
refers to the knowledge standard for secondary liability; 
If a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to 
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one 
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially 
responsible for any harm done as result of the deceit219. 
 
It appears that the InWood knowledge standard is a broad knowledge standard 
that consists of actual knowledge and constructive knowledge of infringement 
through the ‘had reason to know’ test. The question raised here refers to the 
possibility of applying the InWood standard to ISPs, because the prerequisite 
for the InWood knowledge standard is “continues to supply its product to one 
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement”, 
whereas an ISP is only a service provider, not a product supplier.  
This question has been answered according to case law. Case law has shown 
that supply terms in the InWood knowledge standard have been extended to 
services as well. As such, the modern courts have evaluated the knowledge of 
service providers with the InWood knowledge standard, as in the cases of 
Perfect 10 Inc. v. Visa International Service Association; National Federation 
of the Blind, Inc. v. Loompanics Enterprises Inc.; Tiffany v. eBay; and the 
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Network Solution case220. In the latter case, the court acknowledged that the 
InWood standard could be applied to the internet if there is evidence of 
monitoring and control221. The reasons behind extending the scope of the 
InWood standard are the growth of the online marketplace and the 
considerable number of infringement of trademark and notification cases222. 
3.3.1 Actual Knowledge Interpretations 
Assessing the appropriateness of the InWood knowledge standard in 
evaluating ISPs’ actual knowledge about users’ trademark infringement is vital 
to uncover whether actual knowledge has been interpreted as general or 
specific knowledge and as human or machine knowledge. This assessment is 
also important to discover who the burden of the identification of trademarked 
work and the identification of the locations of trademark infringement is 
placed on and to identify the role of notice by the right holder in proving ISPs’ 
knowledge and efforts to restrict trademark infringement. 
3.3.1.1 Specific Knowledge 
Concerning whether actual knowledge in the InWood knowledge standard 
requires specific knowledge or not, the answer can be found in the Tiffany Inc. 
v. eBay Inc. case223. Tiffany sued eBay for direct and contributory trademark 
infringement (based on the InWood case), unfair competition, and other 
infringements. The plaintiff argued that counterfeit Tiffany silver jewellery 
had been sold on the eBay website and that eBay had permitted hundreds of 
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thousands of counterfeit silver jewellery items to be offered for sale on the 
eBay website from 2003 to 2006224. Tiffany argued that it put eBay on notice, 
sent by email, but eBay ignored it and did not investigate and control the 
illegal activity. The 2
nd
 Circuit225 concluded that eBay did not have the 
requisite level of knowledge to satisfy the InWood standard because “for 
contributory trademark infringement liability… a service provider must have 
more than a general knowledge or ‘reason to know’ that its service is being 
used to sell counterfeit goods”226.The information from Tiffany was general 
information and could not help the defendant to identify specific cases of 
infringement. Therefore, eBay was not liable for contributory trademark 
infringement. 
Although the 2
nd
 Circuit noted that general knowledge in this case was 
insufficient and defined the InWood knowledge test as requiring specific 
knowledge, it was not clear how much knowledge defines specific knowledge. 
In this regard, the Supreme Court drew attention to the InWood standard’s 
plain language: “continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement”227. The case shows that 
the court explicitly linked specific knowledge to individual infringers. 
Similarly, in Perfect 10 Inc. v. Visa International Service Association, Perfect 
10 filed against Visa International Service Association, alleging that some 
websites that were using the Perfect 10 trademark were stolen-content 
websites. Therefore, authorizing those websites to draw on the Perfect 10 
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trademark led the public to believe that some websites belonged to Perfect 10. 
Moreover, Visa had been informed and was able to choose to stop processing 
payments to these websites, which might have had the practical effect of 
stopping or reducing the infringing activity. The court refused the plaintiff's 
argument due to the lack of specific knowledge of infringement and stated: “a 
defendant must have... continued to supply an infringing product to an 
infringer with knowledge that the infringer is mislabelling the particular 
product supplied”228. The plaintiff was not able to prove that the defendant had 
“induce[d] a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark or supplied a product to 
a third party with actual or constructive knowledge that the product [was] 
being used to infringe the mark”229. 
The court in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions Inc., furthermore, 
held that a trademark owner’s mere assertion that its domain name had been 
infringed was insufficient to impute knowledge of infringement. Moreover, the 
court stated that while “uncertainty of infringement [is] relevant to the 
question of an alleged contributory infringer’s knowledge… [a] trademark 
owner’s demand letter is insufficient to resolve this inherent uncertainty”230. 
A close analysis of the above interpretations of the actual knowledge test in the 
InWood knowledge standard shows that actual/ISP knowledge (according to 
the InWood standard) requires specific knowledge about the infringer’s act. In 
line with this, general information or machine knowledge do not suffice. 
Specific knowledge in these circumstances is related to knowledge processing 
in computer philosophy, as cited in Chapter 2, because affirming ISP liability 
based on general knowledge could lead to affirming the duty of infringement 
investigation for ISPs, although others have noted that the specific knowledge 
requirement is ‘novel’ and ‘wrong’231. 
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Additionally, evaluating specific knowledge is another factor that needs to be 
addressed to understand how the courts deal with evaluating specific 
knowledge and what the guidelines are. The courts, as noted in the Sony and 
Tiffany cases232, mostly seem to intend to restrict the extension of contributory 
liability and instead apply the nature of direct infringement, the plaintiff’s 
argument, and evidence to evaluate the ISP’s specific knowledge of users’ 
trademark infringement. In addition, in the case of Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., the court considered “direct control and monitoring of 
the instrumentality used by the third party to infringe the plaintiff's mark”233in 
order to evaluate specific knowledge. However, implementing such criteria 
(direct control, monitoring, the nature of direct infringement, and so on) 
breaches the values of the narrow standard of trademark infringement set by 
the InWood knowledge standard, as the lack of guidance on specific 
knowledge can lead to divergent interpretations of such knowledge.  
3.3.1.2 Identification of Infringement 
According to the InWood standard, providing specific information about the 
location and identification of trademark infringement is the duty of the right 
holder or plaintiff, because of non-commercial use or fair use of trademarks 
and other legitimate situations that make it complicated to identify trademark 
infringement. In this regard, what needs to be addressed is whether when a 
plaintiff carries out its duty of the identification of infringement, it should do 
so by a notice through email or whether there are other acceptable approaches. 
This research analyses several cases as follows to examine the criteria for 
providing information to identify trademark infringement. 
In the case of Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., Tiffany claimed that it had sent a 
demand letter “asserting that counterfeiting was rampant on eBay’s website 
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and that any listing of five or more Tiffany items was presumptively 
counterfeit” and argued that the letter should not be dismissed as too general. 
There was no dispute regarding the type of such notice; the dispute only 
referred to the information, which was not adequate to identify the 
infringement that the plaintiff claimed. The court noted explicitly that to accept 
such a claim would: 
Credit the potentially self-serving assertions of a trademark owner, 
particularly when those assertions... were unfounded, and when the 
trademark owner’s demands, if met, clearly would have eliminated 
even legitimate sales on eBay. The doctrine of contributory liability 
cannot be used as a sword to cut off resale of authentic Tiffany 
items234. 
 
The court concluded that the letter from Tiffany that was presented did not 
provide sufficient information to identify the infringement, and the court 
declared that evidence of general knowledge of infringement on the eBay 
website was insufficient to impute knowledge to eBay of specific infringement 
items235. Here, it should be noted that an address or email by itself cannot 
prove knowledge of the identification of infringement and cannot prove that 
notice regarding the trademark was sent in good faith. This is because in most 
marketplaces, a direct infringer is able to delete one account and immediately 
post under a different email address or username236. 
In GMA Accessories Inc. v. Electric Wonderland, GMA was the owner of the 
CHARLOTTE trademark, which was used for “clothing, footwear and 
headgear, namely hats, scarves, gloves and socks”. GMA sued Electric 
Wonderland, a corporation that supplied showroom services to the fashion 
industry and fashion accessories to prospective wholesale purchasers. GMA 
contended that their CHARLOTTE trademark had been used illegally, as the 
Solnicki goods in Electric Wonderland's showroom were labelled ‘Charlotte 
Solnicki’. GMA argued that Electric Wonderland had knowledge or reason to 
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know of the CHARLOTTE trademark because the GMA registration of the 
trademark could lead to constructive notice. Furthermore, Electric Wonderland 
was served with the complaint on 4 April 2008, but did not answer nor remove 
the infringing goods. The clerk of the court issued a certificate of default 
against Electric Wonderland on 30 April 2008. 
Similarly to the GMA case, the court recognised the notice as knowledge in 
the Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions Inc. case
237
. The 9
th
 
Circuit had recently affirmed contributory trademark and copyright 
infringement claims against a web hosting company that hosted an allegedly 
infringing website. In the Louis Vuitton case, the plaintiffs sent 18 notices of 
infringement to the defendants
238
 from 2006 to 2007 and demanded the 
removal of the infringing websites from the web servers run by Chen and his 
companies
239
. The court acknowledged receipt of a notice that consisted of 
the names of the websites and the infringed trademark as actual knowledge 
for contributory liability. The court affirmed that for finding contributory 
liability, the test only mandates “actual or constructive knowledge that the 
users of services were engaging in trademark infringement”240, and intent is 
not necessary. 
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., the court applied the 
InWood test and stated that the test’s ‘narrow standard’ requires knowledge of 
‘identified individuals’ engaging in infringing conduct. In other cases also, 
notification was identified as an approach to providing knowledge or 
information regarding the identification of the trademark infringement, as can 
be found in Gucci America Inc. v. Hall & Associates241. 
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3.3.1.3 Appraisal 
Close analysis of the aforementioned case law shows that the courts removed 
the chance of debate by explicitly placing the burden of the identification of 
trademark infringement on the plaintiff, which seems logical. Due to the 
possibility of passing off and other legitimate uses of a trademark, it is not 
possible for an ISP to identify infringement by itself. In regard to tort, the 
rationale of this duty can also be seen in the general rule of tort and the 
formalist theory of tort (Kant) concerning omission in negligence, which does 
not provide an affirmative duty to act for the benefit of another without right 
(although there is liability for misfeasance)242. However, in terms of the 
approach to accomplish this duty, the courts have not strictly focused on a 
fixed format of notification but have widely admitted that such notification is 
an approach to supplying ISPs with information about the identification of 
alleged trademark infringement, as can be found in all of the discussed cases 
(Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., GMA Accessories Inc. v. Electric Wonderland, and 
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions Inc.). The courts focused on 
notification through any method, whether through email, demand letter, or 
other ways. There is no requirement for a physical or electronic signature. In 
line with this, a question is raised as to whether a single notification for the 
infringement of multiple trademarks at a single online site is acceptable. It is 
also debatable just what constitutes reasonable information sufficient for 
finding the location of material in a statement of the complaining party with 
the good faith belief that the use of the trademark is wrong or not authorised 
by the trademark owner (or its agents or the law). Case law does not answer 
these questions.  
Although the court in the Louis Vuitton case linked the notification to specific 
information rather than to general information, a legal gap exists regarding the 
concept of specific information, because it is not clear whether specific 
information requires the names of the website, trademark, infringer, 
complainer, and others. Furthermore, the court recognised receipt of the name 
of a website as specific information and evidence of actual knowledge in the 
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Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions Inc. case243. However, this 
cannot be used as guidance for all cases, because a trademark could be linked 
to a website with a different URL at a different time, which makes finding 
such alleged infringement complicated. However, despite the lack of guidance 
in relation to notification in the above cases (chiefly the case of Louis Vuitton 
Malletier S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions Inc.), the lesson for plaintiffs is that they 
must be vigilant in their efforts in monitoring infringement through providing 
notices, in order to maintain their chance to impose secondary liability on a 
defendant. Regarding the specific knowledge required, the courts have taken a 
different approach to reach a conclusion and, consequently, both of trademark 
holders and ISPs does not know when a notice could be proof of specific 
knowledge. 
3.3.2 Constructive Knowledge 
In the absence of actual knowledge of a specific act of direct infringement, 
constructive knowledge is assessed to find out whether the defendant (the ISP) 
had reason to know it was contributing to infringement or not. In this regard, 
interpretations of the reason to know user infringement (probabilistic 
knowledge) have been made in the light of the capability or incapability of the 
plaintiff's proactive notifications to expose constructive knowledge based on 
the InWood standard and ‘wilful blindness’. 
3.3.2.1 Probabilistic Knowledge 
In the Tiffany case, the central argument was the ‘five-or-more’ rule set out in 
its demand letters to eBay, which was the “operative framework through which 
[(according to Tiffany)] eBay should have known that a listing was 
counterfeit”244. The other substantial point that Tiffany applied to support its 
argument for illustrating constructive knowledge was the content of the 
demand letters that were sent by Tiffany to eBay, “asserting that counterfeiting 
was rampant on eBay’s website and that any listing of five or more Tiffany 
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items was presumptively counterfeit”245. In short, Tiffany claimed that it had 
sent over 1,000 NOCIs (notices of claimed infringement) to eBay and that 
buyers complaining that they had purchased fake Tiffany jewellery had sent 
over 100 emails to eBay during a six-week period, which Tiffany argued could 
lead to constructive knowledge or ‘reason to know’. However, the court 
disagreed because the “service provider must have reason to know that its 
service is being used to sell counterfeit goods”246, while “evidence of general 
knowledge of infringement on its website was insufficient to impute 
knowledge to eBay of specific infringing items”247. The court applied the 
InWood knowledge standard rather than evaluating the probabilistic 
knowledge that someone merely might infringe the trademark in common law 
tort based on the ‘reasonable man’ test or deducing.  
In the case of GMA Accessories Inc. v. BOP LLC248, GMA contended that its 
trademark had been registered and therefore registration was constructive 
notice to the defendant, and it could be the basis to provide constructive 
knowledge for contributory infringement. In addition, it supported its claims of 
the existence of ‘had reason to know’ through the notices and numerous emails 
that GMA had sent to BOP. The court quoted the 2
nd
 Circuit’s language in 
Tiffany v. eBay (insufficiency of general knowledge)249 and refused the 
plaintiff’s argument for constructive notice (federal trademark registration as 
basis of knowledge)250. 
Similarly to GMA Accessories Inc. v. BOP LLC, in the case of Nomination Di 
Antonio E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories Ltd.251, the plaintiff 
based its claims on the fact that the licensor defendants continued to supply 
their own intellectual property to the supplier defendants despite their 
knowledge that the supplier defendants were infringing the plaintiff’s mark. 
The case also demonstrated the interpretation of the ‘had reason to know’ or 
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constructive knowledge standard in the scope of specific knowledge and did 
not recognise federal trademark registration as evidence of ‘had reason to 
know’, because such constructive notice is insufficient to provide knowledge 
for the individual infringer. However, the difference in this case was that the 
court applied the Lockheed Martin test, in contrast with other traditional 
criteria, to assess the knowledge by examining the defendant’s control and 
monitoring procedures, as clarified in the specific knowledge part. To assess 
the knowledge, the court noted and applied the 9
th
 Circuit’s opinion in 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.252, which ruled that: 
when measuring and weighing a fact pattern in the contributory 
infringement context without the convenient ‘product’ mold dealt 
with in InWood Lab., we consider the extent of control exercised 
by the defendant over the third party’s means of infringement [and 
thus the direct] control and monitoring of the instrumentality used 
by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark. 253 
 
Thus, the court examined the plaintiff’s allegations in the light of the 
Lockheed Martin test. The plaintiff alleged that “the Licensor Defendants are 
sophisticated companies that regularly engage in and carefully control and 
monitor the licensing of their respective intellectual property”. The court 
found, however, that the fact that the licensor defendants monitored and 
controlled the licensing of their own marks did not mean that they also 
monitored and controlled the manufacture and distribution of the counterfeit 
bracelets produced by the supplier defendants254. The court concluded that 
because the plaintiff had not sufficiently shown that the licensor defendants 
exercised the necessary ‘direct control and monitoring’ of the supplier 
defendants’ activity, the claim for contributory infringement against the 
licensor defendants was deficient. 
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In the case of Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A.255, the court clarified 
the current situation: not only should knowledge of the patent infringement be 
actual knowledge, but the intent to induce, aid, or abet infringement should 
also be thoroughly assessed, as the two aspects are interrelated. The significant 
point here is that the court (in terms of imposing secondary liability in the 
same way as in the aforementioned trademark cases) evaluated the defendant’s 
intent to supply a product, rather than the defendant’s actual knowledge of the 
patenting and registration of a trademark256. 
Moreover, potential infringement does not mean constructive knowledge, as 
ruled by the case of Hendrickson v. eBay257: the court’s ‘innocent infringer’ 
ruling was premised on the court’s determination that eBay had no affirmative 
duty to monitor its own website for potential trademark violation and that the 
plaintiff had failed to put eBay on notice that particular listings violated the 
plaintiff’s Lanham Act rights before filing the lawsuit.  
In contrast with the aforementioned cases, the court in the Tiffany case 
highlighted that probabilistic knowledge of third-party trademark infringement 
through Tiffany’s notice was sufficient for establishing constructive 
knowledge. Tiffany supported its argument in line with the restatement test 
(rather than the InWood test), in which a party may be found liable for 
contributory trademark infringement when “the actor fails to take reasonable 
precautions against the occurrence of the third person’s infringing conduct in 
circumstances in which the infringing conduct can be reasonably 
anticipated”258. However, the court focused on the InWood test rather than the 
restatement test as the tort law test for constructive knowledge to avoid 
admitting the probabilistic knowledge of infringement as constructive 
knowledge for holding an ISP liable. 
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Considering the rulings in the aforementioned cases, attention has been paid to 
the differences in the scope of constructive knowledge in the InWood test and 
in its origin of common law tort. This is a vital factor because, in tort, liability 
is based more on negligence (a breach of duty) rather than on knowledge about 
a user’s infringement. It should be considered that the courts, as applied in the 
Tiffany case, evaluate only two factors: one is whether the defendant provided 
a service for enabling infringement and had direct control over the means of 
infringement. The other is whether, based on the InWood test, the defendant 
continued to supply its services to one whom it knew or had reason to know 
was engaging in trademark infringement. The courts do not focus on the ‘but 
for’ test of tort in the light of causation of harm and do not require ISPs to 
follow the ‘reasonable anticipation’ standard to find out whether there was 
constructive knowledge or not259. 
 3.3.2.2 Wilful Blindness 
When the defendant has knowledge of infringement through direct 
infringement conduct but does not respond by removing or ceasing 
infringement, knowledge can be affirmed by assessing for ‘wilful blindness’. 
In this regard, there is some confusion as to how to distinguish wilful blindness 
from negligence. Case law has interpreted wilful blindness as being different 
from negligence. The court explicitly noted in the Hard Rock Café case260 that 
negligence refers to a failure to take reasonable steps (in that case, to detect 
and prevent the sale of counterfeit Hard Rock Café goods), and that a failure to 
take reasonable steps does not affirm wilful blindness, because to be wilfully 
blind a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate. 
The ‘had reason to know’ standard of assessing for contributory liability 
required to understands what a reasonably prudent person would understand. 
                                                          
259
 The court especially noted that the InWood test does not require the ‘reasonable 
anticipation’ standard: the InWood majority, in response to Justice White’s concurring 
opinion, explicitly rejected the notion that it was endorsing the ‘reasonable anticipation’ 
standard, holding that “[i]f the Court of Appeals had relied upon [the reasonable anticipation 
standard] to define the controlling legal standard, the court indeed would have applied a 
‘watered down’ and incorrect standard”; Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d [503]. 
260
 Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services Inc., 955 F. 2d 1134, 1149 (7
th
 Cir. 
1992); Microsoft Corp. v. Black Cat Computer Wholesale Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 118, 123 
(W.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 89 
 
In other words, wilful blindness exists when the defendant knows and turns a 
blind eye to the conduct of the direct infringer and continues to contribute to 
the infringement in terms of providing services. 
 Similarly, in the Tiffany case, to assess for wilful blindness, the court required 
evidence of the defendant’s specific knowledge of individual infringement and 
stated that wilful blindness “requires more than mere negligence or mistake 
and does not lie unless the defendant knew [there was a] high probability of 
illegal conduct and purposefully contrived to avoid learning of it, for example 
by failing to inquire further out of fear of the result of the inquiry”261. The 2nd 
Circuit stated that “when [a service provider] has reason to suspect that users 
of its services are infringing a protected mark, it may not shield itself from 
learning of the particular transaction by looking the other way”262.Therefore; 
constructive knowledge for wilful blindness is interpreted by the courts in a 
narrow way. Moreover, according to case law, the courts have ruled that 
through monitoring, controlling, and wilful blindness, constructive knowledge 
(‘had reason to know’) in the InWood test “does not extend so far as to require 
non-infringing users to police the mark for a trademark for a trade name 
owner”263. Similarly, in the Tiffany case, the court affirmed that a service 
provider does not have a duty to investigate and work as trademark police, and 
it noted that “without specific knowledge or reason to know, the plaintiff was 
under ‘no affirmative duty to ferret out potential infringement’”264. Thus, 
constructive knowledge specifically for secondary liability of trademark 
infringement does not require ISPs to be trademark police. 
In the case of 1-800 Contacts Inc. v. Lens.com Inc. d/b/a Lens.com, 
Justlens.com and Justlenses.com265, 1-800 Contacts was a seller of contact 
lenses and products related to contact lenses and mostly did business through 
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its e-commerce website. 1-800 Contacts sued Lens.com for infringement of the 
1-800 Contacts trademark by having purchased 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks as 
keywords to trigger sponsored advertisements from Google. 1-800 Contacts 
claimed that this confused potential purchasers of 1-800 Contacts’ services by 
directing those purchasers to one of the Lens.com websites266. In this regard, 1-
800 Contacts claimed that the defendant’s action caused the likelihood of 
confusion. To evaluate whether there was wilful blindness, the court 
considered whether “the contributing party intended to participate in the 
infringement or actually knew about the infringing activities”. One cannot be 
‘wilfully blind’, however, and escape liability. To be wilfully blind, “a person 
must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately fail to investigate.”  
The court explicitly noted that “With respect to the 65,000 Infringing 
Impressions, the plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant knew about the 
infringement and failed to take action or was wilfully blind to it”. The court 
acknowledged that, for contributory liability, specific knowledge and intent of 
infringing are factors and that the notification content was based on Lens.com 
advertisements appearing when search terms related to the plaintiff were 
entered into Google and other search engines. Attached to that notification 
were a number of screenshots depicting Lens.com advertisements and 
advertisements from other contact lens companies267.  
Overall, the court refused the wilful blindness claim. The court questioned 
whether the notice (which was a spread sheet that listed specific URLs for the 
search results and link destinations) was enough for identification of trademark 
infringement and to fulfil the specific knowledge standard268. Commission 
Junction, an online advertising company, used the information in the notice to 
identify and contact the specific affiliates at issue. Commission Junction 
applied the information and informed Lens.com that “[a] number of the links 
are not associated with a Commission Junction publisher from what I can see”. 
However, the court stated that highlighting such information could not make 
the defendant able to identify the exact affiliate by itself, owing to the fact that 
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it did not have information for its affiliate network like Commission Junction, 
which had this and was able to contact the affiliates. Furthermore, another 
noticeable point that the court considered was the time of processing a URL 
and notice in terms of whether the URL can be attached to the notice or not. 
3.3.3 Appraisal 
The evaluation of constructive knowledge has mostly involved applying an 
objective test to assess for wilful blindness and does not relate to the other 
elements that constructive knowledge shares with common law tort, for 
instance the ‘should have known’ standard, which is based on the ‘reasonable 
man’ test. Furthermore, as case law has shown (Tiffany), constructive 
knowledge focuses on the nature of the action of the individual infringer and 
the service provider’s role in control and monitoring, so as to assess the 
specific knowledge of the service provider. In this regard, it is clear that 
human intervention is required to interpret the constructive knowledge of ISPs, 
because constructive knowledge is based on the ‘reasonable man’ test. In other 
words, although the courts apply strict interpretations of the ‘had reason to 
know’ user infringement in the InWood standard, divergent interpretations are 
still possible, because most of the courts are guided towards focusing more on 
objective elements rather than subjective elements. Although the courts in 
assessing objective knowledge have focused on specific knowledge, they have 
not amplified any fixed approaches or guidance to show how a plaintiff can 
fulfil its duty by giving  
ISP sufficient information to identify alleged trademark infringement. 
Therefore, it seems a difficult task for an ISP to evaluate whether the notice 
information provided by the plaintiff is reasonable or not. 
Moreover, on the one hand, the case law concerning the identification of 
infringement is silent about the precise format of an identification-compliant 
notice. However, on the other hand, it requires notification with specific 
information, while the possibility of providing specific and reasonable 
information without a fixed notification format or procedure is open to 
question. However, this strict rule does not play a role in the final decision on 
 92 
 
knowledge because, for evaluating both notification and specific information 
requirements, the courts apply the ‘reasonable man’ test based on the nature of 
the defendant’s conduct (although this does not fit with ISPs). Thus, it seems 
that constructive knowledge still has more links with common tort law due to 
the possibility of human deduce. Consequently, current interpretations cannot 
preserve the interests of both parties: for instance, ISPs do not know whether 
their practices may cause a challenge by other trademark holders; on the other 
hand, trademark owners do not know when particular knowledge can be 
attached to an ISP. 
3.3.4 The Lanham Act Safe Harbour and ISP Knowledge Standards 
In Section 32(b) of the Lanham Act, a safe harbour is provided for publishers 
and online providers of content written by others that violate a trademark: 
(B) Where the infringement or violation complained of is contained 
in or is part of paid advertising matter in a newspaper, magazine, or 
other similar periodical or in an electronic communication as 
defined in section 2510(12) of title 18, the remedies of the owner of 
the right infringed or person bringing the action under section 
1125(a) of this title as against the publisher or distributor of such 
newspaper, magazine, or other similar periodical or electronic 
communication shall be limited to an injunction against the 
presentation of such advertising matter in future issues of such 
newspapers, magazines, or other similar periodicals or in future 
transmissions of such electronic communications. The limitations of 
this subparagraph shall apply only to innocent infringers and 
innocent violators. 
 
This section of the Lanham Act provides a limited safe harbour to ISPs, noting 
that this limitation shall apply only to innocent infringers and innocent 
violators. In the case of Hendrickson v. eBay
269
, the court found that eBay had 
no knowledge of a potential trademark violation before the plaintiff filed his 
suit; therefore, eBay was an ‘innocent infringer’. Consequently, the plaintiff’s 
remedy was limited to an injunction against the future publication or 
transmission of the infringing advertisements on eBay’s website270. By 
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observing the above provision and the Hendrickson case, it is clear that the 
Lanham Act and current case law do not provide any exceptions to ISPs’ 
liability via knowledge standard. Moreover, this limitation only refers to when 
an ISP does not have knowledge. It replaces the trademark owner’s entitlement 
to obtain a remedy with an injunction against the defendant for future issues. 
The court in the Hendrickson case elaborated and limited such an injunction to 
the necessary time, as it refused the plaintiff’s request due to the lack of 
necessity and ruled that: 
No authority supports [the] Plaintiff’s position. Indeed, such an 
injunction would effectively require eBay to monitor the millions of 
new advertisements posted on its website each day and determine, 
on its own, which of those advertisements infringe [the] Plaintiff’s 
Lanham Act rights. As the Court previously noted, ‘no law currently 
imposes an affirmative duty on companies such as eBay to engage 
in such monitoring’”. 
 
In the Lanham Act and case law, the safe harbour remains an unregulated one, 
and many ISP companies take some lessons from copyright provision to 
benefit from some exemptions to their secondary liability or knowledge by 
implementing private notice and take-down procedures so as to respond to 
both parties’ interests271. This self-regulation (e.g. eBay272 applies notice and 
take-down procedures) could perhaps be evidence of a good faith effort to 
focus on the trademark owner’s rights, but it has suffered legal issues like its 
origin of the DMCA Section 512. In short, the safe harbour gap in trademark 
law is still open. 
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3.3.4.1 Appraisal of the InWood Knowledge Standard and the Lanham 
Act Safe Harbour  
The InWood standard for evaluating ISPs’ knowledge for secondary liability 
of trademark infringement has rigorous criteria compared with common law 
tort. The InWood test requires that a service provider must ‘have known’ or 
‘had reason to know’ in both actual knowledge and constructive knowledge in 
relation to a particular third party who is engaging in trademark infringement. 
This is in contrast with the ‘reasonable anticipation’ standard, which has a 
wide scope and imposes secondary liability on ISPs by general knowledge or 
merely foreseeing wrongdoing by negligence (as in the Hines tort case). In 
other words, the courts provide strict interpretations of the term ‘specific 
knowledge’ and show that the InWood test is not based on probabilistic 
knowledge, which imposes more duties on ISPs. For instance, the plaintiff 
based its argument in the Tiffany case on the ‘but for’ test for causation to 
prove eBay’s knowledge, but the court refused this argument. Even if the 
InWood test and its interpretation have some advantages, it does not provide 
any guidance for attaching knowledge to ISPs and finding such knowledge, as 
mentioned in the discussion of the identification of trademark infringement. 
The InWood test and its interpretations address any disputes about the duty of 
the trademark owner to make available reasonable information sufficient for 
the identification of the trademarked work and its location, but the test is silent 
on how this must be done. Other questions that arise are: What is defined as 
reasonable information? Should reasonable information be done through 
notice? What should the terms and format of the notice be? What about a 
representative notice for multiple infringements? In line with this, what is the 
rule on bad faith belief (due to the possibility of illegal allegations being made 
by the other party)?  
As analysed, there is a lack of guidance in the InWood standard regarding the 
above questions and this legal vacuum leaves both plaintiffs and defendants in 
complicated situations. In addition, to evaluate both notifications and specific 
information, the courts consider the nature of the defendant’s conduct through 
the Lockheed Martin test. However, this approach places less focus on the 
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subjective knowledge measure and thus it could affect the ‘reasonable man’ 
test and lead to divergent approaches. Furthermore, concerning constructive 
knowledge, the InWood test has been applied in a strict way for imposing the 
duty of investigation onto an ISP. However, issues arise in the objective 
knowledge or ‘wilful blindness’ test, which are part of the ‘reasonable man’ 
test. In other words, even though the courts apply strict interpretations of the 
‘had reason to know’ aspect of the InWood standard, the standard is still open 
to divergent interpretations because, in most decisions, the courts focus on the 
objective elements rather than the subjective elements. 
The Lanham Act safe harbour is limited to when an ISP is innocent. Moreover, 
the Lanham Act safe harbour replaces the remedy with an injunction for future 
services. Other types of safe harbours exist for ISP companies; for example, 
notice and take-down procedures may be used as evidence to prove an ISP’s 
good faith belief. However, there are still legal issues, such as the DMCA safe 
harbour. Thus, the InWood knowledge standard and its interpretations, even 
though they have some advantages, still have the above legal ambiguities 
regarding knowledge standards.  
3.3.5 Conclusion  
It appears that the US knowledge standard for ISPs’ secondary liability for 
copyright infringement is in the form of a broad knowledge standard that 
consists of actual knowledge, traditional constructive knowledge, and 
awareness of infringement in the form of the ‘red flag’ test. Regarding the case 
law knowledge standard, it only consists of actual and constructive knowledge 
and the ‘red flags’ is absent. The case law knowledge standard is judicially 
interpreted widely and differently, although its scope has been limited by the 
Sony case (non-infringing use), the Grokster case (inducement), and the 
Perfect 10 case (evaluating specific knowledge and negligence in tackling 
infringement). The courts in this regard have been inconsistent in relation to 
ISPs’ functions and technical capabilities, and they have not tackled the 
possibility of ISPs having some duties without rights. Moreover, there is no 
cooperative approach that would reduce the possibility of imposing liability 
without knowledge and would guarantee freedom of expression and fair 
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competition, but there are possibilities of different interpretations due to the 
lack of specific guidance. Such uncertainty leads to a fear of liability. 
Additionally, the DMCA tries to establish a balance between both parties and 
encourage cooperation and coexistence by facilitating the possibility of 
proving a claim to pursue ISPs for copyright infringement. On the other hand, 
an ISP is protected when it does not possess knowledge or awareness. The 
DMCA manifests actual knowledge in the light of notice and take-down 
procedures and defines awareness of infringement through the ‘red flag’ test. 
Despite the aforementioned advantages, in practice, ISPs have been faced with 
divergent interpretations in terms of notice duration, form, and elements, and 
put back system that can be in conflict with fair competition and other rights. 
Furthermore, the DMCA standard in the scope of the ‘red flag’ test has some 
uncertainty in its definitions and the courts have applied divergent 
interpretations of it.  
Moreover, as case law proves, the courts (in contrast with US legislation) have 
intended to apply the traditional constructive knowledge. In addition, case law 
shows that the knowledge standard (which was initially one of the elements of 
traditional contributory liability) still in practice has its interpretations rooted 
in the formalist approach and receives its guidance and values from this initial 
source. 
Thus, the foregoing evaluation of the ISP copyright liability legislation and 
case law interpretations answers the research question that was posed at the 
beginning of the chapter, finding that a broad knowledge standard is 
appropriate and a single standard does not suffice. However, there is no 
compatibility between the case law approach and the broad knowledge 
standard of the DMCA, as there are inconsistencies between the judicial 
interpretations and the DMCA rules regarding the real functions of ISPs. This 
could affect the efficiency of the approach for deterring copyright infringement 
and promoting the ISP industry. Therefore, the DMCA knowledge standard is 
a broad knowledge standard and notice and take-down procedures can be used 
as part of an effective knowledge standard, subject to some modifications as 
recommended in the final chapter. 
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The limited case law available leaves the law of contributory trademark 
infringement ill-defined, “especially when applying it to online 
marketplaces”273. However, based on the aforementioned cases, the potential 
for imposing secondary liability in favour of trademark owners exists but 
ambiguities also exist as to how the trademark owner can provide knowledge 
according to the InWood knowledge standard. This could affect the interests of 
both parties in cooperating to combat infringement. Although the courts apply 
the InWood standard test rather than other tests such as tort law standards 
(probabilistic knowledge, negligence, and ‘but for’ tests), current 
interoperations do not eliminate the ‘reasonable man’ test and divergent 
interpretations.  
Regarding the role of differences of trademark and copyright, it seems that 
their potential differences (such as monitoring) does not have any consequence 
on criteria of evaluating ISP knowledge when ISP operate in a neutral manner 
and without inspecting of date (as would be more explained in chapter 5 and 
6).  
Consequently, the answer to the research question seems to be: the current 
broad knowledge standard seems appropriate in terms of the type of standard, 
but they suffer from legal weaknesses in the identification of infringement and 
the criteria for attaching specific knowledge and constructive knowledge to 
ISPs. Furthermore, current interpretations do not tackle these ambiguities and 
do not offer any proper guidance for upcoming cases or to encourage both 
parties’ interest in cooperation. Based on the current interpretations of the 
InWood standard, modifications and limitations to its scope (in the form of the 
‘reasonable man’ test) seem to be needed. In this regard, are made in the final 
chapter.  
 
  
                                                          
273
 Tiffany, 2010 Wl 1236315, [9]. 
 98 
 
CHAPTER IV: Knowledge Standards for ISPs’ Copyright and 
Trademark Liability in the EU E-Commerce Directive 
4.1 Introduction 
The knowledge requirement for imposing secondary liability for copyright and 
trademark infringement upon ISPs has been established explicitly in the 
European E-Commerce Directive (ECD) 2000/31274. It has been considered a 
vital factor for an information society service to benefit from the ECD’s safe 
harbours. The ECD was also introduced to harmonise ISP regulations, because 
the countries involved were different in terms of the criteria depicting ISP 
knowledge standards and ISPs’ liability. The divergence in the knowledge 
standards among the Member States affected the ISPs’ functions concerning 
the expansion of cross-border services as it caused uncertainty. This claim is 
attested by the ECD Recital 40: “Both existing and emerging ISP disparities in 
Member States’ legislation and case law concerning liability of service 
providers acting as intermediaries prevent the smooth functioning of the 
internal market, in particular by impairing the development of cross-border 
services and producing distortions of competition”275. 
Before the ECD, the lack of harmonisation regarding the knowledge standards 
for ISPs’ secondary liability prevented closer links being formed between the 
Member States and their people and prevented the free movement of 
information society services276. Meanwhile, some countries had specific 
regulations about ISPs or used case law or general tort in relation to ISP 
liability cases. Given this trend, the ECD knowledge standard was enacted to 
eliminate the aforementioned barriers and to contribute to the proper 
                                                          
274
 The directive was adopted on 8 June 2000. 
275 ECD Recital 40; ‘See also’ Anonymous, ‘EU progress on Internal Services Directive At 
Last’(2006) 24(5)  The Safety & Health Practitioner 8 <http://search.proquest.com> accessed 
1 March 2013. 
276
 As quoted in Recital 1 of the ECD: “moreover, specific free movement is a part of a general 
principle of law in the European Electronic Community, namely freedom of expression based 
on Article 10 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”; 
Pablo A. Baisterocchi, ‘Liability of Intermediary Service Providers in the EU Directive on 
Electronic Commerce’, (2003) 19 Computer & High Technology Law Journal112. 
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functioning of the internal market by ensuring the free movement of 
information society services between the Member States277. In this regard, the 
European Commission provided some limitations to the liability of ISPs in 
Articles 12–14 in the form of knowledge requirements. The knowledge 
standard is split into two forms: a) actual knowledge and b) awareness of 
apparent infringement (constructive knowledge). The scope of the knowledge 
standard is limited to certain types of ISP services in the internal market but it 
has the capability of covering different types of infringement278 in certain types 
of ISP services. In sum, the ECD takes a horizontal approach to ISPs’ 
knowledge279 i.e. it has recognized a criteria for assessing all types of 
infringement, like; copyright, trademark and other rights, whereas vertical 
approach is based on different critical for each type of infringement). 
Regarding the tendency of the Member States to implement the ECD 
knowledge standard in their national laws and as the First Commission Report 
noted, in Articles 12–14, the knowledge standard have been literally 
transposed to the national laws in most Member States280.However, copyright 
and trademark infringement legislation exists in many forms and this issue has 
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 ECD art 1(1); The ECD aims to be a leading law that each Member State has to impose 
upon its own national law. See also The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art 
288, 2008 O.J. (115) 74 ;“a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon 
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods.”). 
278
 This knowledge standard is widely defined and it covers information society services, 
which, according to ECD Article 2 (b), consist of any natural or legal person providing an 
information society service; For finding international perspective on ISP liability ‘See also’ 
Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual Property Rights 
Infringement, (2008) American Business Law Journal 45(2)247–282.   
279
 Weckstrom, ‘Liability for Trademark Infringement for Internet Service Providers’ (2012) 
16 MARQ. Intell. Prop. L. Rev 1 <http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi> accessed 11 
February 2013.  
280
 The First Commission Report, at 67, 72 for instance. France implemented the E-Commerce 
Directive with the passage of the law on copyright and related rights in the information society 
on 1 August 2006. In 2002, Spain implemented the E-Commerce Directive as part of its law 
on information society services and electronic commerce (with safe harbours for ISPs). 
Germany did the same in 2007 as part of the Telemedia Act and Italy did this in 2003, without 
specifying notice and take-down procedures for ISPs; see  Emerald Smith, ‘Lord of the files: 
International Secondary Liability for Internet Service Providers’(2011) 68Wash, & leel. 
Rev1575-1578.  
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raised some questions concerning the efficiency and clarity of the ECD 
knowledge standard281.  
This chapter focuses on the following research questions: Whether Electronic 
Commerce Directive provisions and case law interpretations are able to afford 
the legal integration regarding criteria and approaches to ISP knowledge 
standards, to shield ISP and other parties’ rights in information society.  Aside 
from these questions, the appropriateness of the legislation approaches 
(horizontal or vertical) to the knowledge standard and the knowledge-critical 
factors (i.e. constructive knowledge or awareness of apparent infringements) 
are explored. 
To answer these research questions, this chapter firstly draws attention 
specifically the ECD knowledge standard for ISPs’ liability for copyright and 
trademark infringement and then evaluates the application of the knowledge 
standard as a factor of the ECD’s safe harbour provisions. Furthermore, this 
study attempts to examine the related law cases and statutes (in different 
countries) to better elaborate the deficiency or efficiency of the ECD 
knowledge standard.  
4.2 ISP Knowledge Standard   
Article 14 of the ECD provides the knowledge standard for ISPs; if an ISP 
complies with the provisions, it is eligible to benefit from the exemption to 
limited liability as a hosting and/or caching service. It is worth noting briefly 
that the ECD limitation only gives ISPs immunity from financial damage; it 
does not eliminate the issuing of any types of injunction that are compatible 
with the national laws of the Member States, as demonstrated in the final 
paragraphs of Articles 12–14282 and Article 15 of the ECD283. In addition, the 
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 Due to the possibility of divergence in evaluating ISPs’ knowledge among the Member 
States, ISPs could be held liable without knowledge of the existence of illegal or infringing 
content.  
282
 Article 13-2 “This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative 
authority, in accordance with the Member States’ legal systems, of requiring the service 
provider to terminate or prevent an infringement”. Article 14-3 (hosting): “This Article shall 
not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with the 
Member States’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an 
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ECD does not define the types of liability applicable to ISPs284.Article 14 of 
the ECD classifies the knowledge requirement/standard into two aspects: 
actual knowledge and constructive knowledge, as below: 
Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, 
Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for 
the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on 
condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of 
illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is 
not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity 
or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such 
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable 
access to the information
285
. 
 
Article 14-1(a) (b) thus shows that the ECD knowledge standard is a broad 
knowledge standard because it comprises both actual and constructive 
knowledge. Alongside this, the ECD knowledge standard is based on the fault-
based liability of tort, rather than strict liability
286
. The use of a broad 
knowledge standard seems reasonable because in the present digital age, many 
people can access the internet at low costs and can easily violate copyright, 
trademark, or other rights (see the report on eBay counterfeit goods)
 287
. For 
this reason, a broad knowledge standard can protect the rights of right holders 
and can lead to better participation in the information society (on the internet).  
Moreover, for the most part, the objective knowledge requirement (awareness) 
can lead to tackling some objective violations. Furthermore, the ECD’s broad 
                                                                                                                                                        
infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures 
governing the removal or disabling of access to information”. 
283
 In addition, the IP Enforcement Directive and the Copyright Directive are explained and 
addressed in the last part of this chapter in terms of the assessment of knowledge and 
providing injunctions.  
284
 Baisterocchi (n 276)118; if an ISP does not qualify to benefit from Article 14, its liability 
will be determined by the national law of the relative member. This is the same as in the US, 
where if the ISP does not comply with the provisions of the DMCA, its liability will be 
determined by general tort law. 
285
 art14-1.  
286
 This view indicates that the roots of ISPs’ knowledge are in contributory liability, as 
explained in Chapter III; see Katri Havu, ‘Horizontal liability for Damages in EU law - The 
Changing Relationship of EU and National Law’(2012) 18(3) European Law Journal 424. 
287
 eBay (n264) 
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knowledge standard comprises many types of infringement, like trademark, 
defamation, copyright, and other infringement. In other words, the knowledge 
standard is based on a horizontal approach
288
 instead of a vertical approach, 
applying different approaches to different types of infringement. Moreover, in 
the vertical approach, the terms and conditions for evaluating an ISP’s 
knowledge of infringement are different, as the InWood standard for 
trademark infringement and the DMCA in the US show
289
. 
Concerning the rationale and philosophy behind applying the horizontal 
approach in the ECD, some commentators have noted that it reinforces the 
prohibition of monitoring (Article 15), because the impossibility of monitoring 
and controlling users’ data means that ISPs act as passive and neutral 
machines; therefore, implementing a horizontal approach seems to be in line 
with ISP functions
290
. However, in practice, there are differences between the 
types of infringements. For instance, a famous trademark does not need more 
monitoring or monitoring prohibition as trademark infringement is not the 
same as copyright infringement, as ruled in the InWood trademark standard in 
the US. It seems that, besides the monitoring prohibition, the logic behind 
implementing the horizontal approach is the result of a prevalent, instrumental, 
and economical view on the realism of tort that applies to the instrumental and 
economical view of protecting the economic advantages of ISPs, which are 
linked to the ECD’s aims291. Additionally, the horizontal approach of the 
knowledge standard links with fault-based liability, because fault-based 
                                                          
288
 This is based on whether the ISP is a broker or passive host service; see Brandon Peene, 
‘Lux for Less: Ebay’s Liability to Luxury Brands for the Sale of Counterfeit Goods’ (2010) 40 
SECTION HALL L.REW 1087-89; Michael Paroussis and Helen G. Papaconstantinou, 
‘Greece EU Directive Provides Little Help to Greek Patent Owners’, (2010) Building and 
Enforcing Intellectual Property Value 125. It’s worth noting that means of standard which 
applied in this part is knowledge standard for assessing ISP actual and constructive knowledge 
on user infringement. 
289
 They applied vertical approaches in terms of policing the owners of content on the web; 
Baisterocchi (n276)117. 
290
 See Kurt M. Saunders and Gerlind Berger-Walliser, ‘The Liability of Online Markets for 
Counterfeit Goods: A comparative Analysis of Secondary Trademark Infringement in the 
United States and Europe’, (2010) 32(1) Northwestern Journal of International Law and 
Business 55-63. 
291
 The ECD has been broadly compared with the relevant US laws in Chapter V. 
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liability depends on the ISP’s infringement with knowledge, rather than the 
types of rights that were infringed by the ISP.  
Following from the above outline of the fundamentals of the ECD knowledge 
standard, the research moves to discuss the appropriateness of the ECD broad 
knowledge standard and the efficiency of case law’s interpretations of it, in 
order to partly answer the research questions. 
4.2.1 Actual Knowledge  
The ECD only classifies the level of ISP knowledge for secondary liability, 
instead of defining what actual knowledge is. Which type of knowledge does 
actual knowledge require? Does it require human knowledge or computer 
knowledge on illegal activities or illegal information from the hosting or 
caching service? Does actual knowledge constitute intent and negligence? 
Overall, the ECD is silent regarding the concept of actual knowledge, 
preventing ISPs from easily recognising which activities or information are 
legal and which are illegal. In addition, it does not specify whether actual 
knowledge requires general knowledge or if it requires specific knowledge in 
relation to illegal content
292
. In short, the ECD leaves it to the court to 
determine the levels and types of knowledge that actual knowledge requires.  
In this regard, the courts provide different rules. For instance, Spain transposed 
actual knowledge to its Information Society Services and Electronic 
Commerce Act 2002
293
 (LSSICE) in Articles 16 and 17. In the case of 
ajoderse.com, the Spanish court applied a restrict interpretation relating to 
actual knowledge in Article 17 (concerning the immunity of information 
location tools). The court stated that for a service provider to be held liable: 
                                                          
292
 Saunders and Walliser (n312) 62. 
293
 “In July 2002, the Spanish Parliament approved Act 34/2002 on the Information Society 
Services and E-Commerce, by means of this new Act, which came into force in October 2002, 
the Spanish authorities incorporated the EC Directive 2000/31 (‘Directive on electronic 
commerce’) into Spanish law”; Alberto P. Gómez, ‘Act on E-Commerce’, (2002) IRIS Merlin  
<http://Merlin.Obs.Coe.Int> accessed 12 July 2012; ‘See also’ Carolina Gonzalez-Honorato, 
‘The Information Society Services and Electronic Commerce Spanish Act’(18th BILETA 
Conference, London, April 2003) <http://www.bileta.ac.uk> accessed 12 July 2012.  
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…there must be actual knowledge on the part of the service 
provider that the hyperlinked activity or information is illegal. 
However, even if the service provider knows that the linked pages 
are illegal, Law 34/2002 defines what is understood as actual 
knowledge in the final paragraph of Article 17.1
294
. 
  
Furthermore, the German courts have stated that actual knowledge is specific 
knowledge about the illegal content, rather than general knowledge of the 
infringement
295
. In addition, the German courts have explicitly focused on the 
relationship between specific knowledge and negligence and have noted that 
actual knowledge is not dependent on negligence or intent, unlike constructive 
knowledge.  
Generally, the lack of guidance for interpreting actual knowledge of 
infringement in the ECD causes the courts to admit general knowledge rather 
than specific knowledge in practice and to focus on finding out about actual 
knowledge. As mentioned by Poch
296
, the courts in Spain have decided some 
cases based on the nature of fact and general knowledge, whereas actual 
knowledge is seen as related to specific knowledge of illegal activities.  
Admitting specific knowledge of infringement as actual knowledge does not 
close the debate on the efficacy of the ECD actual knowledge standard because 
this standard does not require ISPs to establish notice and take-down 
procedures to benefit from immunity of actual knowledge and to combat 
infringement. In this regard, the ECD (Recital4(only permits the Member State 
to “establish specific requirements which must be fulfilled expeditiously prior 
to the removal or disabling of information”297. To achieve this, ISPs need to 
harmonise their notice and take-down procedures, with specific elements 
across all EU Members States. The following section analyses some of the 
                                                          
294
 Miquel P. egueraPoch, ‘I Just Know that I (actually) Know Nothing’: Actual knowledge 
and Other Problems in ISP Liability Case Law in Spain’, (2008), European Intellectual 
Property Review. 
295
 Greatest Hits II 12 O621/07, MMR [2008] and the case of Rapidshare II [1993] HCA 10; 
See Stefano Barazza, ‘Secondary Liability for IP Infringement: Converging Patterns and 
Approaches in Comparative Case Law’, (2012) 7(12) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and 
Practice 7.  
296
 Poch(n316) 
297
 Recital 46. 
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vital elements of notice and take-down procedures and their judicial 
interpretations. 
4.2.1.1 Actual Knowledge and Notice and Take-Down Procedures 
Notifications have been prevalent among the Member States as the mechanism 
for proving an ISP had actual knowledge of infringement. However, the fact is 
that the self-admitting notice as an approach to evaluate actual or specific 
knowledge of copyright or trademark infringement is not enough in 
establishing actual knowledge. In this regard, this research delves into the 
elements of notice and take down and its current law case interpretation: 
4.2.1.1.1 Identification of Copyrighted and Trademarked Works and 
Their Locations 
To obtain actual knowledge, an ISP needs information about the protection of 
copyright or trademarks and sufficient information about the location of the 
alleged infringement to find it among the vast content on the internet and 
numerous trademarks and goods. Regarding notice and take-down procedures, 
the ECD suffers from legal gaps in terms of offering useful guidance for 
clarifying how a proper notice must be formatted. It also suffers from a lack of 
clarity in the actual knowledge standard in terms of defining the entity 
responsible for providing reasonable information regarding the protection of 
copyright and trademarks and their locations. In this regard, there are 
differences in implementing the notice and take-down procedures and 
clarifying their elements:  
a) Many Member States (like Germany and the Netherlands) do not have a 
formal format for notification procedures but their case law and legal doctrines 
give some criteria
298
. 
b) Other Member States have not established formal notice and take-down 
procedures but notification is mandatory in their statutes (for instance in the 
UK).  
                                                          
298
 Federico Poggi and Alis-Irena Riviere-Osipov, ‘Legal Analysis of A Single Market for the 
Information Society’(2009) European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/information society> 
accessed 1 December 2011. 
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c) Some Member States have established formal notification procedures, such 
as France, Spain, and Italy
299
. However, Spain has imposed that a notification 
be sent to the ‘competent body’ instead of the ISP. Spain’s legislature also 
does not clarify which format the court requires a notice to follow. In addition, 
it does not clarify when the right holder has the right to send such a notice to 
the ‘competent body’300. 
d) In contrast to all of the above, the UK’s statutes state that notification must 
explicitly enclose reasonable information about the location of the alleged 
infringing content and the unlawful nature of the infringement.  
With respect to case law’s interpretations of notification and its elements, EU 
case law has recognised notification as an instrument to inform the defendant. 
The courts have applied this in the following cases: Lancôme Parfums et 
Beaute & Cie v. eBay International AG, SABAM v. Scarlet, ROLE v. eBay 
(Germany), and Louis Vuitton v. eBay (France).  
In the case of Louis Vuitton v. eBay (France), Louis Vuitton sued eBay and 
claimed that eBay did not take sufficient action to stop the sale of counterfeit 
goods on its online auction site. The issues went back to the admissibility of a 
general notice on the counterfeit goods and imposing investigative duties on a 
service provider, because eBay claimed that it did not have sufficient expertise 
to investigate and find out whether a product was counterfeit or if it violated 
the trademark of the protected goods
301
. eBay stated that if the owner of the 
trademark provided evidence to support his claim, eBay would take down the 
infringing material.  
                                                          
299
 See Laurent Szusk, Sophie Fourques de Ruyter and Jennifer Doucleff, ‘Beyond 
Counterfeiting: The Expanding Battle against Online Piracy’, (2009) 21 Intellectual Property 
& Technology Law Journal 4. 
300
 The official translation of Article 16 is as follows: “it will be understood that the service 
provider has the actual knowledge referred to in paragraph (a) when a competent body has 
declared that the data are unlawful or has ordered their removal or the disablement of access to 
them or existence of the damage has been detected and the removal of content that providers 
may apply by virtue of voluntary agreement and without prejudice to other means of actual 
knowledge that might be established.”;  Poch(316). 
301
 Patrick van Eecke and Barbara Ooms, ‘ISP liability and the E-Commerce Directive: A 
growing Trend Toward Greater Responsibility for ISPs’, (2007) 3 Journal of Internet Law 7 ;  
Patrick van Eecke and Maarten Truyens, ‘Recent Events in EU Internet Law’, (2010) Journal 
of Internet Law21. 
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The case shows that a plaintiff can generally inform or notify a website 
concerning the identification of the location of the infringing material and does 
not need to illustrate clearly a specific location of trademark infringement. In 
addition, it has been proven that a notice has to consist of information 
regarding the protection of a trademark by trademark law, although there are 
no specific rules regarding the reasonable information that a notification 
requires. In practice, the courts have admitted general information rather than 
specific information for the identification of infringement. Since case law 
illustrates that a plaintiff can force a service provider to address infringing 
material by providing only general information, this claim is evidenced by 
considering the duty of the ISP to implement technical measures to search its 
network to find the infringing martial. For instance, in the case of SARL Zadig 
Productions, Jean-Robert Viallet et Mathieu Verboud v. Ste Google Inc. et 
AFA
302
, the court believed that when Google was informed about the existence 
of the infringing film, it was obliged to prevent any future dissemination of the 
plaintiffs’ film. In short, case law interpretations frequently only require 
informing the ISP generally, rather than supplying the ISP with specific 
information. Other interpretations do not require copyright or trademark 
holders to send a notice with the specific location of the infringement or with 
reasonable information. 
Consequently, in analysing these cases, it appears that case law interpretations 
do not establish any useful guidance in relation to reasonable information on 
the alleged trademark or copyright infringement for creating a notification. 
The court permits accepting a notice with general information rather than 
specific information regarding the identification of copyrighted and 
trademarked works and their locations. Thus, in spite of broadly admitting 
notice as a factor of actual knowledge, case law interpretations suffer from a 
lack of specific and useful guidance concerning reasonable information in 
providing a notification. These legal gaps, accompanied with admitting general 
information as reasonable information for notification, lead to an increase in 
                                                          
302
 SARL Zadig Productions, Jean-Robert Viallet et Mathieu Verboud v. Ste Google Inc. et 
AFA, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (3d Chambers, 2d Section), decision of 19 October 
2007; Seagull Haiyan Song, ‘A Comparative Copyright analysis of ISP Liability in China 
Versus the United States and Europe’ (2010) 27 The Computer & Internet Lawyer 13. 
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the risk of ISPs being held liable without knowledge. Furthermore, admitting 
general information as reasonable information for notification forces the ISP to 
investigate to identify the location of the infringement in its network, which 
forces ISPs to act against the prohibition of monitoring (in conflict with Article 
15).  
4.2.1.1.2 Expeditiously Removing or Disabling Access by Receiving Notice 
as Actual Knowledge 
An investigation to find the location and intellectual property (IP) right 
protection of an alleged infringement requires time. The ECD, using the term 
‘working expeditiously’, requires ISPs to remove or disable access to the 
alleged infringement upon receiving the notice and then to contact the 
customer, or it requires ISPs to wait for the result of the contact with the 
customer, remove or block access to the alleged infringement, and consider the 
good faith belief of the notice. An ISP offering hosting and/or caching services 
has to consider multiple parties’ rights, including those of the ISP itself, 
copyright and trademark holders, and users
303
. Users, like copyright and 
trademark holders, seek online freedom of expression and safe networking 
places. Therefore, forcing ISPs to take down or block access to alleged 
infringing content expeditiously upon receiving a notice from an alleged right 
holder without contacting the user or customer creates legal issues. The owner 
of the website can easily take legal action against the ISP to receive 
compensation because of the unjustified removal of material.  
Consequently, to protect all parties, explicit definitions regarding the legal 
concept of ‘expeditious removal’ seem necessary304. In addition, the legal 
ambiguities about the rights and timescales involved for the ISP to contact the 
                                                          
303
 See Ian King, ‘On-line Privacy in Europe--New Regulation for Cookies’, (2003) 12(3) 
Information & Communications Technology Law 228 ;  Assafa Endeshaw, ‘Regulating the 
Internet: Clutching at a Straw?’ (1998) 20(16) Computer Communications 1520. 
304
 Some of the Member States have applied the word ‘expeditiously’ in their statutes, like 
Article 6.I.2 of the French CDEA: “They will similarly be exempt from liability if, upon 
obtaining such knowledge or awareness, they then act expeditiously to remove or disable 
access to the information”; ‘See also’ Huaiwen He ,’Safe harbor Provisions of Chinese Law: 
How Clear are Search Engines From Liability?’(2 0 0 8)  Computer law & S e c u r i t y R e p 
o r t 2 4 4 5 4 – 4 6 0 
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customer or user need to be tackled. The legal ambiguities relating to the term 
‘expeditiously’305 put ISPs in the middle of the door of306 being held liable: if 
an ISP ignores an alleged infringement notice (or addresses it too late), it 
might be sued by the right holder. If it recognises the notice and restricts 
access to the alleged infringing content, it might be sued by its users for 
breaching freedom of expression or breaching competition or other illegal 
actions
307
. The ECD does not address the above ambiguities. Likewise, EU 
case law does not have a fixed rule for responding to and clarifying the above 
ambiguities. For example, the Netherlands’ case law has interpreted the term 
‘expeditiously’ as requiring the alleged infringing content to be immediately 
taken down, while other cases have defined and interpreted the term 
differently. In line with this discussion, the Nas study
308
 is one of the best 
examples illustrating the divergent interpretations of ‘expeditiously’ removing 
or blocking access to alleged infringing content. Nas, in the Multatuli Project, 
studied three dial-up ISPs (Freeler, Tiscali, and Wanadoo), three paid access 
providers (Demon, Planet Internet, and XS4ALL), three hosting providers 
(iFast, Ladot/Active 24, and Yourhosting), and one cable internet provider 
(UPC/Chello). The Nas study clearly shows the existence of divergent 
interpretations on the term ‘expeditiously’, as further elaborated in the 
following paragraphs. 
Tiscali, as a large access provider in Europe, paid attention to a notice one day 
after receiving it, without sending a full complaint to the customer. The right 
holder’s representative told Tiscali to give the customer 48 hours to remove 
                                                          
305
 For instance, French law also requires the immediate removal or blocking of access in 
criminal cases: “Article 6.I.3 sets a stricter standard for criminal liability, since in this case the 
limitation of liability is only lost where there is actual knowledge of the unlawful nature of the 
material. Naturally, liability is likewise avoided by the hosting service provider who removes 
or disables access to the information as soon as it acquires such actual knowledge, pursuant to 
the provisions of Article 14 of the DEC” ; See pp 27-29. 
306
 Consider the effect of such vagueness when national jurisprudence determines an ISP’s 
liability as a contributing factor for a crime by using the national penal code. 
307
 For instance, in the 2006 Appellate Court of the Hague, all claims were rejected and it was 
ruled that freedom of expression should prevail over copyrights ; See Sjoera Nas, ‘The 
Multatuli Project: ISP notice & take down’ (2004) <http://www.bof.nl/docs> accessed 1 
December 2011. 
308
 ibid. 
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the alleged infringing content
309
. Furthermore, Wanadoo acted fast in response 
to a complaint by giving its customer 24 hours to remove the alleged 
infringing content without sending them a full complaint notice. It removed the 
offending website’s homepage ten days after receiving the second notice310. In 
addition, Yourhosting, a hosting service, received a complaint and removed 
the alleged infringing websites within three hours
311
. 
In addition, related to the right of an ISP to contact the user and to allow a 
logical time for taking down the alleged infringement, the Ladot/Active 24 
host service immediately contacted its customer to remove the alleged 
infringing content within 24 hours. Along with this, it contacted the copyright 
representative (Mr Droogleever) and stated that the content would be removed 
subject to customer response: if the customer claimed that the content had the 
copyright holder’s permission to be used, Ladot/Active 24 could not remove 
the alleged infringing content and Mr Droogleever would need to take legal 
action
312
. 
In line with the above host services, the iFast host service sent full details of 
the customer to the representative of the copyright owner and asked them to 
contact the customer directly. The representative of the copyright owner 
contacted the customer directly to remove the content and carbon-copied in 
iFast, insisting that if the customer ignored the takedown after 12 hours, it 
would take legal action against the customer. However, iFast complained 
within 12 hours
313
. 
In reviewing the above study in relation to recognising the service provider’s 
right to contact the user and to specify the time to take down the alleged 
content after receiving the notice, it appears that the service providers did not 
send full complaints to their customers. Four ISPs removed the materials 
without even looking at the websites or demonstrating any evidence of basic 
                                                          
309
 ibid. 
310
 ibid.  
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 Yourhosting contacted the customer and wrote to the representative of the copyright owner 
(Mr Droogleever) that “normally we only take materials off-line if we receive a written 
notification with proof, but in this case we have made an exception.” 
312
 ibid. 
313
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copyright knowledge
314
, and three hosting providers prevented their customers 
from defending their materials as not breaching IP rights.  
This shows that removing alleged infringing materials expeditiously only upon 
receiving a notice affects access to actual knowledge because it forces the ISP 
to take down alleged infringing materials even if the notice has been sent in 
bad faith, for instance if the notice was sent by a competitor of the right holder. 
Without a statement (see following section), this can aggravate issues, 
especially when there is a lack of a proper mechanism in case law 
interpretations and the ECD has to be used identify whether the notice was 
sent in good faith. In particular, issues arise when ISPs take down alleged 
infringing materials without waiting for the user’s response315. In summary, 
there are divergent interpretations about expeditiously removing or blocking 
access to alleged infringing content, and these interpretations are inadequate in 
filling the legal gaps of the ECD knowledge standard to protect the rights of 
ISPs and other parties.  
4.2.1.1.3 Good Faith, Put-Back Procedures and Statements 
Sometimes, right holders send a notice to an ISP in good faith that contains 
mistakes (wrong information), send a notice mistakenly, or send a notice 
intentionally to make content be removed by the ISP for reasons other than 
right infringement
316
. Therefore, the lack of a ‘statement’ from the sender as a 
precondition of taking down or blocking access threatens the ISP’s protection 
by the actual knowledge standard. In addition, the lack of put-back procedures 
to return the data back
317
 and a legal approach to evaluate the good or bad faith 
of a notice has effects on the efficacy of the actual knowledge standard.  
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Overall, it should be noted that the ECD actual knowledge standard is not 
adequate in helping ISPs determine whether to remove suspicious material or 
not. Finding out who the holder of a copyright or trademark alleged to have 
been infringed is or whether it is protected by fair use and so on requires 
specific knowledge, skills, and time, rather than expeditious action. It requires 
the evaluation of millions of bytes of data to find out which content is illegal. 
Imposing the above duties on an ISP forces the ISP to turn into a publisher 
rather than an intermediately service. Moreover, ISPs, in practice, receive 
numerous notices that are not sufficient as actual knowledge, are not sent in 
good faith, are sent in good faith but contain wrong information, or are sent 
wrongly to the ISPs. Indeed, complying with the ECD actual knowledge 
standard in current provisions causes ISPs to receive multiple complaints about 
an alleged infringement. In addition, the knowledge standard often leads to an 
ISP removing or blocking access to alleged infringing material automatically 
or systematically, without paying attention to others’ rights. Overall, a private 
notice that does not include the name, address, and electronic signature of the 
complaining party; sufficient information to identify the work alleged to be 
infringed; the location of the alleged infringing material; and a statement of the 
accuracy of the notice cannot give the ISP a chance to benefit from the actual 
knowledge standard in Article 14 of the ECD. Expeditiously removing or 
blocking access to the alleged infringing content upon receiving such a notice 
as sufficient knowledge does not reflect the ECD’s aim. 
4.2.2 Constructive Knowledge (Awareness) 
Article 14(1) (b) of the ECD considers constructive knowledge alongside 
actual knowledge for exempting ISPs from liability when the ISP “is not aware 
of facts or circumstances from which illegal activity or information is 
apparent”318. Awareness of apparent infringement is the same as ‘should have 
known’ or ‘had reason to know’ user infringement, as implemented in tort 
law’s evaluation of constructive knowledge319.  
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The following sections analyse Article 14(1) (b) in terms of how ISPs’ 
knowledge or awareness should be evaluated. An attempt is made to discover 
whether the ECD constructive knowledge standard comprises subjective and 
objective tests
320
. Alongside this, it explores the judicial interpretations of the 
term ‘apparent’. 
Considering the requirement that the service provider “is not aware of the facts 
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent” it 
seems that subjective knowledge is limited to the service provider’s awareness 
of the alleged infringement. The legal challenges concerning awareness refer 
to the constructive knowledge criteria for evaluating and defining the term 
‘apparent’. Should it be evaluated by a ‘reasonable man’ test (a tort law 
measure) or by a technical test (the same as the subjective elements of the ‘red 
flag’ test)? In order to find criteria for defining the term ‘apparent’, some EU 
countries’ legislations and law cases are explored.  
4.2.2.1 Act Criteria for Defining the Terms ‘Apparent’ and ‘Awareness’ 
in Assessing Constructive Knowledge 
 The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) states in Section 23 that 
“an article which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe is, an 
infringing copy of a copyright work”321. In considering the wording of “has 
reason to believe” in evaluating constructive knowledge and the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in the LA Gear Inc. v. Hi-Tec Sports Plc.322 case, it appears 
that the UK courts pay attention to the ‘reasonable man’ test rather than 
technical criteria in defining the terms ‘awareness’ and ‘apparent’.  
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Germany applies an assessment of ‘should have known’323 user infringement 
based on the ‘reasonable man’ test for evaluating subjective knowledge; 
therefore, the German courts define ‘awareness of apparent infringement’ in 
the same way as constructive knowledge. In other words, there are no specific 
interpretations of ‘apparent’ infringement.  
In contrast, Austrian legislature (according to the Commission Report) defines 
‘apparent infringement’ as manifestly illegal content and as infringement that 
is obvious to non-lawyers without further investigation
324
. In addition, in 
France, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that the sale of copyrighted video 
games well below counter prices is considered manifestly illegal content
325
.  
Analysing the above interpretations and legal criteria for interpreting the 
phrase ‘awareness of apparent infringement’, it appears that some countries 
have the tendency to implement the ‘reasonable man’ test to interpret and 
evaluate awareness of infringement. The fact is that implementing this test 
imposes aggregative issues on ISPs because it is based on general law grounds, 
which are not compatible with ISPs. An ISP needs clear guidance regarding 
apparent infringement rather than the varied ‘reasonable man’ test, in order to 
avoid confusion.  
4.2.2.2 Case Law Criteria for Defining the Terms ‘Apparent’ and 
‘Awareness’ in Assessing Constructive Knowledge 
EU case law has provided some guidance for evaluating and interpreting 
awareness or constructive knowledge. For instance, in the L’Oréal case, the 
court considered whether eBay had been aware of facts or circumstances from 
which the illegal activity or information was apparent, because offers for sale 
were at issue and infringed L’Oréal’s trademarks326. The court interpreted the 
terms ‘awareness’ and ‘apparent’ widely by noting that: 
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…it is sufficient, in order for the provider of an information 
society service to be denied entitlement to the exemption from 
liability provided in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, for it to have 
been aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a 
diligent economic operator should have identified the illegality in 
question and acted in accordance with Article 14(1) (b) of 
Directive 2000/31
327
.  
 
The court also explicitly admitted that ‘awareness’ must cover situations where 
the service provider concerned becomes aware, in one way or another, of such 
facts or circumstances
328. Additionally, the court ruled that ‘apparent’ 
infringement is infringement that a ‘diligent economic operator should have 
identified’; therefore, ISPs have to pay attention to the illegality of their users’ 
content. This shows that the court extended the scope of ‘awareness’ to cover 
all situations that could lead to obtaining knowledge about illegal content, 
instead of limiting it to obvious illegal activity or information. As illustrated in 
paragraph 122:  
The situations thus covered include, in particular, that in which the 
operator of an online marketplace uncovers, as the result of an 
investigation undertaken on its own initiative, an illegal activity or 
illegal information, as well as a situation in which the operator is 
notified of the existence of such an activity or such information. In 
the second case, although such a notification admittedly cannot 
automatically preclude the exemption from liability provided for in 
Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, given that notifications of allegedly 
illegal activities or information may turn out to be insufficiently 
precise or inadequately substantiated, the fact remains that such 
notification represents, as a general rule, a factor of which the 
national court must take account when determining, in the light of 
the information so transmitted to the operator, whether the latter was 
actually aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a 
diligent economic operator should have identified the illegality
329
. 
 
When considering the phrase ‘diligent economic operator should have 
identified’, it seems that the courts focus on the terms ‘apparent’ and 
‘awareness’ in light of the objective test, rather than offering any definitions. 
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This focuses on the ISP’s ‘active role’ regarding the infringement, as cited in 
paragraph 123: the operator plays such a role when it provides assistance that 
entails, in particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in 
question or promoting them
330
. Therefore, an ISP is liable if it is aware of the 
facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator 
should have realised that offers for sale or the provision of other services for 
trademarks or copyright were unlawful and, in the event of it being so aware, 
failed to act expeditiously in accordance with Article 14(1) (b) of Directive 
2000/31
331
. 
When analysing it closely, it seems that the ECJ only links the phrases 
‘awareness’ and ‘apparent’ to the phrases ‘diligent economic operator’ and 
‘active role’. In other words, it only uses a subjective and objective test for 
constructive knowledge without clarifying how an ISP can assess the phrases 
‘diligent economic operator’ and ‘active role’. In addition, the ECJ has 
concluded that it depends on the national courts to evaluate whether an ISP can 
pass these tests or not. This seems to allow the national courts to evaluate 
constructive knowledge by the ‘reasonable man’ test or other general criteria.   
Overall, it is clear that the current rules of EU case law are inadequate in 
offering a stable and reliable approach for ISPs to identify when a website is 
exhibiting apparent illegal infringement.  
4.2.2.4 Constructive Knowledge and Preventing Future Infringement with 
Injunctions  
The possibility of issuing injunctions raises questions regarding the ECD’s 
definition of constructive knowledge and how an ISP can accomplish 
preventing duty with general knowledge of infringement, because 
investigation and monitoring are in contrast with the general rule of Article 15. 
Article 15 of the ECD states that Member States shall not impose a general 
obligation on service providers to monitor the information they transmit or 
                                                          
330
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store by performing mere conduit, caching, and hosting services, nor should 
they be they under a general obligation to actively seek facts or circumstances 
indicating illegal activity332. However, the general obligation of non-
monitoring has some exceptions, according to Article 15-1, Recital 47,333 and 
Article 15-2:  
Member States may establish obligations for information society 
service providers: promptly to inform the competent public 
authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information 
provided by recipients of their service or obligations to 
communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, 
information enabling the identification of recipients of their 
service with whom they have storage agreements334.  
 
In general, the national courts have permitted the issuing of injunctions to 
order ISPs to prevent further infringement, as stated in Articles 12-3, 13-3, 14-
3335, 18-1336 and Recital 45337 of the ECD and in other EU directives (i.e. 
Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
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related rights in the information society, Directive 2004/48/EC on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, Directive 95/46/EC on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and 
electronic communications)338. The possibility of issuing an injunction in line 
with the above directives poses an issue regarding the application of the ECD 
knowledge standard; furthermore, such injunctions force ISPs to violate their 
users’ privacy rights because it causes their data to be monitored through 
implementing technical features like filtering339. In other words, it brings the 
harmonisation of the directives into question. To remedy this and to highlight 
the application of the ECD knowledge standard for accomplishing such 
injunction orders without breaching others’ rights, the ECJ provides some 
rules for the national courts when interpreting these directives and their 
conflicts, as discussed below340.  
In the case of L’Oréal SA v. eBay341, the court ruled that Member States have 
the right to order the operator of an online marketplace to take a measure that 
helps them to bring to an end the infringement of a copyright or trademark 
holder’s rights and to prevent further infringement. The court submitted that 
the third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights must be interpreted in line with the possibility of 
ordering an injunction to protect intellectual property. In addition, the court 
stated that injunctions must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive and 
should not create barriers to legitimate trades. The court admitted the right of 
right holders to order an injunction against a hosting service to prevent further 
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infringement. However, it did not offer any approach as to how a hosting 
service can prevent future infringement with general knowledge and without 
the right holder’s cooperation to supply the host service with reasonable 
information. In sum, although the court focused on the protection of IP rights 
in light of injunctions, it did not focus on the negative role of injunctions on 
ISPs when there is no legal approach to find the specific infringing item in the 
ISP’s network. It also did not discuss preventing users’ privacy rights from 
being infringed when an ISP searches for copyright or trademark infringement. 
Thus, the L’Oréal case ruling does not seem to have eliminated these legal 
conflicts. 
In the case of Promusicae v.Telefónica
342
, Promusicae requested that 
Telefónica disclose the personal data
343
 of users (29 people) who had used the 
Telefónica internet connection for the Kazaa file exchange programme (for 
peer-to-peer file sharing) and who had provided access to shared folders on 
their personal computers including phonograms in which the members of 
Promusicae held the exploitation rights. Promusicae stated that this data was 
needed to be able to bring civil proceedings against the people concerned, but 
Telefónica refused the request
344
. On 28 November 2005, Promusicae made an 
application to the Commercial Court No. 5, Madrid, for preliminary measures 
against Telefónica on the grounds that users of Kazaa were engaging in unfair 
competition and infringing IP rights. The court admitted this request on 21 
December 2005
345
. Telefónica appealed to the court and claimed that the order, 
according to what the LSSICE disclosed, was only authorised for a criminal 
investigation or for the purpose of safeguarding public security and national 
defence, not in civil proceedings or as a preliminary measure relating to civil 
proceedings. The legal issues were about the legal interpretation of Directives 
2000/31, 2001/29, and 2004/48 and with Articles 17(2) and 47 of the Charter. 
Promusicae submitted that the Member States, according to the purposes of 
these directives, must interpret Article 12 of the LSSICE in accordance with 
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these provisions
346
. In this regard, the court (the Grand Chamber)
347
 ruled that 
the directives “do not require the Member States to lay down, in a situation 
such as that in the main proceedings, an obligation to communicate personal 
data in order to ensure effective protection of copyright in the context of civil 
proceedings”. In addition, the court ruled that when transposing the directives, 
they should be interpreted in a way that allows a fair balance to be struck 
between the various fundamental rights protected by the community legal 
order.  
As a consequence, the case shows that compliance with the principle of 
proportionality
348
 is necessary for parties in order to make a balance between 
IP rights and fundamental rights. Therefore, an ISP must consider this balance 
when it prevents further infringement according to a preliminary order or 
injunction with constructive knowledge on infringement
349
. Here, the legal 
issue is the lack of guidance regarding how ISPs can accomplish the duty of 
preventing further copyright and trademark infringement and the difficulty of 
taking into account fundamental rights with general knowledge or constructive 
knowledge (Article 14.2(b)) at the same time, because complying with these 
duties requires specific knowledge on the copyrighted or trademarked work 
and the locations of alleged infringing materials, rather than general 
knowledge. In addition, requiring ISPs to implement technical measures for 
the investigation of users is also in conflict with fundamental rights. These 
barriers have been illustrated by the ECJ rulings in the following cases.  
The first case to be discussed is Scarlet v. SABAM
350
. SABAM is a 
management company that represents the authors, composers, and editors of 
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musical works and authorises the use of their copyrighted works by third 
parties. SABAM sued Scarlet (as an ISP) as its users were downloading works 
in SABAM’s catalogue from the internet. It argued that, without authorisation 
and without paying royalties, such use (by means of peer-to-peer networks) 
was copyright infringement. SABAM made a copyright infringement claim
351
 
and sought an order requiring Scarlet to bring such infringements to an end by 
blocking these files or making it impossible for its customers to send or 
receive them in any way
352
. 
Scarlet appealed that complying with the injunction would be impossible since 
the effectiveness and permanence of filtering and blocking systems are in 
question and implementing such systems has numerous practical obstacles in 
terms of network capability. Moreover, it is in conflict with Article 21 of the 
Law of 11 March 2003, on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, which transposes Article 15 of Directive 2000/31 into national law 
and does not allow the monitoring of information. Furthermore, it also 
supported its appeal by referencing European Union law on the protection of 
personal data and the secrecy of communications: such filtering involves the 
processing of IP addresses, which constitute personal data. In short, it argued 
that complying with the injunction would affect the general surveillance of all 
the communications passing through its network
353
. In view of this, the 
referring court “took the view that, before ascertaining whether a mechanism 
for filtering and blocking peer-to-peer files existed and could be effective, it 
had to be satisfied that the obligations liable to be imposed on Scarlet were in 
accordance with European Union law”. The ECJ, for a preliminary injunction, 
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paid attention to fundamental rights: it ruled that the relevant directives
354
 must 
be read together and construed towards the protection of fundamental rights. It 
therefore ruled that this combined reading: 
… must be interpreted as precluding an injunction imposed on an 
ISP to introduce a system for filtering all electronic communications 
passing via its services, in particular those involving the use of peer-
to-peer software; which applies indiscriminately to all its customers; 
as a preventive measure;  exclusively at its expense; and for an 
unlimited period, which is capable of identifying on that provider’s 
network the movement of electronic files containing a musical, 
cinematographic or audio-visual work in respect of which the 
applicant claims to hold intellectual property rights, with a view to 
blocking the transfer of files the sharing of which infringes 
copyright
355
.  
 
Given the above case, it is argued that the ECJ does not preclude monitoring: it 
makes monitoring possible when it is not in conflict with fundamental rights. 
Therefore, regardless of the negative effects on ISPs’ services and the costs of 
such filtering to protect copyright and trademarks, it is clear that permitting 
filtering and monitoring to comply with an injunction (or to accomplish the 
duty of preventing further infringement) eliminates any debate on the 
knowledge application for holding ISPs liable. In line with this, it should be 
added that, by permitting ISPs to do the filtering, exploring the prevention of 
further infringement as the subject of constructive knowledge application will 
be bounded or closed. 
Similarly, in 2012, the ECJ made a preliminary ruling in the proceedings of the 
SABAM v. Netlog case
356
 concerning Netlog’s obligation to introduce a system 
for filtering information stored on its platform in order to prevent files that are 
infringing copyright to be available. The issues related to an ISP’s capability to 
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comply with an injunction of the national court to prevent future infringement 
because complying with such an injunction is in conflict with Article 15 of the 
ECD (precluding monitoring) and other directives. The court (the Third 
Chamber) made the same ruling as in the Scarlet case. 
those directives, must be interpreted as precluding a national court 
from issuing an injunction against a hosting service provider which 
requires it to install a system for filtering:– information which is 
stored on its servers by its service users;–  which applies 
indiscriminately to all of those users;–  as a preventative measure;–
 exclusively at its expense; and–  for an unlimited period, which is 
capable of identifying electronic files containing musical, 
cinematographic or audio-visual work in respect of which the 
applicant for the injunction claims to hold intellectual property 
rights, with a view to preventing those works from being made 
available to the public in breach of copyright. 
 
Taking a close look at the aforementioned cases, it can be argued that the ECJ 
focused on balancing fundamental rights with protecting copyright and 
trademarks by focusing on the no-monitoring general obligation and protecting 
users’ rights. Overall, prohibiting monitoring is more in line with ISPs’ 
interests due to the conflict of monitoring with user interests and its high cost. 
In spite of the advantages of prohibiting filtering, an ISP can experience a 
complicated situation due to the injunction rule. An injunction requires an ISP 
to prevent or terminate further infringement without breaching fundamental 
rights, which is not possible without actual knowledge of specific infringement 
rather than constructive knowledge. Furthermore, it is not possible without the 
participation of both parties (the ISP and the right holder) through an 
appropriate mechanism that facilitates the possibility of obtaining actual 
knowledge. The ECJ, in the above cases, did not offer any approach for the 
ISPs to achieve knowledge to comply with the injunctions to balance 
fundamental rights with protecting copyright and trademarks. 
4.2.3 Appraisal of Actual Knowledge and Constructive Knowledge 
The ECD, in view of it having both actual and constructive knowledge 
standards, seems in accordance with the protection of copyright and 
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trademarks. However, its broad knowledge standard suffers from some legal 
issues in practice. Its actual knowledge standard (Article 14) is inadequate in 
decreasing the risk of an ISP being held liable, due to the lack of stable and 
reliable guidance on obtaining knowledge and the ambiguities in terms of the 
current approach for proving an ISP’s actual knowledge (like through 
notification). Although notification has been frequently used as an instrument 
to attest that the ISP received actual knowledge, in case law there are legal 
challenges on the required notification elements. In this regard, the ECD actual 
knowledge standard suffers from a lack of rules regarding the identification of 
copyrighted and trademarked work. It is not clear who has the duty of 
identification and what type of information is required to establish actual 
knowledge. This weakness affects the ISP’s chance of benefitting from actual 
knowledge immunity because without the cooperation of the right holder 
regarding the identification of protected work and the locations of alleged 
infringing materials, an ISP will be forced to investigate billions of different 
types of information. It is impractical for an ISP to be sued for breaching user 
privacy
357
. Aside from this, there is a lack of stable and reliable guidance on 
good faith, put-back procedures, statements (on knowingly materially 
misrepresenting take-down notices), and the duration of take-down notices, 
which makes it possible to conclude that the ECD actual knowledge standard 
is not effective in keeping ISPs safe from being held liable when they do not 
have knowledge and do not have the capability to combat the copyright and 
trademark infringement and protect their users’ rights. Similar to the actual 
knowledge standard, the constructive knowledge standard (“is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is 
apparent”358) suffers from some legal issues. The ECD and EU case law do not 
have any adequate guidance for assessing constructive knowledge: EU case 
law has only ruled that the court should pay attention to the phrases ‘active 
role’ and ‘diligent economic operator’; it forwarded evaluation of the ISP’s 
conduct based on these phrases to the national courts. It therefore seems there 
is the possibility for divergent interpretations of these terms based on the 
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‘reasonable man’ test, rather than a specific technical test. Moreover, 
constructive knowledge imposes a duty on ISPs to prevent future infringement 
based on general knowledge, while there is no valid way for an ISP to achieve 
this knowledge (according to Article 15 and recent case law). Aside from this, 
the constructive knowledge standard of Article 14 does not have any specific 
rules preventing ISPs from ignoring apparent infringement. As a result, the 
case law rules are also not adequate in this regard. 
4.3 ECD Knowledge Standard Application Scope 
There is debate on the scope of the ISP in the EU owing to the fact that the 
scale of the ECD knowledge standard is narrow, unlike the knowledge 
standards in the US. ISPs (which are identified as only having three specific 
functions) are entitled to benefit from the ECD limitation on liability because 
the ECD provides objective exemptions for an ISP’s mere conduit function if 
the ISP complies with Article 12. Through Articles 13 and 14, the ECD has 
enshrined subjective exemptions for caching and hosting services. However, it 
is worth noting that these subjective exemptions are subject to the objective 
criteria of Article 12 and other duties. Based on the importance of these 
services in evaluating the efficiency of the ECD knowledge standard, this 
chapter briefly highlights and examines them. 
4.3.1 Mere Conduit 
This objective exemption means that no knowledge of infringement is equal 
with no liability because the functions have a sole purpose. The ISP mere 
conduit service of Article 12 comprises “transmission in a communication 
network of information provided by a recipient of the service”359, where the 
ISP acts as a mere carrier of the data provided by third parties through its 
network. It is not doing anything more than performing a passive role. Other 
types of mere conduit activities refer to the “provision of access to a 
communication network”360 or merely providing internet access. ISPs are not 
liable for the aforementioned transmit information functions because they have 
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been recognised as functioning without knowledge, which includes the 
automatic, intermediate, and transient storage of the information transmitted. 
Accordingly, such transmissions have the sole purpose of transmitting with a 
limited period of storing that data which is necessary for transmission. These 
functions can be seen as “packet-switching transmissions”361, which allow ISPs 
to store information in small pieces for a short time. The ISP only uses copies 
of the information for transmitting purposes, without permitting them to 
become available to the subsequent user.  
The rationale behind these objective exemptions refers to the role of the ISP, 
which “does not initiate the transmission, select transmission and select or 
modify the information contained in the transmission”362. In short, the 
capability to control, select, and modify data is the condition for the 
knowledge requirement and the cause of the liability debate. In other words, a 
lack of control in the data transmitted in an ISP’s network is equal to no 
knowledge about infringing the data that it is carrying.  
4.3.2 Caching Services 
An ISP is safe from liability when it automatically, intermediately, and 
temporarily stores information for the sole purpose of making this information 
more efficient in transmissions to other recipients for the services they 
request363. Caching subjective immunity depends on an ISP performing the 
caching functions without modifying the information and complying with the 
conditions to access the information and the rules concerning updating the 
information, which are specified in a manner widely recognised and used by 
the industry364. In addition, an ISP, significantly, has to pay attention to the 
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lawful use of the technology that is widely recognised and used by the industry 
to obtain data on the use of the information365.  
More challengeable terms in the ECD refer to ISPs acting ‘expeditiously’ to 
remove or disable access to the information that they have stored upon 
obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information is infringing or if a 
court or administrative authority has ordered such a removal or disablement366. 
Obtaining the actual knowledge needed to remove or disable access to 
information expeditiously can often occur through a simple process but finding 
all of the required information accurately is quite hard, especially when there 
is a lack of proper guidance to discover if the information is correct or not.  
The fact is that Article 13 is silent concerning how an ISP caching service 
receives actual knowledge and what actual knowledge is. Is it specific 
knowledge or general knowledge? Furthermore, who has the responsibility for 
obtaining actual knowledge? If obtaining such knowledge is the duty of the 
ISP, then it needs to conduct investigations to obtain actual knowledge. 
However, such investigations are in conflict with Article 15, which prohibits 
monitoring367. For this reason, the standard for obtaining actual knowledge for 
ISP caching services is open to question. It is analysed in this chapter in 
reference to the actual knowledge standard along with the hosting service 
knowledge standard due to their similarities in the type of knowledge 
evaluated (both standards evaluate subjective knowledge).  
4.3.3 Hosting Services 
Hosting services are one of the key internet services and are vital in providing 
storage space to help the online market to survive. ISPs offer these services to 
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companies, individuals, and organisations. These services may be free of 
charge and may allow the customer to store any kind of data and information 
in the storage space. The ECD has acknowledged the value of this type of 
service, ruling that ISPs will not be held liable for third-party information 
stored in their storage space subject to these conditions: the ISP does not have 
actual knowledge of illegal activities or information368, and they may not be 
“aware of facts or circumstances from which illegal activity or information is 
apparent”369. The above standard acknowledges the lack of ISPs’ control in 
storing data because the data is stored by a third party directly in the ISP’s 
storage space, as noted in Article 14-3370. 
A notable subject regarding application of ECD knowledge standard in hosting 
services is the interpretation of non-free hosting ISP services like Google’s 
AdWords service (and keyword advertising in general), online auctions like 
eBay, content sharing services and Wikis. Article 14-3 relates to such services, 
discussing users acting under the authority or the control of the provider. 
Especially when interpreting the phrase “consists of the storage of information 
provided by a recipient of the service”371, the term ‘consists’ can lead to some 
legal challenges, if applied as a criterion of hosting of the new service rather 
than the provision of web space for storing a personal website. For instance, in 
France, the Artistic Commission discussed the issues regarding hosting 
services and Web 2.0 thus: “the Commission cannot conclude how 
participatory Web 2.0 websites should be qualified so that one arrives at the 
boundaries of the concept of hosting provider”372. This poses the question as to 
whether an ISP is neutral and without knowledge and control of the hosted 
data or not. Such measures for defining a host can lead to narrowing the scope 
of the implementation of actual and constructive knowledge standards for 
protecting such ISP services because of the limited scope of hosting. In 
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general, the different interpretations of hosting services have given rise to 
practical legal problems within EU Member States373. 
4.3.3.1 Hosting Services in Case Law Interpretations 
There are various interpretations regarding ISP hosting services in case law to 
make ISPs eligible for benefiting from the ECD knowledge standard. In the 
case of Laffess v. MySpace374, it was stated that a service provider offering an 
editing tool and forcing its users to implement a certain structure in the content 
meant controlling and publishing the activities. The court noted that the social 
website (MySpace) was really the host of the information provided by its 
users. MySpace did more with the data than solely providing space for storing 
the data. Furthermore, the court elaborated that MySpace was an editor that 
offered a presentation structure via frames to its users and displayed banners 
during each visit, from which it clearly drew profits. Therefore, it had to take 
responsibility like an editor, so MySpace could not benefit from the hosting 
limitation on liability (Article 14). The reason for the court’s decision was that 
the court focused on the result that it obtained from evaluating the relationship 
between MySpace and its users and the possibility of MySpace controlling its 
users’ activities with the existence of actual knowledge. 
Similarly, an action was brought about in 2002 by two publishing houses 
against Tiscali Media (currently Telecom Italia) because a comic had been 
illegally reproduced and communicated on one of the websites hosted by this 
ISP375. Tiscali provided free web space in which its customers could publish 
personal webpages, and the webpages could be created in a predefined 
structure (using a template and editing tools provided by Tiscali). 
Advertisements managed by Tiscali were displayed.  
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The court found that the hosting function of the Tiscali service posed the 
question of whether Tiscali had relinquished its passive role by virtue of 
supplying a service whereby end users could design their own webpages (in 
the case in question, the infringer had used this service) and then inserted 
advertising into such pages, from which a financial reward was obtained376. 
The court, in the first instance (in 2005), decided that Tiscali qualified as a 
hosting service and was protected against the copyright claim of the plaintiffs. 
Conversely, on appeal (in 2006), the court ruled that Tiscali did not qualify as 
a hosting provider as its customers were required to use the predefined editing 
templates and tools of Tiscali and because Tiscali published their 
advertisements on the personal websites377. Later on, the French Supreme 
Court confirmed the decision and stated: 
Considering that Tiscali has offered internet service users the 
possibility to create personal web pages on its website and has also 
purposed to advertisers to create advertisement space directly on 
these pages, managed by Tiscali; that these sole Tiscali exceed the 
simple technical function of storage as provided by [the French Act 
that implements the E-commerce Directive] so that Tiscali could not 
benefit from these legal provisions, and the decision of the court of 
Appeal was consequently justified378. 
 
In contrast to the above decision, one month later, another Paris court 
interpreted ‘editing tools’ differently in the Dailymotion case379. 
In the case of the Share Hoster II and Rapidshare cases in Germany380, the 
courts found that the defendants were hosting services because they provided 
users with the space to upload content (i.e. other users could access the content 
if the user who uploaded the content shared the link with others). It might be 
true that the courts in these cases adopted a broader definition compatible with 
the hosting roles of the defendants, as also occurred in the recent European 
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Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings in the AdWords case381 and the Rolex v. eBay 
case.382 
Other significant cases that raised questions regarding the information host in 
light of control and knowledge were the Google France cases. Google allows 
internet users free access to its search engine. The search engine gives two 
types of results in general: natural search results and sponsored search results. 
When entering keywords into the search engine, users are presented with a list 
of natural results selected and ranked according to their relevance to the 
keywords, determined by objective criteria. Google also operates an 
advertising system called AdWords, which enables ads to be displayed 
alongside the natural results in response to the keywords
383
. Three cases 
against Google were referred to the ECJ in the French Court de Cassation and 
were joined together. The first was the case of Louis Vuitton (case C-236/08), 
in which the Louis Vuitton keyword was entered into the Google search engine 
and triggered a display of sponsored links that led to counterfeit products. The 
second case was the Bourse des Voyages (BDV) case (case C-237/08), in 
which a keyword was linked to an identical and similar product in Google 
results. The third case was the Eurochallenges case (case c-238/08), in which a 
Google query led to displaying a similar or identical product. 
The Court de Cassation asked the ECJ three questions: concerning the 
trademark infringement, concerning the search engine as an information 
society service, and concerning the interpretation of the ECD and the 
application of hosting exemptions to AdWords services (application of Article 
14)384 . In this regard, the Advocate General (AG) argued that Google stores 
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texts of ads and their links at the request of its users, which is in accordance 
with the terms of Article 14385. The Court of Appeal did the same:  
…it cannot be disputed that the referencing service provider… 
stores, that is to say, holds in memory on its server, certain data, 
such as the keywords selected by the advertiser, the advertising link 
and the accompanying commercial message, as well as the address 
of the advertiser’s site. The AG also added that: ‘…information 
society services will rarely consist of activities which are 
exclusively technical, and will normally be associated with other 
activities which provide their financial support’386. 
 
Given the decision, it seems that the court was inclined to extend the scope of 
the hosting service exemption because it did not apply a traditional view 
regarding the storage of data on the web when interpreting a hosting service. 
The AG interpreted Article 15 widely by noting that the article has two sides: 
one of them refers to imposing a negative obligation for liability exemption on 
Member States, whereas the other side dictates that “service providers which 
seek to benefit from a liability exemption should remain neutral regarding the 
information they are carrying or hosting”. The ECJ did not endorse the neutral 
concept but it paid attention to Article 14, in which the exemptions are only 
deemed applicable to intermediaries: “the conduct of that service provider 
should be limited to that of an ‘intermediary service provider’ within the 
meaning intended by the legislature according to the content of Section 4 of 
that directive”387. In line with this, the court paid attention to Recital 42 of the 
ECD388. It should be noted that although Google controls the terms of 
payments, this does not mean that it must be excluded from Article 14389. In 
addition, the court stated that there is the possibility that Google AdWords 
could benefit from the hosting immunity of Article 14 if their activities are 
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technical, automatic, and passive in nature. This is because when service 
providers work in this manner, they do not have knowledge and control over 
the data stored. 
Aside from the above, it could be argued that the ECJ applied an economic 
instrument of thought in interpreting Google’s AdWords service as a hosting 
service390. Implementing Article 14 broadly is in accordance with the advance 
of technology and e-commerce, as per the ECD’s aims. In other words, 
narrowing the scope of Article 14 affects the advantages of Web 2.0 and online 
auctions. Moreover, the expression of Article 14 means that service providers 
avoid liability when they have the chance to prove a lack of knowledge and a 
lack of control over the data. However, a proper mechanism is needed for 
evaluating service providers’ knowledge.  
In the Google France cases, the court paid attention to a proposal of the 
European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of 
electronic commerce in the internal market (COM, 1998) and the working 
paper of the Council Directive dated 21 May 1999, which broadly defines the 
scope of the information and the host391. In addition, as can be understood from 
the practices of service providers, hosting is restricted to the sole management 
of the technical infrastructure rather than having an administrative role in the 
content. As such, placing the focus on the technical infrastructure for 
interpreting hosting services seems reasonable.  
However, the legal issues arise from the lack of attention paid to the ‘neutral’ 
scope, which makes it possible for the courts to interpret hosting differently 
because the ECD does not offer specific guidelines for interpreting the 
technical, automatic, and passive nature of a service provider, as criticised by 
the AG in the L’Oreal v. eBay case392. 
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In the case of L’Oréal v. eBay Europe393, the legal issue was the trademark 
infringement of the keyword advertisement and counterfeit goods on eBay’s 
online marketplace. eBay stored data supplied by its customers; eBay received 
remuneration as it charged a percentage on the transactions completed, on the 
basis of those offers for sale. In this regard, the referring court asked the ECJ, 
in essence, whether the service provided by the operator of an online 
marketplace is covered by Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31 (hosting), as the 
listing information is provided by the sellers (in this case, eBay’s 
customers)394. The ECJ delved into the definition of an ‘information society 
service’ to respond this. The court ruled that: 
As has been pointed out by, inter alia, the United Kingdom 
Government, the Polish Government and the Commission, as well 
as by the Advocate General at paragraph 134 of his Opinion, an 
internet service consisting in facilitating relations between sellers 
and buyers of goods is, in principle, a service for the purposes of 
Directive 2000/31
395
. 
  
The court’s analysis of the marketplace hosting service question took a similar 
approach to those approaches applied by the court in the Google France cases. 
It quoted Section 4 and stated that, in “information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce”, the operation of an online marketplace can 
bring all those elements into play
396
. In line with this, the court explicitly ruled 
that to benefit from Article 14’s safe harbour, eBay should fall within the 
scope of Article 14(a) and (b). It is worth noting that although the court 
defined the term ‘host’ broadly, it restricted the exemption of the EU 
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knowledge requirement by requiring the host to be neutral
397
. Moreover, the 
guidance concerning an ISP’s active role (the low threshold for exemption), as 
elaborated in the L’Oréal v. eBay Europe case, does not lead to the possibility 
of interpreting an ISP as a passive host, because the court deferred to the 
national court in deciding what an active or passive role is
398
. 
Analysing the ECJ ruling in the L’Oréal v eBay case, one can argue that the 
ECJ still holds to the previous rule, as ruled in the Google France case. 
Moreover, the court similarly extended the scope of the term ‘hosting’ in 
Article 14-1. Therefore, search engine, online auction and Web 2.0 services 
are host services if their functions are technical, automatic, and passive. If this 
is the case, the service provider is eligible to benefit from the hosting services 
exemption because, in the absence of the aforementioned preconditions, the 
ECD ISP knowledge standard (Article 14(a) and (b))
 
is not applicable to its 
functions
399
. There are other cases where the courts have also recognised 
hosting services as benefitting from the knowledge standard exemption, like 
Lancôme Parfums et Beaute & Cie v. eBay International AG
400
; SARL Zadig 
Productions, Jean-Robert Viallet et Mathieu Verboud v. Ste Google Inc. et 
AFA
401
; SABAM v. Scarlet; and Pirate Bay 2009 (Sweden)
402
. In general, in 
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these cases, Article 14 exposed different criteria for judging whether the 
service could be considered a host. For instance, the French court, in the 
Laffess case, focused on the editing tools and forcing users to adopt a specific 
structure in the content to evaluate “the storage of information provided by a 
recipient of the service”403 and, consequently, did not recognise the defendant 
as a host. Controversy, in the Dailymotion case and also in the YouTube case, 
the courts acknowledged their functions as host services
404
. For this reason, 
there are divergent criteria for defining a host service, as proved by the rulings 
of the courts in the L’Oréal v. eBay Europe case and the Google France case. 
In the latter two cases, the ECJ acknowledged eBay’s online marketplace and 
Google’s AdWords service as hosting services by interpreting the scope of the 
terms ‘information society service’ and ‘intermediate service’ widely405.  
This prevents the national courts from paying attention to free services or the 
non-financial interest nature of a service in interpreting hosting services
406
, 
because the ECJ did not highlight what the elements of a hosting service are: it 
imposed this duty on the national courts. Due to all of the aforementioned 
preconditions, a proper ISP knowledge standard is required for developing the 
internal mark. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The ECD, by providing safe harbours (Articles 12 to 14), establishes a 
knowledge requirement to impose liability on certain types of ISP services (i.e. 
mere conduit, caching services, and hosting services). However, the ECD does 
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not present any explicit guidance to show how EU Member States should 
define ISP hosting services that are not free services and are mostly used for 
business, like online auctions, AdWords and Web 2.0. This legal vacuum 
causes divergent interpretations among Member States (e.g. the Google 
France case), but the ECJ has offered some rules and has emphasised that the 
definition of a hosting service should be widely interpreted to make an ISP 
able to benefit from Article 14’s knowledge standard.  
Regarding the efficacy of the ECD knowledge standard, it seems appropriate 
in terms of the knowledge type (broad knowledge) and the horizontal 
approach. However, in terms of specific elements, it has some drawbacks and 
loopholes: the ECD constructive knowledge standard (awareness) does not 
focus on the right holder’s cooperation and does not focus on the objective 
elements or constructive knowledge required to establish general knowledge. It 
imposes a duty on ISPs to prevent future infringement based on general 
knowledge about infringement rather than specific knowledge. The evaluation 
of an ISP’s constructive knowledge is based on the ‘reasonable man’ test, 
which is not compatible with ISPs’ technical functions.  
Consequently, the current ECD knowledge standard increases the possibility of 
holding ISPs liable, even when they do not have knowledge. In addition, the 
efficacy of evaluating actual knowledge, in the absence of notice and take-
down procedures (and in the absence of definitions and guidance on the 
interpretation of the actual knowledge standard), is open to question. In line 
with this, current interpretations on actual knowledge and constructive 
knowledge do not provide any positive answers to the research questions. 
Furthermore, the case law interpretations are inadequate so are not reliable or 
useful guidance for the courts for current and upcoming issues regarding ISPs’ 
knowledge of infringement.  
In short, ISP surveillance and the proper functioning of the internal market by 
ensuring the free movement of information society services between the 
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Member States seem complicated in the current knowledge standard and its 
interpretations
407
.  
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CHAPTER V: Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of the Knowledge 
Standards in the US and the EU 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the similarities and differences between the US and 
EU knowledge standards for ISPs’ copyright and trademark secondary 
liability in the light of the research questions and research objectives. This 
chapter also evaluates their weaknesses and strengths to find better solutions 
and to understand the implications of the different approaches. By considering 
the above structure, this chapter presents the US knowledge standards and 
then explores EU knowledge standards. In this regard, the research separately 
examines the US knowledge standards for ISPs’ secondary liability for 
copyright infringement and for trademark infringement due to their 
differences.  
5.2 US Knowledge Standards for ISPs’ Copyright Infringement  
In US law, the knowledge standards for ISPs’ secondary liability for copyright 
infringement can be divided into the copyright case law knowledge standard, 
which has roots in tort contributory liability (consisting of pre-DMCA cases 
and cases that do not comply with DMCA terms), and the DMCA knowledge 
standard.  
5.2.1 The Knowledge Standard for Copyright in Case Law (Tort) 
The US case law (tort) knowledge standard comprises both actual knowledge 
(knew about user infringement) and constructive knowledge (had reason to 
know about user infringement) as crucial elements of contributory liability. 
However, it has narrowed the common law tort contributory knowledge 
standard, as can be seen in the Sony
408
, Grokster409, and Perfect 10410 case 
rulings. For instance, actual knowledge of copyright infringement has been 
narrowed to knowledge of non-infringing use of products by the Sony case and 
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has narrowed mere knowledge of infringement to knowledge of an actual 
instance of copyright infringement, instead of relying on constructive 
knowledge. Later on, ‘infringing use’ was combined with intent to faster 
infringing copyright’ 411(inducement liability as per the Grokster case) and a 
duty of preventing further infringement by technical measures (as per the 
Perfect 10 case).  
In addition, in terms of ISPs’ constructive knowledge, US case law 
implements contributory liability with evaluations of whether the ISP ‘should 
have known’ or ‘had reason to know’ about users’ copyright infringement412. It 
requires ISPs to prevent current and upcoming infringement based on the 
knowledge that infringement exists; failure to comply leads to ISPs’ secondary 
liability. Constructive knowledge is critical for assessing whether an ISP 
should have known or had reason to know about infringement. This is part of 
the ‘reasonable man’ test, rather than technical tests based on a computer 
mind’s understanding.  
Thus, although case law has narrowed the scope of the tort contributory 
knowledge standard, the criterion for evaluating ISPs’ knowledge of 
infringement is still the ‘reasonable man’ test. This leads to divergent rules in 
assessing actual knowledge and constructive knowledge and leads to liability 
based on the negligence. 
5.2.2 The DMCA Knowledge Standard 
The DMCA knowledge standard is a broad knowledge standard. Unlike the 
case law (tort) knowledge standard, its objective knowledge standard is based 
on the ‘red flag’ test as a technical test with both objective and subjective 
elements. Furthermore, the DMCA knowledge standard illustrates an approach 
for better cooperation between parties to eliminate any duties that force ISPs to 
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work as copyright police. In this regard, the DMCA provides safe harbours and 
rules
413
 for ISPs’ conduct: when an ISP fulfils the measure of contributory 
infringement, the ISP’s functions at issue might fall within the provisions of 
the safe harbours’ exemptions, which may remove the ISP’s liability.  
Overall, the DMCA knowledge standard in both forms (actual knowledge and 
awareness of apparent infringement) only consists of four types of ISP 
services. Actual knowledge is considered to be specific knowledge of specific 
infringement, about which the ISP receives a notification that it is in line with 
section 512(c) (3) (b) (i) of the US Copyright Act, because such notifications 
must comply with the requirements stated by the statute. In short, the criterion 
for evaluating ISPs’ actual knowledge or awareness of infringement is 
notification (no notification = no actual knowledge or awareness of 
infringement). It should be noted that for ISPs to benefit from the DMCA safe 
harbour provisions, they must provide notice and take-down procedures in 
their systems, otherwise the DMCA knowledge standard is not applicable and 
the case will be evaluated through the case law copyright knowledge standard 
(tort contributory liability). Section 512(c) (3) (A) of the US Copyright Act 
sets out six elements needed to use the notification as evidence and the right 
holder must ensure that these elements are fulfilled. In this regard, the US 
courts have the tendency to apply a stringent interpretation regarding the 
identification of the copyrighted works and the identification of infringing 
material, as has been proven in the following cases: Arista Records Inc. v. 
MP3Board Inc.414, Hendrickson v. eBay Inc.415, and Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill 
LLC
416
.  
The DMCA’s ‘red flag’ test of objective knowledge has both objective and 
subjective elements. In assessing the subjective element of the ‘red flag’ test, 
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the court examines whether the ISP was aware of a ‘red flag’ or not. To 
evaluate the objective element of the ‘red flag’ test, the court conducts the 
assessment based on the ‘reasonable man’ test, in order to prevent ISPs from 
having the chance to exhibit wilful blindness to ‘red flags’ of obvious 
infringement.  
5.2.3 The US Knowledge Standard for ISPs’ Secondary Liability for 
Trademark Infringement 
It is worth noting that the US Lanham Act, as trademark legislation, does not 
contain explicit language for establishing ISPs’ secondary liability for 
trademark infringement. The US broad knowledge standard for ISPs’ 
secondary liability for trademark infringement has stemmed from common law 
tort and trademark case law (the InWood standard). The InWood
417
 knowledge 
standard consists of actual knowledge (‘knew’) and constructive knowledge of 
infringement (‘had reason to know’), and the courts have applied this standard 
in numerous cases for evaluating ISPs’ knowledge of infringement, for 
example Perfect 10 Inc. v. Visa International Service Ass’n.418, National 
Federation of the Blind Inc. v. Loompanics Enterprises Inc.419, Tiffany v. eBay, 
and the Lockheed Martin case
420
. 
An ISP has actual knowledge when it receives knowledge about individual 
infringement in any form, like an email or other forms, because the InWood 
knowledge standard does not require a specific form of notice. Moreover, it 
explicitly specifies the duty of providing information about individual 
infringement as the plaintiff’s duty.  
In addition, in assessing specific knowledge, the courts also consider “direct 
control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by the third party to 
infringe the plaintiff's mark”421. In terms of constructive knowledge, an ISP 
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does not have an affirmative duty to monitor its own website for potential 
trademark violation. Constructive knowledge has mostly been considered in an 
objective test to detect ISPs’ wilful blindness to ‘red flags’ and other elements 
of common law tort, for instance ‘should have known’ user infringement based 
on the ‘reasonable man’ test422. 
5.3 The Knowledge Standard in the ECD 
The ECD broad knowledge standard consists of actual knowledge and 
awareness of apparent infringement, which is called constructive knowledge 
because it is similar to constructive knowledge in tort law for imposing 
contributory liability on conduct. The ECD does not define the subject of 
actual knowledge but its case law has recognised a notice given by the right 
holder to the ISP as evidence of the ISP’s actual knowledge, as the following 
cases have shown: Lancôme v. eBay423, Rolex v. eBay424, Louis Vuitton v. eBay 
(France)425, and SABAM v. Scarlet (Belgium)426. The aforementioned cases 
were not constricted and specified the type of notice needed to hold ISPs liable 
under actual knowledge of infringement; case law has widely admitted any 
type of notice as evidence of actual knowledge. 
The ECD ruled that once an ISP has received a notice, it expeditiously has to 
remove or block access to material that is infringing copyright or trademarks. 
The ECD and EU case law in relation to specific information on intellectual 
property rights and the location of alleged copyright and trademark 
infringements do not provide specific guidelines, and current interpretations of 
case law concerning actual knowledge show that the courts have focused on 
the nature of the ISP’s conduct and other factors to assess the ISP’s specific 
knowledge about user infringement. Along with this, the absence of awareness 
of apparent infringement gives immunity to ISPs that offer certain types of 
services. Case law has interpreted awareness of apparent infringement as 
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involving an ISP being a ‘diligent economic operator’ playing an ‘active role’ 
in order to assess whether the ISP was aware of the infringement or not. To 
evaluate this, the courts rely on the ‘reasonable man’ test instead of paying 
attention to technical measures or technical standards such as the ‘red flag’ 
test. Moreover, in the ECD (Article 15), a right holder may order an injunction 
against an ISP requiring it to prevent further and future infringement when the 
ISP has constructive knowledge about an infringement (general knowledge). 
5.4 Loopholes in the US Knowledge Standards for ISPs’ Secondary 
Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement  
The loopholes in the US knowledge standards can be divided into two parts: 
(1.) Loopholes in the copyright case law knowledge standard and the DMCA 
knowledge standard for ISPs’ secondary liability for copyright infringement. 
(2.) Loopholes in the US trademark knowledge standard for ISPs’ secondary 
liability for trademark infringement. These are explored in the following 
sections. 
5.4.1 Loopholes in the US Copyright Case Law Knowledge Standard  
Although US case law has limited scope in terms of tort contributory 
liability427, it does not provide any explicit criteria as guidance to assess the 
actual knowledge of ISPs. Evidence of substantial ‘non-infringing use’ (e.g. in 
the Sony case) and ‘affirmative intent’ 428is in the favour of the defendant. 
However, there is a lack of explicit criteria with respect to when and how non-
infringing use can be proved and through which legal mechanism actual 
knowledge can be achieved. Hence, this allows different interpretations of 
assessing knowledge of infringement. Moreover, recognising the ability of the 
‘reasonable man’ test to evaluate an ISP’s knowledge puts the ISP service into 
a complicated situation because it forces it to protect copyright based on this 
test, which is a high-risk task that is technically impossible for ISPs. Thus, the 
uncertainty regarding the knowledge standard for achieving knowledge of 
copyright infringement and the wide tendency to implement the ‘reasonable 
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man’ test to evaluate ISPs’ knowledge could affect their services, as it could 
easily allow ISPs to be liable for secondary liability or increase their fear of 
being liable. In addition, recognising general knowledge about infringement as 
constructive knowledge of infringement through the ‘should have known’ and 
‘had reason to know’ test poses an affirmative duty on ISPs to prevent current 
and upcoming infringement, similar to the knowledge requirement for 
imposing fault or negligence in common law tort contributory liability. It 
forces ISPs to predict and understand upcoming infringement without 
requiring the copyright owner’s cooperation and forces ISPs to be copyright 
police. It also forces ISPs to implement some non-compatible technical 
systems, as cited in the Perfect 10 case. This creates a heavy burden for ISPs 
because complying with the above duties based only on general knowledge 
means forcing ISPs to directly control and monitor users’ activities to identify 
alleged infringement and make a judgement; ISP services are reluctant to do 
this, as accomplishing the duty of preventing copyright infringement is 
impossible without specific knowledge.  
As a result, recognising probabilistic knowledge as constructive knowledge 
causes a heavy burden for ISPs to prevent or identify and foresee upcoming 
infringement without the right holder’s cooperation. Furthermore, recognising 
probabilistic knowledge as the ISP’s knowledge of infringement has a 
profound effect on ISP services since they will face serious damage from 
having users’ content removed according to self-probabilistic knowledge of 
infringement. 
5.4.2 Loopholes in the DMCA Knowledge Standard  
The DMCA knowledge standard (s.512), in terms of both actual knowledge 
and awareness of apparent infringement, consists of some loopholes that affect 
the efficacy of this broad knowledge standard in the course of notice and take-
down procedures, as presented below.  
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5.4.2.1 Lack of Consistency between the DMCA Knowledge Standard and 
Freedom of Expression 
When considering the differences between the processing of knowledge in 
human minds and computers, it appears that an ISP’s ability to predict indirect 
infringement depends on the capability and ambit of the ISP’s algorithms, 
unlike the human mind. For this reason, the DMCA focuses on the processing 
of knowledge in ISPs to define their responsibility for secondary liability. It 
narrows the ambit of traditional knowledge in the notice and take-down 
procedures, even though the courts, in practice, have ignored the rationale 
behind the DMCA knowledge standard by evaluating a ‘should have known’ 
or ‘had reason to know’ user infringement element in the knowledge standard. 
They have also done this by admitting incomplete notices, which place the 
burden of preventing and finding infringement on ISPs. Consequently, this 
practically forces ISPs to investigate their network data; investigations 
involving user privacy have a negative influence on freedom of expression and 
user participation online. 
5.4.2.2 Effects of the Notice and Take-Down Procedures in the DMCA 
Knowledge Standard 
According to the requirements for notice and take-down procedures, ISPs must 
consider notices from copyright holders on alleged infringing content to 
benefit from the DMCA safe harbours. This makes ISPs evaluate alleged 
infringements and take down alleged infringing material based on the 
copyright holder’s notice without a right of investigation. This affects online 
businesses and enterprises in e-commerce because when the right holder’s 
claim or notice is wrong, returning the user’s data back can take 10 to 14 days. 
This could therefore restrict the online market, especially when there is a lack 
of a specific body to make judgements or assess the alleged infringing content 
before the ISP takes down the content. The ISP may inadvertently restrict the 
market of the alleged copyright holder’s competitor by its judgement on the 
copyright protection of alleged infringing content. 
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5.4.2.3 The ‘Red Flag’ Test of Objective Knowledge  
The ‘red flag’ test is a technical measure that has a number of weaknesses, as 
follows. 
5.4.2.3.1 High Potential Risk of ISP Liability Due to the Wide Scope of 
Wrong Activity 
Section 512 of the DMCA does not describe the awareness of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; it only forwards the 
facts or circumstances to activity ambits which refer to the wide scope of 
wrongful activity that accrue in the provider’s system or network. The wide 
scope of wrong activity has created more ambiguities about the ‘red flag’ test, 
as case law has shown. For instance, in the Perfect 10 case, the court rejected 
the plaintiff’s claim that the terms ‘illegal’ and ‘stolen’ on the website were 
‘red flags’ showing awareness about infringement. The court stated that there 
might be reasons for the use of such terms, such as “an attempt to increase 
their salacious appeal”, other than announcing the infringement429. The court 
also admitted that “Password-hacking websites are thus not per se ‘red flags’ 
of infringement”430. 
Thus, the wide scope of the term ‘wrong activity’ makes it possible to make 
different interpretations of the ‘red flag’ test. Alongside this, the lack of case 
law guidance for interpreting or defining wrong activity is a remarkable 
loophole that could expand the potential risk for ISP liability, as a ‘red flag’ 
can be interpreted differently by an ISP.  
5.4.2.3.2 Possibility of Hiding Websites as Being Blatant ‘Red Flags’ 
Legislation interpretations do not list or guide what a ‘red flag’ is and how 
content can be qualified as such. In practice, it is possible for websites that 
infringe copyright to change their styles and other parts of their websites to 
hide themselves from being ‘red flags’. There are no specific approaches to 
assessing whether an ISP knew of a ‘red flag’ or for the copyright holder to 
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prove there was ‘blatant’ copyright violation. Such a flaw cannot encourage 
parties to cooperate in combatting the violation. In short, these flaws divert the 
right holder’s attention to the constructive knowledge standard because this 
standard does not have a complicated threshold like the ‘red flag’ test.  
Overall, the aforementioned legal ambiguities can make the copyright holder 
reluctant to combat copyright infringement via cooperation with ISPs by 
proving the ISP had reasonable information on the alleged infringement, 
because their chance to hold ISPs liable in any way is safe with the possibility 
of suing ISPs via constructive knowledge. 
5.4.2.3.3 The ‘Red Flag’ Test Causes the Assessment of Constructive 
Knowledge 
The courts’ interpretations limit the subjective element of ‘red flags’ to be 
‘blatant’ or ‘obvious’; evaluating whether an ISP exhibited wilful blindness in 
regard to an apparent infringement uses an objective test based on the 
‘reasonable man’ test. This criterion reduces the efficacy of the ‘red flag’ test 
as a technical criterion because it allows the ISP’s objective knowledge (wilful 
blindness) to be assessed as constructive knowledge (‘had reason to know’ or 
‘should have known’, based on the ‘reasonable man’ test). However, the 
rationale behind establishing whether there was a ‘red flag’ must be whether 
the service provider was “aware of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity was apparent”, rather than what a ‘reasonable person’ 
would have deduced given all the circumstances. Thus, the objective element 
of the ‘red flag’ test leads to the implementation of a constructive knowledge 
test in light of the ‘reasonable man’ test and puts ISPs at risk of being held 
liable, even if the potential infringement was not apparent to the ISP.  
5.4.2.4 Keeping the Traditional Case Law Knowledge Standard in 
Practice 
Section 512 of the DMCA does not require the service provider to have notice 
and take-down procedures and does not force the copyright holder to notify the 
service provider. However, to receive immunity from liability, the service 
provider must install a notice and take-down system. Thus, this non-
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compulsory term means that the technical test (the ‘red flag’ test) and the 
structure of the s.512 knowledge standard (based on the ‘reasonable man’ test 
in the objective element of the ‘red flag’ test) have kept the contributory 
liability element of US case law in practice. This has encouraged the tendency 
to evaluate constructive knowledge with the ‘reasonable man’ test for 
imposing secondary liability; this has numerous disadvantages, as highlighted 
throughout the previous chapters. 
5.4.3 Loopholes of the US Knowledge Standard for ISPs’ Secondary 
Liability for Trademark Infringement  
The knowledge standard for ISPs’ trademark infringement is ambiguous in 
terms of notice and take-down procedures and whether the ISP and right 
holder must cooperate in favour of combatting trademark violations, as 
illustrated below; 
The InWood knowledge standard does not specify any required notice and 
take-down procedures but it does admit notifications in different formats as 
proof of knowledge, as case law has shown (e.g. Tiffany v. eBay, GMA 
Accessories Inc. v. Electric Wonderland, and Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. 
Akanoc Solutions Inc.). If an ISP admits all notices, this could provide 
opportunities for a trademark holder’s competitor to send a notice to the ISP to 
take down the holder’s trademark without fear of liability for sending the 
notice. Consequently, ensuring fair competition and e-commerce development 
is complicated in the InWood knowledge standard due to the lack of specific 
guidance for notice and take-down procedures, as well as the admittance of all 
types of notices to prove knowledge of infringement. 
Moreover, the lack of notice and take-down procedure requirements provides 
the following ambiguities: a) whether a single notification for multiple 
trademarks on a single online site is acceptable; b) what information is 
considered sufficient to find the location of the material; c) whether a 
statement is needed attesting that the complaining party is of the good faith 
belief that the use of the trademark is not authorised by the trademark owner, 
its agent, or the law (a statement attesting that the information in the 
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notification is accurate and is under the penalty of perjury, and that the 
complaining party is authorised to act on behalf of the owner of the exclusive 
right that was allegedly infringed); and d) there is no guidance on reverting 
content that did not infringe a trademark or on protesting the notification by 
submitting a counter notification. Thus, such loopholes make the functions of 
ISPs complicated and do not guarantee freedom of expression and fair 
competition.  
In addition, the loopholes may reduce the cooperation between ISPs and right 
holders, even though both can benefit from working together in terms of notice 
and take-down procedures. The lack of notice and take-down procedure 
requirements can put ISPs in unsafe situations because they may not know 
whether the ISP function results are being sued by trademark holders. 
Furthermore, the lack of notice and take-down procedure requirements leads to 
trademark owners facing the difficulty of knowing when knowledge of 
infringement can be attributed to an ISP. Hence, these legal concerns affect the 
progress of the information society service, which has a significant effect on 
the advancement of society. 
5.5 Loopholes in the ECD Knowledge Standard for ISPs’ Secondary 
Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement  
The ECD knowledge requirement for imposing secondary liability on ISPs has 
numerous weaknesses and loopholes, as illustrated below. 
5.5.1 Limited Scope for the Application of the ECD Knowledge 
Requirement 
One of the loopholes is the scope of the ECD knowledge requirement for the 
secondary liability of ISP services that only offer certain types of services: 
mere conduit, caching, and hosting services. Additionally, other significant 
ISP services (like information location tool services) are excluded from the 
scope of the ECD knowledge standard. Therefore, the limited scope of the 
ECD knowledge requirement can affect the informative and commercial role 
of the ISP service to expand electronic commerce. In evaluating the knowledge 
of other ISP services (such as information location tools), the courts thus have 
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to implement existing tort law knowledge standards, even though there are no 
fixed tort law knowledge standards and interpretations that are applicable to all 
Member States. Consequently, the limited scope of the knowledge standard for 
other types of services causes legal uncertainty and prevents the advancement 
of ISP functions. This therefore contradicts the ECD’s aims in respect of 
facilitating the expansion of e-commerce.  
This limited scope suffers from a lack of criteria in relation to interpreting host 
services, while the surveillance of ISPs is dependent on non-free hosting 
services
431
. For instance, the French Court in the Laffesse v. MySpace case 
focused on the editing tools provided by the service provider, as well as the 
service provider forcing the adoption of a specific structure in the content, to 
evaluate “the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service”432. 
Consequently, the court did not recognise the defendant as a hosting service. In 
contrast, in the Dailymotion and YouTube (2009), the eBay (in Europe) case 
and the Google France case, the courts acknowledged the service providers’ 
functions as hosting services. Given the results of the aforementioned cases, it 
seems that there is the possibility for the courts to interpret a hosting service 
differently. Therefore, this could affect ISPs’ business plans, especially 
nowadays as many ISPs host storage space services. It is worth mentioning 
that although the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the eBay case and the 
Google France case acknowledged an online market and AdWord or new 
webs as hosting services through a broad interpretation of an ‘information 
society service’ and ‘intermediate service’, these rulings do not prevent 
national courts from focusing attention on the non-financial interest nature of 
hosting services in interpretations. This is because the ECJ did not specify the 
hosting element and forwarded the interpretation of the hosting element to the 
national courts. In other words, defining an ISP’s service as a hosting service 
depends on the national law of each Member State. Hence, the legal limitations 
of the hosting concept put the ISP in danger of giving the service to their 
subscribers in the single market. 
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5.5.2 The Lack of Notice and Take-Down Procedures 
Notice and take-down procedures for allowing cooperation between right 
holders and ISPs (to replace liability with responsibility) in combatting 
infringement are absent in the ECD knowledge standard. This legal vacuum is 
able to create complexity in many aspects with reference to the constitution of 
knowledge. 
In reference to the actual knowledge standard in the ECD (Article 14), 
notification is a key factor. However, the ECD does not provide an adequate 
statute or guidance on the subject of the elements of notification required. As 
case law has shown, an ISP is likely to be held liable for the reason that the 
ECD admits receiving any type of notification as a reason for taking down an 
alleged infringement, even if the notice is not flawless in terms of containing 
reasonable information with reference to the location of the alleged 
infringement and identifying the protected copyright or trademark. Admitting 
notices with a lack of reasonable information forces ISPs to investigate a vast 
amount of data to find the location of the alleged infringement and to make a 
judgement as to whether the alleged infringement is under the protection of the 
copyright or trademark. However, the ISP, unlike the publisher, does not have 
adequate knowledge about the source and content of the alleged infringing 
material.  
In addition, the lack of guidance in relation to the ‘reasonable information’ 
needed for obtaining actual knowledge as an element of notice allows national 
existing tort law to be used to assess ISPs’ knowledge and to interpret the duty 
of providing reasonable information. While this means permitting the 
‘reasonable man’ test criterion in interpreting ISPs’ knowledge of 
infringement, this is not in agreement with the real nature of ISPs’ conduct 
(which is more technical and dependent on ISP algorithms, as explained in 
Chapter II) and computer knowledge. The lack of guidance on notice and take-
down procedures forces ISPs to make judgements about alleged infringement 
without adequate knowledge and causes some contradiction with Article 15 
(especially in countries that require monitoring) and users’ privacy in 
accomplishing the duty of preventing infringement.  
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5.5.3 Admitting Private Notices without a Notice and Take-Down Regime 
The knowledge standard of the ECD forces ISPs to decide whether to remove 
suspicious materials from their networks. Obviously, ISPs need more 
knowledge and skills to do this and making such a decision will take time, as it 
requires identifying the owner of the copyright or trademark, their protection 
duration, and fair use or other exceptions. Therefore, the expeditious action 
element of the ECD is in disagreement with ISPs’ functions and capabilities. 
Having an infringement taken down is achievable by supplying an ISP with 
reasonable information. In the absence of reasonable information about the 
location of the infringement and the copyright or trademark protection, ISPs 
have to investigate millions of bytes of data to uncover the infringement; this 
burden makes ISPs into publishers, rather than intermediately services. 
Moreover, ISPs in practice receive numerous notices that are not sufficient 
regarding actual knowledge. They are not done in good faith or they are done 
in good faith but contain mistakes. Indeed, an ISP can receive multiple 
complaints about an alleged infringement.  
In addition, complying with the actual knowledge standard of the ECD upon 
receiving a private notice requires the ISP to adopt and implement a policy that 
can terminate the user’s service on the basis of a mere allegation. It leads ISPs 
to remove or block access to alleged infringing materials automatically or 
systematically in order to prevent being sued, in spite of the fact that this may 
violate other rights.  
Another issue with private notification is that it threatens the ISP’s chance to 
benefit from the actual knowledge standard of Article 14 of the ECD, which 
gives the ISP immunity to liability if it does not have specific knowledge of 
infringement due to the notice not including the name, address, and electronic 
signature of the complaining party; sufficient information to identify the 
copyrighted/trademarked work; information identifying the location of the 
alleged infringement; and a statement of the accuracy of the notice. Obviously, 
the term ‘expeditiously’ is problematic for ISPs: if the ISP ignores the alleged 
infringement notice (or takes a while to respond), it might be sued by the right 
holder. On the other hand, if the ISP removes the alleged infringing material, it 
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might be sued by the user for breaching their freedom of expression or 
competition or other legal rights
433
. 
Hence, the need for the expeditious removal of alleged infringing material 
upon receipt of any type of notice, in the absence of notice and take-down 
procedures, can aggravate issues. In particular, there is a lack of proper 
guidance in relation to identifying whether a notice is sent in good faith. In 
other words, in practice, ‘expeditiously’ removing or blocking access to 
alleged infringing material upon receiving an incomplete notice makes the ISP 
the same as a censorship body.  
5.5.4 The Lack of a Technical Test for Evaluating ISPs’ Objective 
Knowledge 
The ECD does not offer guidance related to ‘apparent’ infringement. It does 
not make available any technical knowledge test for assessing ISPs’ objective 
knowledge. Therefore, this permits Member States to implement their own 
national tort law constructive knowledge standards with a ‘should have 
known’ test. Evaluating awareness of apparent infringement by this test leads 
us to use general grounds as a source of knowledge. It means that the court can 
evaluate awareness of apparent infringement with the ‘reasonable man’ test 
instead of a technical test like the ‘red flag’ test. Furthermore, constructive 
knowledge in the ECD is not dependent on the subjective test, as the ECD 
permits the court to evaluate constructive knowledge separately without actual 
or subjective knowledge. This means that court interpretations of awareness of 
apparent infringement are based on the internal and external factors of the 
‘reasonable man’ test, which restricts cooperation between right holders and 
ISPs. Therefore, the lack of a technical test in the knowledge standard and the 
lack of a proper legal regime for notice and take-down procedures cause the 
courts to assess constructive knowledge, which could force an ISP to make a 
decision about an infringement with probabilistic knowledge; this increases the 
risk of liability for the ISP and causes other legal conflicts. 
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5.5.5 Case Law (ECJ) Rules are Inadequate  
The court, regardless of actual knowledge (by notice), establishes constructive 
knowledge with a subjective test. This test involves evaluating whether a 
‘diligent economic operator’ should have identified the infringement and uses 
an objective test to assess whether the operator plays an ‘’active role’’ when it 
provides assistance that entails optimising the presentation of offers for sale in 
question or promoting them
434
. Therefore, an ISP cannot rely on exemption 
from liability if it is aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a 
‘’diligent economic operator’’ should have realised that the offers for sale or a 
provision of another service were unlawful in terms of copyright and 
trademark infringement and, in the event of it being so aware, failed to act 
expeditiously in accordance with Article 14 (1) (b) of Directive 2000/31
435
. 
The ECJ only uses subjective and objective tests for constructive knowledge 
without giving an explanation of how ISPs could obtain such knowledge. In 
addition, the ECJ concluded that it depends on the national courts to evaluate 
whether a service provider passes these tests or not. It elaborated that there is 
the possibility of evaluating the service provider by the ‘reasonable man’ test 
or on other general grounds. Practically, it confirmed that case law does not 
provide any specific guidance for how ISPs can obtain constructive knowledge 
or can find out when a website is exhibiting apparent infringement.  
In sum, the ECJ’s ruling on awareness of apparent infringement has put ISPs 
in an uncertain and confused position because the court only provides 
subjective and objective tests for constructive knowledge, instead of tackling 
how such knowledge can be gathered.  The ECJ adds a duty for ISPs: before 
providing any service, an ISP must attempt to learn what an ‘active role’ is in 
its national law and how this role will be interpreted. As a consequence, this 
rule for evaluating knowledge does not provide certainty for ISPs. It is worth 
noting that using the ‘active role’ measure for evaluating knowledge (due to 
the lack of specific elements on to how to characterise knowledge of 
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infringement) can confuse ISPs because the term does not give certainty about 
which services involve the ISP playing an ‘active role’. 
5.5.6 Constructive Knowledge and the Duty to Prevent Future 
Infringement 
The ‘should have known’ or ‘had reason to know’ constructive knowledge 
elements permit right holders to require their national court to issue an 
injunction forcing ISPs to prevent future infringement by general knowledge 
about user infringement. It puts ISPs in a complicated situation because, 
besides accomplishing the duty of preventing future infringement, the ISP has 
to account for fundamental rights, like user privacy and freedom of expression. 
In this regard, current case law gives credit to the non-general obligation for 
monitoring information because it leads to monitoring all the communications 
that pass through the ISP’s network or leads to a conflict with other 
fundamental rights, as ruled by the ECJ in the SABAM v. Netlog case
436
. 
Although the case law rulings seem reasonable, the ECD and ECJ cases do not 
give any guidance regarding preventing duty through parties’ participation in 
the course of an appropriate mechanism that can facilitate the possibility of 
obtaining actual knowledge to end an infringement, as a replacement for 
classifying it as an ISP’s duty. Thus, such loopholes are a barrier for ISP 
services and will push ISPs towards being censorship or filtering bodies in 
practice by breaching the no-monitoring and no-filtering obligations
.
. 
5.5.7 The ECD Knowledge Standard and National Legislation 
The ECD allows EU Member States to interpret the ISP knowledge standard 
and Articles 12 to 14 of the ECD differently. Member States may thus 
establish their own procedures for dealing with the knowledge requirement 
concerning ISPs’ secondary infringement for copyright and trademarks. For 
instance, instead of establishing a system for notice and take-down procedures, 
the ECD permits national legislation to define such a system. This means there 
is a lack of a complete protective mantle for ISPs because the different 
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legislations will provide different interpretations on knowledge of 
infringement. In practice, this can cause ambiguities about ISP functions. 
5.6 Advantages of the US Knowledge Standards 
The notice and take-down procedures in US law are incentives for both ISPs 
and copyright owners to work together to combat online copyright 
infringement and to co-exist in the information society. The guidance for these 
procedures shows that the US recognises the nature of the computing mind by 
placing the duty of the identification of the alleged infringement and its 
location on the right holder. In practice, notice and take-down regimes benefit 
both parties because ISPs can be safe from liability without knowledge of 
negligence and the right holder can protect their right through the ISP’s notice 
and take-down system. In line with this, the knowledge standard can prevent a 
copyright owner from making false notifications and can decrease the misuse 
of take-down procedures by competitors. Moreover, evaluating ISPs’ 
knowledge of infringement for secondary liability for copyright infringement 
with a notice and take-down regime protects ISPs that perform certain 
activities when they act to restrict or impede infringements. In other words, the 
notice and take-down procedures protect ISPs from any liability that may arise 
in relation to the take-down procedures. Another advantage of the DMCA is 
that the take-down procedures are in line with the instrumentalist legal view on 
tort liability, because it realises that actual knowledge (as subjective 
knowledge) does not prevent ISPs from ignoring infringement or staying away 
from receiving knowledge of copyright infringement. The knowledge 
requirement through the notice and take-down regime also prevents 
misrepresentation on behalf of the right holder because the DMCA establishes 
that any person who consciously misrepresents such a notice is liable for the 
damage incurred as a result of the ISP acting upon such a notice. Therefore, in 
practice, a proper notice and take-down regime can ensure fair competition and 
freedom of expression in the online society.  
US copyright case law has applied a rigorous interpretation of this regarding 
the identification of copyrighted work and infringing material. The US courts 
have indicated that the identification of copyrighted work and infringing 
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material is the duty of the owner of the copyright. The courts have interpreted 
that the copyright holder must make available specific information, such as the 
name, title, URL and information on technical and non- technical errors 
relating to the alleged infringement, rather than general information. In line 
with this, the court rejected Perfect 10’s claim concerning a combined notice. 
For this reason, in practice, meticulous interpretations can aid both ISPs 
copyright holders because they clarify the parties’ responsibilities. 
Furthermore, such interpretations on the subject of the elements of actual 
knowledge will encourage technological and e-commerce expansion.  
The InWood knowledge standard evaluates ISPs’ knowledge in relation to 
trademark infringement and it has rigorous standards compared to common 
law tort. It assesses particular knowledge to impose secondary liability and 
requires ‘knew’ or ‘had reason to know’ user infringement in assessing actual 
knowledge and constructive knowledge in relation to a particular third party 
who is engaging in trademark infringement. This is in contrast with the 
reasonable anticipation standard, which has a wide scope and imposes 
secondary liability on the ISP via general knowledge or via merely foreseeing 
the wrongdoing by the unknown and negligent. The advantage is that the 
courts can provide tight interpretations regarding the specific knowledge of 
infringement required to impose liability. It has been established that the 
InWood test does not rely on probabilistic knowledge, which imposes more 
duties on ISPs. For instance, in Tiffany v. eBay437, Tiffany made a claim based 
on a ‘but for’ causation test to prove eBay’s knowledge, but the court refused 
this claim. Likewise, trademark case law interpretations have ruled that the 
courts do not intend to extend contributory liability, as cited in the Sony and 
Tiffany cases. Therefore, the tendency to narrow the scope of traditional 
contributory liability is a significant help to ISPs’ advancement. Furthermore, 
the US constructive knowledge standard regarding ISPs’ secondary liability 
for trademark infringement eliminates the opportunity for a trademark owner 
to request an ISP to act as trademark police. Furthermore, in terms of an ISP’s 
wilful blindness to apparent infringement, the courts have also interpreted 
constructive knowledge in a constricted way, stating that constructive 
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knowledge (‘reason to know’) in “InWood does not intend so far as to require 
non-infringing users to police the trademark for a trade name owner”438. An 
advantage of such a rule is that it can decrease the potential risk of an ISP’s 
liability without knowledge or an ISP’s secondary liability when the trademark 
infringement is less apparent to the ISP. 
5.7 Advantages of the ECD Knowledge Standard  
The advantages of the ECD knowledge standard can be divided into a) abroad 
knowledge standard and b) its horizontal approach.  
Article 14.1(a) (b) of the ECD applies a broad knowledge standard that 
comprises both actual and constructive knowledge. Implementing a broad 
knowledge standard seems reasonable and logical because, in the digital age, 
many people can access the internet cheaply and can easily violate copyright, 
trademark or other rights and avoid liability. Therefore, using a broad 
knowledge standard can prevent parties from avoiding liability and exhibiting 
wilful blindness to awareness of apparent infringement. Overall, it facilitates 
the better participation of users, right owners, and ISPs in the information 
society.  
Another advantage of the ECD is that the broad knowledge standard approach 
comprises all types of infringement (like trademark, defamation, copyright, 
and other infringements), because the ECD knowledge standard employs a 
horizontal approach instead of a vertical approach
439
. The horizontal approach 
is appropriate for different circumstances involving different types of 
infringement. The horizontal approach defends the prohibition of monitoring 
(Article 15) by ISPs and confirms that ISPs act as passive and neutral 
machines. Furthermore, the horizontal approach does not pay attention to the 
type of data transmitted by ISPs in terms of whether the service involves 
caching or hosting. The horizontal approach’s focus is on the fault element 
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(rather than the type of infringement) and it pays attention to knowledge of 
infringement as a vital element of fault. Hence, the ECD assists the 
development of online businesses with the enforcement of the horizontal 
approach.  
5.8 Comparison and Evaluation 
In this part, the study compares the US and ECD knowledge standards for 
secondary liability and evaluates them in specific areas. 
5.8.1 Approaches 
The approach of the US copyright (tort law contributory) knowledge standard 
for ISPs’ secondary liability is a vertical approach that is only applicable for 
copyright infringement in light of contributory liability, while the ECD 
knowledge standard is a horizontal approach that is applicable to all types of 
infringement. The knowledge standards of US copyright case law and the ECD 
are similar in terms of the application of a broad knowledge standard. 
However, one difference is that the US copyright case law knowledge standard 
constricts the scope of the traditional tort knowledge standard for ISPs’ 
copyright infringement with new rulings in copyright case law. For instance, 
the extensive scope of the tort law knowledge standard was narrowed by the 
Sony case to consider non-infringing use and in the Grokster case to consider 
ISP inducement. Additionally, the Perfect 10 case restricted the scope of the 
tort law contributory knowledge standard regarding copyright infringement to 
specific knowledge to impose liability. However, the ECD (in both its articles 
and case law interpretations) does not have a particular standard for the ISP 
knowledge requirement to narrow the broad scope of national tort law 
knowledge requirements so as to make its scope in accordance with the role of 
ISPs. The lack of a particular standard for the ISP knowledge requirement is a 
barrier to the cross-border development of ISPs among Member States.  
Comparing the ECD and the DMCA, they differ in terms of approach. In 
contrast with the ECD knowledge requirement, the knowledge standard 
approach of the DMCA is a vertical approach that is only applicable to 
copyright infringement. Similarly, the US knowledge standard for ISPs’ 
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secondary liability for trademark infringement (the InWood knowledge 
standard) is only applicable to trademark infringement. Considering the role of 
ISPs and secondary liability based on knowledge about user infringement, the 
horizontal approach seems more relevant to the functions of ISPs compared 
with the vertical approach, which requires ISPs to follow different knowledge 
standards to identify whether their conduct may lead to liability.  
In sum, the ECD knowledge standard approach seems more appropriate then 
the DMCA and InWood knowledge standards. All of these standards differ on 
the subject of providing certainty to ISPs, guaranteeing freedom of expression, 
and in their capability to omit human interventions in the interpretation of 
technical knowledge. These factors are further discussed in the following 
sections. 
5.8.2 ISP Protection  
The ECD knowledge requirement suffers from the lack of a mechanism to 
protect ISPs when they take down allegedly infringing material incorrectly on 
the basis of good faith. In this situation, ISPs may face a dilemma, as they have 
to respond immediately to a notification of alleged infringement with the 
purpose of exempting themselves from being held liable. At the same time, 
such take-down procedures may lead to ISPs being sued if they take down 
material that they reasonably believed to be infringing copyright or trademarks 
but it later turned out that the material was not infringing such rights. For this 
reason, an ISP is in an insecure situation, as it can be sued easily for taking 
down alleged infringing material incorrectly on the basis of good faith. In this 
regard, the ECD knowledge standard is the same as the InWood knowledge 
standard. The US copyright case law knowledge standard does not offer any 
specific protection to an ISP in this regard but the DMCA has specific 
uniformity on the subject of protecting an ISP against such possible liability. 
However, a legal weakness of the DMCA knowledge standard is that s.512 
requires ISPs to comply with incomplete notices by taking down alleged 
infringing material. Additionally, the DMCA notice and take-down regime 
requires ISPs to establish a reversion procedure to decrease the risk of the ISP 
being held liable and to decrease the need for probabilistic knowledge, which 
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can protect the ISP’s development and freedom expression on the web. 
Moreover, the DMCA protects ISPs by requiring a statement from the 
copyright holder of the alleged infringing content (or their representative) 
attesting that the notification is correct. However, this requirement is absent in 
the ECD knowledge standard.  
The ECD knowledge standard does not offer certainty regarding the 
identification of alleged infringing material and does not offer specific 
guidance on the reasonable information needed for the identification of 
infringement, and these legal gaps force ISPs to work as intellectual property 
right police to find alleged infringement. By contrast, the DMCA explicitly 
tackles the above legal concerns about the identification of alleged 
infringement to protect ISPs from performing non-relevant duties.  
In addition, the ECD knowledge requirement forces ISPs to become 
censorship bodies because the term ‘expeditiously’ in Article 14 requires an 
ISP to remove or block access to an alleged infringement upon receiving a 
notification. This means that the ISP itself evaluates and judges the alleged 
infringement and decides whether the material should be removed or should be 
made available to the public. However, this is not possible because an ISP 
does not have the right to investigate user data to identify alleged 
infringement. Also, an ISP may be reluctant to investigate or judge what is 
right and what is wrong. In this regard, the ECD knowledge standard seems 
inappropriate. Conversely, by establishing a reversion system and notice and 
take-down procedures, the DMCA has brought its knowledge standard in line 
with the cooperation of the copyright holder, instead of requiring ISPs 
themselves to judge what an inappropriate duty is, which can lead to 
increasing the risk of an ISP being held liable. Furthermore, the ECD 
knowledge standard focuses on eliminating the divergent standards and 
interpretations among EU Member States relating to the matter of ISPs, while 
the broad knowledge standard of the DMCA focuses on providing an incentive 
for both ISPs and copyright owners to cooperate with one another in order to 
combat copyright infringement. 
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The scope of the DMCA knowledge requirement, compared with the scope of 
the ECD knowledge requirement, covers more ISP services such as 
information location tools. In essence, a service like an index or referencing 
service cannot benefit from the ECD knowledge requirement and its safe 
harbours. Thus, this legal vacuum has a negative effect on the digital economy, 
fair competition, and information society service providers. Overall, the 
DMCA knowledge standard (due to its notice and take-down regime) offers 
more protection than the US copyright case law knowledge standard, the 
InWood knowledge standard, and the ECD knowledge standard in terms of the 
protection of ISPs and users. 
5.8.3 Protection of Other Rights 
When an ISP acts in accordance with a notification to take down alleged 
infringing material but afterwards it turns out that the alleged infringement was 
incorrect, the material must be reinstated in 10 to 14 days, according to s.512 
of the DMCA. Conversely, the InWood knowledge standard for ISPs’ 
trademark infringement and the ECD knowledge standard do not identify any 
specific periods on the subject of reverting material back.  
In addition, the DMCA knowledge standard prevents unfair competition as it 
requires a validity statement be sent with the notification to prevent 
competitors from sending faults or incorrect notifications. However, but the 
InWood and ECD knowledge standards do not specify the need for such a 
statement.  
Regarding the protection of user privacy right, these knowledge standard has 
different level in reference to prevent monitoring of user data to protect IP 
right. The InWood knowledge standard for ISPs’ trademark infringement also 
permits the control and monitoring of data to protect trademarks. However, the 
DMCA provisions provide a non-general obligation for ISPs to monitor their 
networks to protect copyright (s.512 (m)). This is the same as the ECD (Article 
15), which prohibits a Member State from imposing a general duty of 
monitoring on ISPs. In practice, an ISP can be forced by an injunction to 
prevent an upcoming infringement; therefore, despite the general principle of 
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the prohibition of monitoring, an ISP can be forced to monitor their network to 
comply with injunctions, since this is not possible without probabilistic 
knowledge and constructive knowledge. This requires the ISP to investigate its 
entire network or to apply technologies (such as filtering technology) to 
monitor its systems and identify infringing material. In this regard, there are 
some countries that, in line with the ECD knowledge requirement (Article 14), 
have admitted monitoring. However, the US DMCA knowledge standard, 
instead of monitoring, focuses on providing an approach that encourages right 
holders and ISPs to cooperate to combat copyright infringement. Moreover, it 
rules that, to benefit from the broad knowledge standard of s.512, ISPs have to 
accommodate the technical standards that are utilised by copyright owners to 
identify or protect copyrighted work, rather than filtering technology. In 
conclusion, the lack of a monitoring requirement in the broad knowledge 
standard of the DMCA plays a big role in the advancement of information 
society services. 
5.8.4 Constructive Knowledge and ISPs’ Duties 
The US copyright case law constructive knowledge standard, unlike the 
DMCA knowledge standard, confirms ISPs’ affirmative duty to prevent 
copyright infringement. Similar to the DMCA, the InWood knowledge 
standard eliminates an ISP’s duty to prevent infringement with constructive 
knowledge. In other words, unlike the US copyright case law knowledge 
standard, the DMCA and InWood knowledge standards are limited in scope in 
terms of constructive knowledge; using these standards, the courts have the 
tendency to narrow the ambit of the tort contributory liability knowledge 
standard. In contrast, the ECD knowledge standard requires ISPs to prevent an 
infringement with constructive knowledge. However, this requirement places a 
heavy burden on ISPs and permits different contributory liability knowledge 
standards. Overall, the DMCA knowledge standard seems more compatible 
with the functions of an ISP, the computing mind, and instrumentalist views on 
secondary liability. This harmony restricts constructive knowledge and gives 
benefits to both ISPs and right holders. Moreover, the DMCA offers a 
cooperative approach to combat copyright infringement and specifies that the 
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identification of the copyrighted work and alleged infringement is the duty of 
the right holder. This advantage guarantees online freedom of expression and 
prevents the ISP from monitoring users or breaching users’ rights. Conversely, 
the ECD knowledge standard does not have any specific rule regarding the 
duty of the identification of copyrighted work or providing reasonable 
information about the location of alleged infringement. Furthermore, the ECD 
constructive knowledge standard (which has its roots in tort contributory 
liability) imposes the duty of the identification of copyrighted/trademarked 
work and the location of alleged infringement (among vast amounts of data) on 
ISPs. In fact, imposing such a duty on an ISP to prevent infringement puts the 
ISP in contradiction with protecting users’ privacy and online expression.  
The DMCA constructive knowledge (awareness) standard also differs from the 
ECD constructive knowledge standard because the DMCA implements a ‘red 
flag’ test (with objective and subjective tests as constructive knowledge) to 
establish certainty for ISPs, whereas the ECD constructive knowledge standard 
still has flaws in terms of the technical test and its basis in different national 
tort laws. As a result, the ECD standard is inadequate in providing certainty for 
ISPs. 
5.8.5 Providing Certainty and Guaranteeing Freedom of Expression 
The US copyright case law actual knowledge standard has a narrow scope 
compared with the tort actual knowledge standard (contributory liability). 
However, in terms of giving certainty to ISPs, it sounds inappropriate and is 
similar to the ECD knowledge requirement, because neither standard has a 
notice and take-down regime. By contrast, the DMCA explicitly establishes a 
knowledge standard by setting the requirements that have to be met in order to 
constitute actual knowledge. The ECD criteria for attaching knowledge of 
infringement to ISP functions stem from the national laws of the Member 
States. The criteria allow the national laws to be used to evaluate ISPs’ 
knowledge in a suitable way. Therefore, by considering the differences 
between the case law and legislation of one country with those of other 
countries, it seems that the ability of the ECD knowledge standard to establish 
certainty for ISP services to predict when they can be held liable and to retain 
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freedom of expression in the virtual world is open to question. The same can 
be said for the US copyright case law knowledge standard for ISPs’ copyright 
contributory liability.  
Furthermore, the InWood knowledge standard for ISPs’ trademark 
infringement and the ECD knowledge standard do not have reversion systems: 
they do not provide a user whose material has been taken down with the 
opportunity to put their material back when the user proves that the alleged 
infringement was incorrect. By contrast, the DMCA recognises freedom of 
expression by providing a reversion system in the notice and take-down 
regime.  
5.8.6 Existing National Tort Laws for Interpreting ISP Knowledge  
The US copyright case law knowledge standard for ISPs’ secondary liability 
for copyright infringement has a limited scope of contributory tort through 
new cases, but it has widely authorised the implementation of national tort law 
in interpreting ISPs’ knowledge of copyright infringement. Similarly, the 
knowledge requirements of the ECD and the DMCA have authorised the 
implementation of national tort law for interpreting and evaluating ISPs’ 
knowledge. In contrast, the InWood knowledge standard for trademark 
infringement offers a restricted chance of using the tort law knowledge 
standard, compared with the ECD and the DMCA. The authorisation to use a 
national or existing law in interpreting and evaluating ISPs’ knowledge causes 
ISPs to face divergent knowledge standards, rather than providing legal 
certainty for ISPs. This is because evaluating an ISP’s knowledge of 
infringement by different standards based on the ‘reasonable man’ test instead 
of using a technical test cannot allow ISPs to predict when an infringement can 
be attached to their services.  
5.9 Conclusion 
The US knowledge standards and the ECD knowledge standard apply broad 
knowledge standards to evaluate ISPs’ knowledge, but they differ in terms of 
their elements and conditions for permitting ISPs and copyright holders to co-
exist and combat copyright infringement. The US copyright case law 
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knowledge standard, the InWood knowledge standard, and the ECD 
knowledge standard are deficient in terms of offering a suitable notice and 
take-down regime to reduce the duties of the ISP and to tackle the high risk of 
the ISP being held liable without knowledge, whereas the DMCA is free from 
such legal concerns because of its established notice and take-down 
procedures. Thus, this legal vacuum causes uncertainty on the subject of the 
parties’ rights and obligations and makes divergent interpretations of the 
knowledge requirement possible. In addition, it affects the development of fair 
online competition and freedom of expression.  
Overall, the DMCA standard provides more protection. This is taken into 
account in the recommendations that are given by the current research in the 
final chapter.  
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CHAPTER VI 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
6.1 Conclusion  
This thesis has shown that ISP strict liability has been replaced to limited 
liability in rational of divert the costs of copyright and trademark infringement 
to those who have knowledge of infringement and are in the best positions to 
prevent infringement, by implementing fault based theory and instrumentalism 
theory (an economic realist) on the secondary liability as demonstrated in 
Chapter I and II. Consequently, knowledge about user infringement has been 
prevalently recognized as a crucial element of ISPs’ secondary liability, but its 
elements and approaches are different in the knowledge standards in US 
copyright case law (traditional tort), the US DMCA, US trademark 
infringement (the InWood standard) and in the ECD. These differences have 
raised questions on the efficacy of current knowledge standards (broad and 
single knowledge standards) and the effectiveness of case law interpretations 
to omit current legal ambiguities and to offer appropriate guidance for 
interpreting ISPs’ knowledge of user infringement to avoid liability without 
knowledge and protect all parties’ rights. 
As revealed in Chapter III, the US knowledge standards for copyright 
infringement have been divided into: the copyright case law knowledge 
standard (with contributory liability elements) and the DMCA knowledge 
standard for secondary liability (with a specific legal statute on the subject of 
ISPs’ knowledge of copyright infringement). In this regard, actual knowledge 
and awareness of infringement have been interpreted in case law by the US 
courts under the direction of the legislative history of the DMCA.  
The US copyright case law knowledge standard recognizes the advancement of 
technology by limiting the scope of the tort contributory knowledge 
requirement in the form of replacing mere knowledge of infringement as 
knowledge of infringement to include non-infringing use (the Sony case 
ruling), ISPs’ inducement role (the Grokster case ruling), and (the Perfect 10 
case ruling) specific knowledge. However, as discussed in Chapter III, these 
 169 
 
rules are not adequate in protecting ISPs from the risk of liability, due to the 
lack of certainty on the subject of how specific knowledge can be interpreted 
and evaluated. In other parts, copyright case law allows for ISPs’ knowledge to 
be evaluated based on the ‘reasonable man’ test or probabilistic knowledge. 
Moreover, the US copyright case law knowledge standard suffers from a clear 
statute with respect to cooperation between ISPs and right holders. Also, it 
forces ISPs to act as censorship bodies or copyright police, because the 
constructive knowledge requirement for imposing contributory liability on an 
ISP is fulfilled by a negligent failure to prevent a violation.  
As revealed in Chapters III and V, s.512 of the DMCA clearly applies a broad 
knowledge standard and focuses on the parties’ cooperation relating to 
combatting online copyright infringement, instead of attempting to impose 
burdensome and non-relevant duties on ISPs. It clearly emphasizes sending a 
notification as a vital approach to making parties’ cooperation possible. 
Section 512 undoubtedly specifies the duty of identifying copyrighted work 
and the location of infringement as a copyright holder’s duty, in order to limit 
the chance of forcing ISPs to monitor their networks to perform such 
identification. In addition, it supports ISPs by protecting them from false 
notices by requiring a verification statement; at the same time, it protects the 
rights of users and right holders by requiring ISPs to establish a material 
reversion system. Furthermore, as the present research has shown in Chapters 
III and V, the DMCA knowledge standard protects both ISPs and right holders 
from false notifications and it also limits competitor abuse chances by setting a 
high threshold for notices.  
Furthermore, as revealed in the analysis of the DMCA knowledge standard in 
Chapters III and V, evaluating actual knowledge as subjective knowledge is 
not sufficient to prevent ISPs from ignoring or avoiding receiving knowledge 
of copyright infringement. Therefore, the DMCA knowledge standard 
recognises the role of technical criteria for assessing ISPs’ wilful blindness to 
apparent infringement with the ‘red flag’ test. In this regard, strict 
interpretations have been applied by the courts, even though there are 
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divergent and inadequate interpretations. This is elaborated later in this 
chapter. 
In addition, as indicated in Chapters III and V, the US knowledge standard for 
ISPs’ trademark infringement is based on the InWood knowledge standard, 
which is a rigorous standard compared with the contributory liability 
knowledge standard for trademark infringement (common law tort). It 
specifies the knowledge requirement of secondary liability by requiring 
specific knowledge about a particular third party, rather than the reasonable 
anticipation standard. As discussed in Chapter III, the InWood knowledge 
standard prevents any chance of inflicting a duty on ISPs to prevent trademark 
infringement with general knowledge, if the standard is interpreted strictly (as 
illustrated by the Tiffany case and other cases).  
This research has submitted( in Chapters III) that the limited scope and strict 
interpretation of the trademark knowledge standard can prove the 
implementation of instrumentalism in the US knowledge standard for 
trademark infringement as it focuses on the capability of the ISP to impose a 
duty in combatting online trademark infringement. 
Chapter IV states that the ECD knowledge standard applies a broad knowledge 
standard with a horizontal approach for all types of online infringement, as 
stated in Article 14 and as ruled by case law. The present research has revealed 
that the ECD knowledge standard focuses on fault for holding ISPs liable, 
rather than focusing on the type of infringement. Moreover, the ECD 
knowledge standard broadly recognizes notification as a factor for proving that 
ISPs have actual knowledge. In addition, it specifies the ISP’s duty to prevent 
current and upcoming infringement in the following ways: 1) by permitting the 
national courts to issue injunctions against ISPs to stop copyright and 
trademark infringement and 2) by acknowledging constructive knowledge as a 
requirement for secondary liability. With respect to the duty of preventing 
infringement, Chapter IV submitted that the ECJ’s interpretation does not offer 
adequate guidance for the parties’ cooperation while keeping ISPs safe from 
liability when they do not have real knowledge of infringement. In addition, 
the ECD knowledge standard permits national law to remain intact in terms of 
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establishing a legal approach for the parties’ collaboration and for assessing 
ISPs’ secondary liability. 
6.2 Research Findings 
The research questions have been explored in Chapters II, III, IV, and V and 
the broad knowledge standards of the US copyright case law and the DMCA 
and their judicial interpretations have been examined. In the same line, the 
research has examined the InWood case knowledge standard and the Lanham 
Act, as well as the ECD knowledge standard. 
The US and EU Electronic Commerce Directive knowledge standards for 
ISPs’ copyright and trademark infringement apply broad knowledge standards 
but differ in their notice and take-down procedures, types of knowledge, and 
level of reliance on tort knowledge standards. Thus, the knowledge standards 
seem appropriate in terms of the use of broad knowledge standards to evaluate 
ISPs’ knowledge of infringement, but they are inadequate in criteria and other 
aspects, as discussed in the following sections. 
6.2.1 The US Copyright Knowledge Standard (the DMCA)  
The present research has examined US copyright case law (tort), the DMCA, 
and the judicial interpretations of both in relation to ISPs’ secondary liability 
for copyright infringement. It has found that the US copyright case law 
knowledge standard is not appropriate due to the following legal vacuums. 
US copyright case law (tort contributory liability) has flaws in terms of 
providing explicit guidance and legal procedures for both ISPs and right 
holders to know when actual knowledge infringement is attachable to an ISP 
service, the court permitted evaluating knowledge through the ‘reasonable 
man’ test as courts applied in ,. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios Inc.,
440
 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.,
 441
 , Perfect 10
442
. 
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 464 US 417 (1984) [37]; See applications of this theory in the cases of NCR Corp. v. 
Korala Assocs., Ltd., 512 F. 3d 807, at 816 (6
th
 Cir. 2008) and Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. 
Columbia Arts Management Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1166 (2d Cir. 1971). 
441
 545 US 913 (2005). 
442
 Perfect 10 Inc. v. Amazon.com, 487, F. 3d 701, 727 (9
th
 Cir. 2007) [729]. 
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Similarly, its constructive knowledge requirement allows divergent 
interpretations concerning ISPs’ knowledge of copyright infringement and 
leads to force ISPs to prevent infringement with probabilistic knowledge. 
Thus, this requirement increases the risk for ISPs to be held liable without 
knowledge and imposes non-relevant duties on ISPs, like preventing 
infringement, because of the implementation of the ‘reasonable man’ test (with 
the ‘should have known’ or ‘had reason to know’ test) instead of a technical 
criteria for evaluating ISPs’ knowledge. In this regard, the research has found 
that current judicial interpretations of the US case law knowledge standard are 
inadequate in addressing the aforementioned legal issues. Consequently, the 
copyright case law knowledge standard emphasizes the liability instead of the 
responsibilities of parties in combatting copyright infringement to protect ISP 
and other parties’ rights as well. Furthermore, this knowledge standard is not 
in line with the process of gaining knowledge for ISPs (computing knowledge 
epistemology) and it cannot guarantee the safety of ISPs’ and right holders’ 
rights online.  
In contrast with US copyright case law (tort contributory liability), this 
research has found that the DMCA knowledge standard establishes a broad 
knowledge standard and focuses on ISPs’ and right holders’ responsibilities 
instead of liability ( for instance in Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC,)
443
. It does 
this by providing notice and take-down procedures to make the parties’ 
responsibilities in combatting copyright infringement clear as law cases shown 
(ALS Scan Inc. v. RemarQ Communities Inc.,
444
 Hendrickson v. Amazon.com 
Inc., 
445Recording Industry Ass’n. of America v. Verizon Internet Services 
Inc.,
446
 and other law cases). 
 
Furthermore, this research has revealed that the DMCA knowledge standard is 
in harmony with the ISP industry and ISPs’ ability to combat online copyright 
infringement because of the implementation of strict judicial interpretations 
and a technical test (the ‘red flag’ test) to assess objective knowledge of 
                                                          
443
 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (Dist. Court Cal. 2004 
444
 239 F. 3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) 
445
 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
446
 351 F. 3d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
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copyright infringement. In spite of the above advantages, the DMCA broad 
knowledge standard needs some amendments in certain areas: the notice and 
take-down procedures do not prevent human interference when defining ISPs’ 
knowledge about users’ copyright infringement to impose secondary liability. 
Moreover, the notice and take-down procedures do not omit the possibility of 
the elements of s.512 being interpreted differently. Furthermore, notification as 
a criterion of ISPs’ actual knowledge of copyright infringement has some 
issues in terms of the efficiency of reversion systems, notice duration, notice 
form, and incomplete notices
447
. These legal issues put ISPs in contradiction 
with other rights like freedom of expression, privacy and so on as illustrated in 
chapter V. They also restrict the cooperation of parties through the notice 
procedures and allow copyright holders to keep their rights via constructive 
knowledge.  
Current judicial interpretations are inadequate in offering guidance to assist 
ISPs and right holders in cooperating better to combat copyright infringement. 
They also do not give adequate immunity to ISPs from being forced to act as 
censorship bodies and being held liable through the negligent (this inadequacy 
is provable by ALS Scan v. RemarQ Communities Inc., and other cases as 
submitted in chapter III)
448
. 
In addition, in this study it was found that the DMCA knowledge standard 
suffers from ambiguity in the scope of the ‘red flag’ test to evaluate ISPs’ 
objective knowledge, due to insufficient guidance in defining the scope of the 
test (IO Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc.,). In line with this, this research has 
found that the ‘red flag’ of infringement test (as an objective test via the 
‘reasonable man’ test) has a negative effect on ISPs’ functions because 1) it 
increases ISPs’ risk of being held liable, even when they do not have 
knowledge of copyright infringement, due to the possibility of different 
                                                          
447
 The law cases can prove that fact, it has been widely discuss in chapter III through the 
analyzing the following cases’ Recording Industry Ass’n. of America Inc. v. Verizon Internet 
Services Inc., 351 F. 3d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing H.R. Rep. at 56). According to 
Section 512(c) (3) (B) (ii), Hendrickson v. eBay Inc. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1335 (C.D. Cal. 2001)., Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC,481 F. 3d 751 (Court of 
Appeals, 9
th
 Cir. 2007), Arista Records Inc. v. MP3Board Inc.[2002] No. 00 Civ. 4660, 2002 
WL 1997918, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002). 
448
ALS Scan v. RemarQ Communities Inc., US Court of App 4
th
 Cir. February 6, 20012, 39 F. 
3d 619, 57 USP Q2d 1996. 
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interpretations and 2) it leads courts towards a direct tendency to use 
traditional constructive knowledge for assessing ISPs’ subjective knowledge, 
as case law has shown
449
 for instance In A & M Records v. Napster Inc ALS 
Scan v. RemarQ Communities Inc. and other cases like
450
, ALS Scan v. 
RemarQ Communities, Inc
451
, Sega Enterprises Ltd and Sega of America Inc. 
v. Maphia 
452
, Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc
453
. NCR Corp. v. Korala Assocs. Ltd.
 
454
, A&M Records v. Napster
455
, Netcom case
456
.  
Thus, based on the findings of this research, it can be concluded that the 
DMCA’s broad knowledge standard (with its notice and take-down regime) 
                                                          
449
 Moreover, as case law proves, court law in contrast with the American legislature intended 
to provide a stringent system and applied the traditional constructive knowledge which arises 
from the weakness of critically evaluating objective elements of the red flag test which is 
based on the human mid test like traditional constructive knowledge. Apart from that, the case 
law has shown that knowledge standard which is initially one of the elements of traditional 
contributory liability is still in practice and its interpretation has roots in the formalism 
approach and gets its guidance and values from the initial source. 
450
 They are rooted in the traditional theory of tort law as factors that establish fault. 
451
 [2001] 39 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001) 
452
 Sega Enterprises Ltd and Sega of America Inc. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, US. (N.D. 
Cal.1994) 
453
 The District Court of Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc, referred to the ‘awareness of infringement’ 
stipulated in Section 512(c) (1) (A) (ii) as ‘constructive knowledge’ several times in its 
decision. As to whether the defendant had knowledge of the infringement, the court stated that 
“the limited information that the plaintiff provided to eBay cannot, as a matter of law, establish 
actual or constructive knowledge that particular listings were involved in infringing activity” 
;165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1335 (C.D. Cal. 2001).  
454
 512 F.3d 807, at 816 (6
th
 Cir. 2008) 
455
 the court did not use the awareness and ‘red flag’ test; instead, it used constructive 
knowledge for evaluating the ISP’s liability and the Ninth Circuit Court found that Napster, by 
its conduct, had performed both actual and constructive knowledge infringement, and had 
knowingly encouraged as well as assisted in the infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright. This 
concerned the first generation of file sharing systems. Napster had designed and operated a 
free software program that permitted the transmission and sharing of sound recordings 
employing digital technology. In this case, the use of Napster’s system by users who uploaded 
and downloaded copyrighted music was qualified by Napster as fair use, but the court rejected 
this argument and the Ninth Circuit noted that, traditionally, “one who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of 
another, may be held liable as a contributory infringer”. The Ninth Circuit found that Napster, 
by its conduct, had both actual and constructive knowledge of direct infringement and had 
knowingly encouraged as well as assisted in the infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright. 
456
 The court accepted constructive knowledge as the ISP’s liability; Religious Technology 
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.Cal.1995). 
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can be an effective knowledge standard, subject to some modifications: these 
are recommended in the final part of this chapter. 
6.2.2 The US Trademark Knowledge Standard  
Regarding the US trademark knowledge standard, the present research has 
found that the InWood knowledge standard for ISPs’ secondary liability for 
trademark infringement protects both parties’ rights because it limits actual 
knowledge of trademark infringement to specific knowledge of individual 
infringement for instance court ruled by Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. case
457
.), and 
it specifies that identifying trademarks and the locations of alleged 
infringements is the duty of the trademark owner (Tiffany v. eBay Inc.,
458
.. In 
addition, the InWood standard is implemented by the US courts rather than 
other tests, such as the tort law standard (using probabilistic knowledge, 
negligence assessment, and the ‘but for’ test). However, the InWood 
knowledge standard and its contemporary judicial interpretations do not 
establish certainty for ISPs and trademark owners in relation to how specific 
knowledge of individual infringement is interpreted. This thus allows 
divergent interpretations on the specific knowledge of individual 
infringement
459
.  
Consequently, in this regard, the current study has concluded that the current 
broad InWood knowledge standard seems appropriate in terms of the type of 
standard but it suffers from legal weaknesses. Its current interpretations do not 
eliminate these weaknesses and do not offer any proper guidance encouraging 
the parties’ cooperation in combatting trademark infringement460.  
                                                          
457
 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D. New York. 2008). 
458
 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) and other cases like Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions Inc. In GMA Accessories Inc. v. Electric Wonderland 
459
 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions Inc.Nos. 10-15909, 10-16105, 2011 US 
App. WL 4014320 (9
th
 Cir. 2011), it admitted name of web as specific information. 
460
 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions IncNos. 10-15909, 10-16105, 2011 US 
App. WL 4014320 (9
th
 Cir. 2011) it admitted name of web as specific information; 
Nomination Di Antonio E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories Ltd, 2010 WL 4968072 
5 (S.D.N.Y) as discussed in chapter III 
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6.2.3 The ECD Knowledge Standard  
Regarding the ECD knowledge standard, which was discussed in Chapters IV 
and V, the findings of the present research have shown that although the ECD 
implements knowledge requirements with safe harbours (Article 12 to 14) and 
by imposing liability on certain types of ISP services (mere conduit, caching, 
and hosting services), its knowledge standard’s limited scope creates barriers 
for other types of ISP services, like information location tools. Furthermore, 
concerning the concept of hosting services, although the ECJ ruled that hosting 
services should be interpreted widely to give ISPs the chance to benefit from 
Article 14, ISP hosting services that offer non-free services are in a difficult 
situation, such as online auctions, Google AdWords, and Web.20
461
.  
Overall, this research has found that the ECD knowledge standard is 
appropriate in terms of the type of knowledge (broad knowledge) and its 
horizontal approach, but it has drawbacks and loopholes in some elements 
which does not shield the ISP form being held liable without knowledge and in 
while at the same time protect other parties right through the takedown or keep 
content or services. Its constructive knowledge (awareness) requirement does 
not focus on right holders’ collaboration with ISPs and does not offer any 
technical test (as chapter IV discussed through the L’Oréal SA v. eBay)462for 
assessing objective knowledge of infringement. It offers a similar approach to 
using probabilistic knowledge to prove ISPs’ objective knowledge of 
infringement (Scarlet v. SABAM
463
, Promusicae v.Telefónica
464
, SABAM v. 
Netlog case
465
). Its constructive knowledge requirement forces ISPs to prevent 
future infringement, which contravenes users’ privacy466. Moreover, based on 
                                                          
461
 See Laffess v. MySpace Share Hoster II and Rapidshare cases in Germany, Google France 
cases. L’Oréal v. eBay Europe as applied in chapter IV. 
462
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 12 July 2011. 
463
 Case C-70/10. Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs 
SCRL (SABAM), 24 November 2011 The Court (Third Chamber),  
464
 Case C-275/06, 29 January 2008 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. 
Telefónica de España SAU <http://eur-lex.europa.eu> accessed 22 September 2012]. 
465
 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v. Netlog 
NV, Judgment of The Court (Third Chamber), 16 February 2012. 
466
 It has been submitted in chapter IV through analyzing the rule of case law ; SARL Zadig 
Productions, Jean-Robert Viallet et Mathieu Verboud v. Ste Google Inc. et AFA, Tribunal de 
Grande Instance de Paris (3d Chambers, 2d Section), decision of 19 October 2007; Seagull 
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the results obtained in this study, using the ‘reasonable man’ test as a criterion 
for evaluating ISPs’ knowledge of infringement seems incompatible with 
ISPs’ functions and can increase the possibility of ISPs being held liable when 
they do not have knowledge of infringement by negligent rule like forcing ISP 
through the constructive knowledge for injunction SABAM v. Netlog case
467
. In 
addition, it was found that the efficiency of the actual knowledge requirement 
in protecting both parties’ rights and in encouraging cooperation between the 
parties is open to question. This is due to the absence of a notice and take-
down regime and the lack of definitions and guidance on interpreting the 
knowledge standard’s elements. In line with this, current case law 
interpretations concerning ISPs’ actual knowledge and constructive knowledge 
suffer from a lack of fixed guidance
468
 for assessing ISPs’ knowledge of 
infringement and ISP encountered with divergence interpretation to participate 
in the European information society service. 
In short, the ECD knowledge standards and their interpretations are inadequate 
to protect ISPs in terms of making them able to offer proper functions in the 
online market by ensuring the free movement of information society services 
between the Member States and addressing the above legal vacuums
469
. The 
divergence of rule and interpretation and approach for cooperation among 
member stated confirm inadequacy of current knowledge standard to achieve 
consistency of national law with the ISP as research submitted in chapter IV 
and V. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Haiyan Song, ‘A Comparative Copyright analysis of ISP Liability in China Versus the United 
States and Europe’ (2010) 27 The Computer & Internet Lawyer 13 .The ECJ, in the above 
cases, did not offer any approach for the ISPs to achieve knowledge to comply with the 
injunctions to balance fundamental rights with protecting copyright and trademarks. 
467
 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v. Netlog 
NV, Judgment of The Court (Third Chamber), 16 February 2012. 
468
 For instance Scarlet v. SABAM Case C-70/10. Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des 
auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 24 November 2011 The Court (Third 
Chamber), does not offered any technical approach. 
469 
ECD, Article 1(1), it worth noting that the ECD aimed to be a leading law that each 
member state has to impose upon its own national law; ‘See also’ treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union, art, 288, 2008 O.J. (115) 74; ‘’a directive shall be binding, as to the result 
to be achieved, upon each member state to which it is addressed but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods’’                                     . 
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6.3 Recommendations 
This research provides the following recommendations for both US copyright 
and trademark law and ECD knowledge standards. 
6.3.1 Recommendations for the US Knowledge Standard for ISPs’ 
Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement (the DMCA)  
a) This research recommends that a special body be established to cooperate 
with ISPs in removing or blocking access to infringing content in an 
inexpensive and fast way (when a notice is not complete and for urgent 
request). Also, this special body could prevent ISPs from being forced to take 
down materials upon receiving notices that are sent in good faith but contain 
mistakes. Besides, special body could decrease ISP risk of being held liable 
without knowledge by providing chance to ISP to take - down based on special 
body conform, which this approach in the same time is in accord with user and 
IP rights holder as well. Furthermore, the special body cost is fewer comperes 
with ISP cost for doing flittering or investigating in (all) numerous numbers of 
data. 
b) It is also recommended that the DMCA be amended in terms of the 
objective element of the ‘red flag’ test, which is currently based on the 
‘reasonable man’ test. This should be changed to use a technical method to 
prevent the courts from focusing on constructive knowledge using the 
‘reasonable man’ test and to encourage copyright owners to participate in 
combatting infringement. In this regard, the current research recommends that 
the law get assistance from computer science to establish a technical approach 
in order to omit human intervention in interpreting apparent infringement or 
awareness of infringement; this would bring the knowledge standard more in 
line with the philosophy of the computer mind and ISPs’ functions. 
Alternatively, the DMCA could codify and establish a special body for 
assessing the ‘red flagging’ of content on the web.  
c) It is recommended that the DMCA provide a reasonable timeframe for a 
subscriber to reply to the ISP’s contact and provide a logical timeframe for 
reverting data, to avoid any abuse. An appropriate time frame could clarify 
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each party’s responsibility regarding the freedom of expression, access on 
online free movement, online mark and other services. For instance, reverting 
an online auction data by 24 hours instead of reverting in14 days has 
remarkable effect on online market and online parties rights to access and 
participate in information in the online society. In line with that, as discussed 
in chapters III and V, there are ambiguities in notice and take-down section 
512 concerning the representative list for notification and expeditiously 
remove or block access. Therefore, to have an effective notice, it is time to 
prevent divergent interpreting (as shown in a number of cases) by providing an 
explicit standard grounded on the technical possibility.  
d) It is recommended to make adherence to the DMCA’s provisions 
compulsory for both parties to encourages parties’ cooperation in the light of 
the notice and take-down system and avoid the implementation of the tort law 
knowledge standard with vary interpretations (tort copyright case law). 
Furthermore, by considering the impact of tendency of courts to apply the 
single knowledge standard (constructive knowledge) on effectiveness of s.512 
knowledge standards, as addressed in chapters III and V, the current 
researchers recommend the application of broad knowledge for imposing 
secondary liability to ISP be compulsory.   
6.3.2 Recommendations for the US Knowledge Standard for ISPs’ 
Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement  
a) This research recommends that the Lanham Act codify the InWood standard 
for ISPs’ secondary liability for trademark infringement to make it more 
certain and principled in evaluating ISPs’ knowledge. 
b) By considering the flaws of the current knowledge standard, this study 
recommends that a notice and take-down regime be added to the Lanham Act 
to tackle the possibility of interpreting ISPs’ knowledge differently and 
encourage parties to participate on combatting trademark infringement. It 
should specify when and how knowledge of infringement exists to avoid 
confusion for ISPs.  
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6.3.3 Recommendation for an Alternative to the US Knowledge Standards 
for Both Copyright and Trademark Infringement   
This research recommends an alternative to the US knowledge standards for 
both trademark and copyright infringement: take advantage of the horizontal 
approach of the ECD and apply it, including specifying notice and take-down 
procedures. 
6.3.4 Recommendations for the ECD Knowledge Standard for ISPs’ 
Secondary Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement  
a) The current research recommends that the ECD focus on realism in 
secondary liability rather than formalism to move from the legal focus on the 
liabilities of ISPs towards the parties’ responsibilities by providing appropriate 
notice and take-down procedures with specific elements (format, detailed 
internet address, opportunity for provider to explain its reason behind the 
technical claim, put back with reasonable time frame, statement and reasonable 
information for identification of copyright and trademark infringement and  
other elements). In this regard, it is suggested that ECD implement the 
DMCA’s notice and takedown (after applying the recommended amendments 
to DMCA like Special body) to deal with the roles of ISPs and parties' rights. 
It is worth noting that the cost of assistance of the special body to ISPs when 
they need assistance to assess and attend to a notice and other factors for 
preventing copyright and trademark infringement is lesser than the cost of an 
ISP investigating and examining all network data. Moreover, compelling the 
ISP industry to monitor their network to protect copyright or trademark 
discourages users from using the ISP services. This further imposes massive 
expenses on ISP business targets and other invisible costs.  
b) In line with the above recommendations, this research recommends that 
Article 14-3, which permits Member States to establish their own notice and 
take-down regimes, be revised to force Member States to implement a standard 
notice and take-down regime in their national laws, preventing Member States 
from implementing their different existing laws to provide a consistency in EU 
members concerning the ISP knowledge standard.  
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c) For implementation of an injunction (article15) by ISPs to prevent 
upcoming infringements, it is suggested that its implementation be subject to 
the ISP receiving a complete notice from the right holder to prevent ISP from 
being forced to apply injunction via probabilistic knowledge or through 
breaching other parties' rights. 
6.4 Final Remarks 
By considering the differences between the processing of knowledge in human 
minds and ISPs, it appears that an ISP’s ability to assess indirect infringement 
depends on the capability and ambit of the ISP’s algorithms, unlike the human 
mind. Therefore, it is time to implement instrumentalism in designing broad 
knowledge standards for ISPs. In this regard, it is recommended that the US 
and EU knowledge standards focus on the role of the ISP and the philosophy 
of computer knowledge in order to enhance the parties’ cooperation (by 
implementing notice and take-down procedures) and limited wide application 
of negligence based on the human mind test. Consequently, the parties could 
combat intellectual property right infringement and develop their industries 
and public interest. 
6.5 Future Research Avenues  
The knowledge standards for imposing secondary liability have been 
considered by a few studies in accordance with the research knowledge. The 
current study is one of the first to investigate them from a law perspective. 
Therefore, there is a need for more research in different fields of law and 
technology, as well as a need for the literature to fill the gap relating to ISPs’ 
knowledge standards to preserve the co-existence and cooperation of all parties 
on the internet.  
6.6 Contributions to Knowledge  
The first contribution of this study is that it can assist in filling the gap in the 
literature concerning current knowledge standards in the US and the EU from a 
law perspective. The second contribution is that it suggests reforms to the 
current knowledge standards to align them with realism and the nature and role 
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of ISPs in practice. The final contribution is that the given recommendations 
protect the parties’ rights due to the application of broad knowledge standards 
with relevant and appropriate legal mechanisms like notice and take-down 
procedure which lead to responsibility of all parties to cooperate rather 
focusing on ISP liability. 
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